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Abstract
Masking is the central topic of this thesis based on publications. Masking is a
technique that allows the secure execution of cryptographic algorithms in untrusted
environments. More concretely, masking provides security guarantees even if an
adversary observes side-channel leakage.
We first propose a methodology to attack masked implementations more quickly.
Our method is relevant in practice since it allows to carry out attacks that before
took months in days. The proposed method first locates the relevant time samples
for an attack and then only attacks those. For this purpose we rely on versatile
information-theoretic tools.
The second selected paper in this thesis deals with Di erential Power Analysis,
masking and bit-slicing at very high clock speeds, such as those typically found
in today’s smartphones and personal electronic devices. We present an attack on
an ARM Cortex-A8 running at 1 GHz, and then apply the principles of gate-level
masking to develop a DPA-resistant bit-sliced AES implementation.
In our third selected paper, we propose a new masking strategy for a post-quantum
public-key algorithm: ring-LWE. Our solution is essentially arithmetic masking
with a bespoke probabilistic decoder. Our approach fits in a standard FPGA and
incurs manageable performance overheads.
We explain in our fourth paper similarities and di erences between theoretical and
practical instances of masking schemes. These observations allow us to break some
masking schemes proposed in literature and transfer attractive features from one
scheme to another.
To conclude, in the fifth paper we describe a simple, yet powerful tool to detect
flaws in masking schemes. Sound masking schemes can be surprisingly di cult to
design (especially if they provide higher-order security guarantees); our tool assists
the design process of a masking scheme by assessing the soundness of a masking
scheme at the algorithmic level before implementing it on an actual device.
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iv ABSTRACT
Samenvatting
Het centraal onderwerp van deze publicatie-gebaseerde thesis is maskering.
Maskering is een techniek die het veilig uitvoeren van cryptografische algoritmes in
onbetrouwbare omgevingen verzekert. Meer bepaald, masking verzekert beveiliging
zelfs wanneer een tegenstander zijkanaal-informatie ontvangt.
Eerst stellen we een methode voor om gemaskeerde implementaties sneller aan
te vallen. Aanvallen die eerder maanden lang duurden, nemen nu maar dagen
in beslag. De voorgestelde methode zoekt enkel de tijdsmonsters die relevant
zijn voor een aanval, en valt enkel die aan. Hiervoor gebruiken we veelzijdige
informatie-theoretische instrumenten.
Het tweede geselecteerde artikel in deze thesis gaat over DPA, maskering en “bit-
slicing” bij zeer hoge klokfrequenties, zoals typisch gevonden in smartphones en
persoonlijke elektronische toestellen. We presenteren een aanval op een ARM
Cortex-A8 op 1 GHz, en dan passen we “gate-level” maskeringsprincipes toe om
een “bit-sliced” AES implementation te ontwikkelen die bestand is tegen DPA.
In ons derde geselecteerde artikel, introduceren we een nieuwe maskeringsmethode
voor ring-LWE, een post-quantum publieke-sleutel algoritme. Onze oplossing is
rekenkundige maskering met een op maat gemaakte probabilistische decodeerder.
Onze aanpak past in een standaard FPGA en is e ciënt.
In ons vierde artikel leggen we de gelijkenissen en verschillen tussen theoretische en
praktische instantiaties van maskeringsschema’s. Met deze observaties breken we
sommige voorstellen en kunnen we aantrekkelijke eigenschappen van één schema
naar een ander overbrengen.
In de laatste paper beschrijven we een simpel, maar krachtig instrument om fouten
in maskeringsschema’s te detecteren. Goede maskeringsschema’s kunnen moeilijk
te ontwerpen zijn (vooral als ze hogere-orde beveiliging garanderen); ons instrument
helpt het ontwerpprocess door de kwaliteit van een maskeringsschema te meten op
algoritmisch niveau vóór implementatie op een toestel.
v
vi SAMENVATTING
Contents
Preface i
Abstract iii
Samenvatting v
Contents vii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvii
List of Abbreviations xix
I Analysis and Design of Masking Schemes for Secure
Cryptographic Implementations 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 A brief history of cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 A brief history of side-channel attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 TEMPEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Compromising emanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Timing attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Power analysis attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.1 Acquisition of power traces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.2 Simple power analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.3 Di erential power analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.4 A peek at the leakage causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6 Other countermeasures against side-channel analysis . . . . . . . . 11
1.7 Outlook for the rest of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
vii
viii CONTENTS
2 Design of masking schemes 15
2.1 What is a masking scheme? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 A simple example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Construction of linear operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Generic first-order masking constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1 Masked tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.2 Gate-level masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.3 Threshold implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Particular masking constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.1 Particular constructions for AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5.2 Particular constructions for DES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.3 Particular constructions for RSA and DH . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.4 Particular constructions for ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.5 Particular constructions for ring-LWE . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6 Higher-order masking constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6.1 Higher-order masked tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6.2 ISW-derived constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6.3 Higher-order threshold implementations . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.7 Theoretic considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7.1 Secret sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7.2 Connections with multi-party computation. . . . . . . . . . 32
2.8 My contributions in this context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.8.1 DPA, masking and bitslicing at 1 GHz . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.8.2 A masked ring-LWE implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.8.3 Additively homomorphic ring-LWE masking . . . . . . . . . 35
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Analysis of masking schemes 37
3.1 Attacks on masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.1 First-order attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.2 Second-order attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1.3 Biasing the masks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Evaluating masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.1 Leakage detection tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Complications of masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.1 Glitches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.2 Distance issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Theoretic considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5.1 Probing model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5.2 Noisy leakage model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5.3 Connections between them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5.4 On provable security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 My contributions in this context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
CONTENTS ix
3.6.1 Selecting time samples for multivariate DPA attacks . . . . 46
3.6.2 Consolidating masking schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.6.3 Detecting flawed masking schemes with leakage detection tests 47
4 Conclusion and future work 49
Bibliography 51
II Publications 65
List of Publications 67
Selecting time samples for multivariate DPA attacks 71
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.2 Masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.3 Multivariate attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3 Identifying interesting tuples of time samples . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.1 Core idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 Suggested workflow for multivariate attacks . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3 Which tuples of time samples pop up? . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1 E ciency analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 On the S-box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Additional applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Estimation of mutual information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5 Key recovery step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.1 Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2 Selection of a time window: step 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.3 Computation of the method: step 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4 Performance evaluation of step 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.5 Practical attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.6 Computational e ciency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
DPA, masking and bitslicing at 1 GHz 97
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
1.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2 A bitsliced AES implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
x CONTENTS
3 Developing an attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.1 Strategies for side-channel measurements . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.2 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.3 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.4 Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4 Masking a bitsliced AES implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5 Evaluation of masked implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.1 Attack when RNG is o  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Attack when RNG is on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A masked ring-LWE implementation 123
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3 High-level overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4 Masked decoder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.1 Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2 Masked table lookup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5 Implementation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.1 Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2 Cycle count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.3 Comparison with an elliptic-curve cryptosystem . . . . . . . 134
5.4 Trade-o s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.5 Maximum frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.1 Error rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2 Comparison with other decoding strategies . . . . . . . . . 137
6.3 Post-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4 Extension to higher-order security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.1 PRNG o  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.2 PRNG on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.3 Second-order attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.4 Horizontal DPA attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
9 Optimal values of  i for q = 7681 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
10 Attack on half-masked variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Consolidating masking schemes 151
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
1.1 Related works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
1.2 Our contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
CONTENTS xi
2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3 Conciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.1 From ISW to TI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.2 From ISW to the Trichina AND-gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.3 Generalizing and inducing a structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.4 Security arguments for generalized scheme . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.5 Wrapping up. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4 What can go wrong? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.1 Higher-order TI is not so higher-order secure . . . . . . . . 166
4.2 ISW and Trichina in the presence of glitches . . . . . . . . 168
5 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.1 Using d+ 1 input shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.2 Resistance against distance leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7 First-order Masking of Quadratic 4-bit Permutations with d+1 Shares177
7.1 Class Q44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.2 Class Q412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.3 Class Q4293 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.4 Class Q4294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
7.5 Class Q4299 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.6 Class Q4300 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Detecting flawed masking schemes with leakage detection tests 183
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
2 Leakage detection for masked schemes in simulation . . . . . . . . 186
2.1 Trace generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
2.2 Trace pre-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
2.3 Leakage detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
2.4 Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
3.1 Smoke test: reproducing a first-order flaw . . . . . . . . . . 191
3.2 A first-order secure implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
3.3 Reproducing a second-order flaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
3.4 Reproducing a third order flaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
3.5 Schramm–Paar second-order leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
3.6 Higher-order threshold implementations . . . . . . . . . . . 196
3.7 Refreshing in higher-order threshold AES sbox . . . . . . . 197
4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.1 Implementing the framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.2 Time to discover flaw, computational complexity and scaling. 198
4.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.4 Related works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.5 Which leakage function to select? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
xii CONTENTS
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Curriculum Vitae 209
List of Figures
I Analysis and Design of Masking Schemes for Secure
Cryptographic Implementations 1
1.1 Map of representative publications included in this thesis. . . . . . 14
2.1 Left: an unmasked circuit. Center: a masked circuit. Right: an
unbalanced masked circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Left: the linear operation to be masked. The input x is split into
two shares x1 and x2. The output y is also split into two shares
y1, y2. If the function L is linear, the output can be computed as
simply yi = L(xi). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Masked AND as per Trichina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Masked MUX as per Motorola. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 The four possible signal paths in the Motorola MUX construction. 22
2.6 ISW secure AND (secure against single probe). . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 ISW algorithm in pseudo-code for an AND gate. . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8 Intermediate state of the ISW computation for s = 3. . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Thought experiment for leakage detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
II Publications 65
Selecting time samples for multivariate DPA attacks 71
1 Left: Matrix of Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)) values. The color bar is in units
of bits. A mean trace is plotted next to the axes. Right: Above
diagonal, ‘x’: 100 pairs of time samples where a multivariate MIA
attack succeeds. Below diagonal, ‘+’: 100 top ranked pairs in the
list of step 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
xiii
xiv LIST OF FIGURES
2 Distribution of the ranking of the first good pair in the list of step 2.
Left to right: MIA S-box output, CPA S-box output, CPA S-box
input, hypothetical random method. 100 good pairs. . . . . . . . . 89
3 Distribution of the ranking of the first good pair in the list of step 2.
Left to right: MIA S-box output, CPA S-box output, CPA S-box
input, hypothetical random method. S sets containing 290 pairs. 90
DPA, masking and bitslicing at 1 GHz 97
1 AES S-Box representation due to Canright. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2 Layout of bitsliced AES registers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3 Photo of our setup (left) and EM antenna schematic (right). . . . . 107
4 Overview measurement of our unprotected AES. . . . . . . . . . . 108
5 Overview measurement of our unprotected AES. . . . . . . . . . . 109
6 Measurement of our unprotected AES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7 One of the first measurements of our unprotected AES. . . . . . . 111
8 Single-sided amplitude spectrum of a measurement. . . . . . . . . . 112
9 Result of attack against unprotected implementation. . . . . . . . . 113
10 Left: Trichina construction for the masked AND gate. Right:
pseudocode for the SAND operation following the Trichina AND
construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
11 Result of attack against masked implementation with RNG o . . . 115
12 Results of first-order attacks against masked implementation with
RNG on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
13 Result of second-order attacks against masked implementation with
RNG on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A masked ring-LWE implementation 123
1 General data flow of the masked ring-LWE decryption. rÕ and rÕÕ
are the arithmetic shares of the private key r; c1 and c2 are the
input unmasked ciphertext; mÕ and mÕÕ are the Boolean shares of
the recovered plaintext. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
2 Idea for the masked decoder. Elements in Zq are shown in a circle.
Adding two elements translates into adding their respective angles.
Left: case 0 < aÕ < q/4, q/4 < aÕÕ < q/2, and therefore th(a) = 1.
Center and right: case 0 < aÕ < q/4, 0 < aÕÕ < q/4, which does not
allow to infer th(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3 The masked decoder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4 Left: empirical success distribution for the masked decoder. Right:
Distribution of a when plaintext is 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5 Global error rates with the probabilistic decoder. . . . . . . . . . . 137
6 Evolution of the ratio pg/pbaseline as the number of iterations N grows.137
LIST OF FIGURES xv
7 PRNG o . On top, black, one power consumption trace. The
di erent computational stages can be distinguished: first branch,
second branch and decoding. Next, in blue, the correlation trace for
the value rÕ[0] · c1[0] + c2[0]. The correlation achieves a maximum
value of ﬂ = 0.25. Below, in red, correlation for rÕÕ · c1 (max ﬂ ¥ 0.3);
in green: correlation for the input of the masked decoder aÕ[0]. At
the bottom: correlation with one message bit mÕ[0]. . . . . . . . . 147
8 PRNG o . Evolution of the correlation coe cient as the number of
traces increases for the intermediates rÕ[0] · c1[0] + c2[0] (left) and
rÕÕ[0] · c1[0] (right). Correct subkey guess in red, all other guesses
in green. A 99.99 % confidence interval for ﬂ = 0 is plotted in
black discontinuous line. We can see that starting from hundred
measurements the attacks are successful. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
9 Analogous to Figure 8, but with PRNG on. The correct subkey is
no longer identifiable. This is expected and means that the masking
is e ective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
10 Correlation traces for intermediates within the shared decoder. On
top, a power measurement trace showing the last 15 decodings.
Below, correlation traces. The first two (masks and masked values)
assume that the adversary knows the masks. The third one, in
light blue, is a first-order attack without knowing the attack, and is
unsuccessful. In contrast, the second-order attack against the same
intermediate is successful, as the traces in magenta and yellow show. 148
11 Left: correlation as the number of traces increases for the first-order
attack (PRNG on), around clock cycle 7560. Right: correlation for
the second-order attack with masks on. The attack begins to be
successful with 2 000 measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
12 Crosscorrelation trace. The x and y axes represent time, flowing
from the upper left hand side corner to the lower right. The entire
figure spans 7500 cycles (as Figure 7). It is possible to distinguish
the two branch computations (including its components) and the
decoding. Colors enhanced to improve contrast. . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Consolidating masking schemes 151
1 Exemplary circuit to aid the explanation of the adversarial model
adopted in this paper. Fi and G are combinational logic blocks, regi
are register stages and fi and g are wires that compute the Fi (resp.
G) functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2 ISW algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3 Intermediate state of the ISW computation for s = 3. . . . . . . . 157
4 Original ISW scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5 After first transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6 Before second transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7 After second transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
8 ISW with s = 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9 Trichina AND gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
10 First-order secure (s = 3) after transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . 162
11 Second-order secure (s = 5) after transformation. . . . . . . . . . . 162
12 Diagram of the shared version of the mini-cipher. . . . . . . . . . . 167
Detecting flawed masking schemes with leakage detection tests 183
1 T-statistic (absolute values) of the IP masking scheme, under a HW
leakage model. Deemed insecure (clearly exceeds the threshold at
t = 4.5.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
2 T-statistic (absolute values) applied to the Coron table recomputa-
tion masking scheme, under an Identity leakage model. First order
test. Deemed secure (no value beyond the threshold at t = 4.5.) . . 191
3 Excerpts of the code and output of the leakage detection for the RP
scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4 Two MaskRefresh concatenated. As explained in the text, the second
refresh can be optimized to reduce the randomness requirements yet
still achieving second order security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
5 Pairs of rounds with |t| > 80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6 Pairs of rounds with |t| > 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
7 Higher-order masked AES sbox from de Cnudde et al. . . . . . . . 198
8 Running time to discover flaw in the studied schemes, and number
of traces needed to detect the bias. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
9 Influence of leakage function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
List of Tables
I Analysis and Design of Masking Schemes for Secure
Cryptographic Implementations 1
II Publications 65
Selecting time samples for multivariate DPA attacks 71
1 Running time of MIA attacks using the proposed and the “classical”
workflow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2 Success rates for steps 2 and 3 together, for several parameters:
number of traces, size “ of the list of step 2, key recovery attack. . 91
3 Empirical execution times for steps 2 and 3 (“ = 100) of the proposed
workflow and several attacks using exhaustive search. . . . . . . . . 92
DPA, masking and bitslicing at 1 GHz 97
A masked ring-LWE implementation 123
1 Performance and Comparison on Xilinx Virtex-II xc2vp7 FPGA. . 134
Consolidating masking schemes 151
Detecting flawed masking schemes with leakage detection tests 183
xvii
xviii LIST OF TABLES
List of Abbreviations xix
List of Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BGW Ben-Or–Goldwasser–Wigderson
BSI Bundesamt f¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CMOS Complementary metal-oxide semiconductor
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Di e–Hellman
DPA Di erential power analysis
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DSS Digital Signature Standard
DUT Device under test
EM Electromagnetic
EMV Europay MasterCard and Visa
FPGA Field-programmable gate array
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
ISW Ishai–Sahai–Wagner
LSB Least significant bit
MAC Message authentication code
MD Merkle–Damgård
NSA National Security Agency
RAM Random-access memory
RNG Random number generator
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA Simple power analysis
xx List of Abbreviations
Part I
Analysis and Design of
Masking Schemes for Secure
Cryptographic
Implementations
1
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we provide a brief introduction to side-channel attacks. The central
topic of this dissertation is masking, which is a countermeasure against side-channel
attacks. We omit preliminary concepts from cryptography.
1.1 A brief history of cryptography
Pre-electronic cryptography. Cryptography (Greek for “hidden, secret writing”)
is mostly about secrets. People have been using codes to prevent unauthorized
access to information since the 20th century BC. The techniques have been evolving
ever since. Until World War I, cryptography was mainly a manual craft work. Its
use was generally restricted to military circles, spies and diplomats.
Contemporary cryptography. After the advent of computers, cryptography saw
a significant progress as a scientific discipline and progressively became of civilian
use. Today we use cryptography every day to protect our communications by
phone, and our electronic transactions for commercial and banking purposes.
Breaking cryptography. Parallel to cryptography is the development of crypt-
analysis: the discipline of analyzing and breaking codes. Cryptanalysis comes in
two flavors: traditional black-box cryptanalysis and implementation attacks.
Cryptanalysis. Traditional cryptanalysis refers to mathematical breaks. The
common denominator of these attacks is that they abstract away from the concrete
implementation details. The only information these techniques employ is the
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input/output texts from the encryption process. That is, these techniques treat
the encryption process as a black box.
Modern cryptography is mature enough so that cryptanalytic attacks against
judiciously-chosen cryptographic primitives and protocols are expected to be
extremely hard, requiring a significant breakthrough of publicly available
cryptanalytical techniques, even when the adversary has access to large
computational resources.1
Implementation and side-channel attacks. In contrast to purely cryptanalytical
techniques, implementation attacks, and more concretely side-channel attacks,
consider additional information from the encryption process to break security.
Side-channel attacks consider the encryption process as a gray box: the analyst
can exploit additional information, such as any physical observable.
Let us use an analogy to explain this di erence further. A combination lock can be
broken by just trying all possible combinations. This process is expensive. However,
if we consider the additional acoustic information obtained with a stethoscope, a
skilled locksmith can substantially accelerate the process of guessing the correct
combination, by using a divide-and-conquer strategy.
Similarly, by observing the instantaneous power consumption of a modern chip
that performs some cryptographic operation, the analyst is able to recover the
secrets inside the chip.
The advantage of side-channel attacks is that they often provide a significant
speedup compared to a cryptanalytical attack, bringing down the complexity of
mounting such attacks to the practical realm. In addition, side-channel attacks are
often orthogonal to the intrinsic mathematical strength of the algorithm.
Active vs. passive side-channel attacks. This thesis deals with a class of passive
side-channel attacks, namely power analysis attacks. Passive side-channel attacks,
in contrast to active side-channel attacks, do not disrupt the natural working
procedure of a cryptographical operation. Active side-channel attacks insert faults
during the computation and are outside of the scope of this thesis.
References. A detailed treatment of the historical aspects of cryptography is
outside of the scope of this thesis. A comprehensive study on the history of
cryptography can be found in the monograph of Kahn [Kah96]. Ross Anderson’s
excellent encyclopedic work [And08] is also of historical interest. An extensive
and exhaustive reference for modern cryptography is the Handbook of Applied
Cryptography by Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [MvOV96].
1This situation will change whenever the adversary has access to a quantum computer, but
such a computer has not been publicly built yet. In Section 2.8.2 we elaborate on this.
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1.2 A brief history of side-channel attacks.
In this section we give some historical examples of side-channel attacks.
1.2.1 TEMPEST
TEMPEST refers to a series of NSA and NATO standards that regulate
electromagnetic emissions and their exploitation to recover intelligible information.
This section is based on the following two sources from the NSA. Boak’s “A history
of U.S. communication security” [Boa73] bundles a series of lectures aimed at
interns and other employees from the NSA given in 1966. It was revised in 1973
and declassified in 2008. The 1972 NSA report [Fri72] was written by Je rey
Friedman and later declassified in 2007.
Initial discovery. The U.S. Army and Navy were using secure teletypewriter
communications during WWII. The encryption machine was the Bell-telephone
mixing device 131-B2. Friedman claims that in 1943, in the midst of the war,
engineers from Bell Telephone were testing the 131-B2 when they realized that each
time the machine was actioned, a spike popped up in an oscilloscope in a remote
place in the lab. Further explorations revealed that it was possible to recover
the plaintext being encrypted by the machine using the remote oscilloscope. The
engineers set up a demonstration for military o cials to prove that this e ect was
exploitable in the field. They were placed in a building in Varick Street, downtown
New York; about 25 meters across the street was a Signal Corps’ cryptocenter.
After 1 hour of data capture and 3 hours of analysis, they could recover 75% of
the plaintext data that was processed.
Countermeasures. Bell Labs subsequently was appointed to study this
phenomenon and possible countermeasures. They identified three di erent sources
and three di erent countermeasures:
1. Radiation through space and magnetic fields. The protection suggested is
shielding.
2. Conducted signals on power or signal lines. The countermeasure hinted is
filtering on the lines.
3. Space-radiated or conducted signals. The fix proposed is masking. In this
context, “masking” according to Boak is “deliberately creating a lot of ambient
electrical noise to override, jam, smear out or otherwise hide the o ending
signals.”
Bell Labs reconditioned the 131-B2 mixer adding shielding and filtering to minimize
information leakage over compromising emanations. E ective shielding and filtering
proved to be challenging: Friedman notes that the compromising emanations span
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over a very large portion of the frequency spectrum, “from DC all the way up to
GHz range,” and the leaking behavior changed from mixer to mixer. Even the
same machinery exhibited di erent behavior in di erent enviromental conditions.
Thus, the shielding had to be e ective against a wide range of signals.
The modifications to the 131-B2 did not come for free: as Friedman tells “the
modifications caused problems of heat dissipation, made maintenance extremely
di cult, and hampered operations by limiting access to the various controls.”
Interestingly, none of the countermeasures was actually deployed in the field;
instead o cers were instructed to prevent covert interception by “controlling a
zone about 100 feet in diameter around their communications center.”
Friedman also claims that the story was rediscovered by the CIA later in 1951
while inspecting the same device 131-B2.
1.2.2 Compromising emanations
Electromagnetic compromising emanations. For an overview of the historical
background of electromagnetic compromising emanations, we refer to the PhD
thesis of Markus Kuhn [Kuh03].
van Eck radiation. Although the risk of electromagnetic compromising
emanations had been mentioned before (Kuhn traces it back to 1966), Wim
van Eck was the first to publicly present a proof-of-concept of eavesdropping a
CRT display via electromagnetic compromising emanations in 1985 [vE85]. van
Eck found that CRT displays emit EM fields in the UHF frequency range and
reconstructed the image shown on the screen. He concludes that this exploitation
may be possible for distances up to 1 km. The equipment van Eck uses is very
simple and consists of a modified TV. van Eck proposes several solutions to mitigate
this issue:
1. decrease the signal level
2. increase the noise level
3. randomize the sequence in which the image is drawn on screen.
It is interesting to note that, broadly speaking, these are essentially the same
countermeasures that are used in other fields of emission security, such as side-
channel protections.
Kuhn EM compromising emanations. Kuhn presents a more detailed study
of EM compromising emanations, describing a di erent experimental set-up than
that of van Eck, and discusses possible countermeasures. Kuhn also extends the
work to LCD screens.
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Optical compromising emanations. Kuhn reported in 2002 [Kuh02] reading
CRT displays at a distance by picking-up the intensity of light emitted by the
display, even after di use reflections on a wall. The process is not straightforward
and requires deconvolution. Kuhn presents experiments reading the content of a
screen placed at a meter from a white wall using a PIN photodiode with no direct
line-of-sight between them.
Loughry and Umphress showed in 2002 [LU02] that inconspicuous LED status
indicators from data communication equipment, including encryption boxes, can
emit optical signals that are correlated with the data being handled. The working
principle of this phenomenon is very simple: since the LED is normally controlled
by the same logic that performs some operation on the data, there is a direct
information path flowing from the serial data being handled to the optical output
of the LED. The information is typically modulated in optical amplitude, and
contrary to electromagnetic compromising emanations, can be picked up with
relatively simple equipment. Loughry and Umphress report picking up data from
modems, LAN NICs, IP routers, storage devices and others from a distance of
20 m with ease.
1.3 Timing attacks
Side-channel attacks were introduced by Paul C. Kocher at CRYPTO 1996 [Koc96].
The core idea of the paper is that by measuring the time a cryptographic
implementation takes to execute, an adversary can recover the secrets involved
in the computation. Kocher presents key-recovery attacks on implementations of
RSA, DH, DSS and other algorithms.
The preconditions for the attack are the following. Suppose the operation is
a modular exponentiation with known base and secret exponent. Assume the
modular exponentiation is implemented as a sequence of modular multiplications
and squarings. The sequence of operations depends on the secret exponent. In
addition, it is reasonable to assume that the modular multiplication takes di erent
time for di erent inputs.
The attack works as follows. The attacker collects enough measurements of the
execution time for the exponentiation. Suppose the implementation handles first
the LSB bit of the secret exponent b0. The attacker can model somehow the
execution time based on the known inputs and a guess for b0. This predictions are
contrasted with the measurements, and if they match the guess is deemed correct,
and the attack continues in a divide-and-conquer fashion against the next secret
bit b1 carrying over the information learned on b0.
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Historical notes. Bernstein traces back timing attacks to attacks on the TENEX
operating system password check routine [Ber04] from the 1970s. This routine
compared the user-provided password against the stored password on a character
by character basis, aborting the process whenever the two strings di er. Thus, an
attacker who observes the time it takes to compare the two strings can infer the
point at which both strings di er, and easily use this fact to progressively guess
the password.
1.4 Power analysis attacks
Power analysis attacks were introduced by Paul C. Kocher, Joshua M. Ja e
and Benjamin C. Jun in a technical report in 1998 [KJJ98c] and later at the
CRYPTO 1999 conference [KJJ99]. This is a landmark paper, introducing a whole
new area of research and having a significant impact on the industry.
Power analysis inspects the instantaneous power consumption to find cryptographic
keys from embedded devices. Contrary to other more invasive approaches, power
analysis can be easy to implement if no countermeasures are present, does not
require expensive equipment and the cost per device is low, that is, the attack
scales economically.
1.4.1 Acquisition of power traces
It is hard to give a general methodology for acquiring power traces. Each device
has its own particularities. We describe here the basic method.
Canonical method. A traditional method is to insert a shunt resistor in the
ground path and measure with a digital oscilloscope the voltage drop over the
resistor. This voltage is related to the instantaneous power consumed by the device
under test (DUT). The resistor value is typically low enough to prevent DUT
under-voltage.
A triggering mechanism is needed to start capturing while the device is performing
the cryptographic operation. The sampling frequency depends on many factors,
including the DUT running frequency. The sampling frequency is normally in the
range of hundreds of MS/s to a few GS/s.
Instantaneous power or EM. There are many magnitudes that are related to the
instantaneous power consumption, and that can be used instead to perform power
analysis attacks. The most common is the electromagnetic (EM) radiation. There
are many points to pick up EM radiation suitable for power analysis: either in the
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vicinity of the silicon die that is performing the crypto to any component in the
power supply line (such as decoupling capacitors). The advantage of EM analysis
is that it requires almost no modifications to the DUT; the disadvantage is that
it is typically more complex to carry out since more variables, such as the probe
location and orientation, should be taken into consideration.
1.4.2 Simple power analysis
Simple power analysis (SPA) encompasses a wide range of analysis techniques. They
typically analyze one or a few traces, and inspect patterns therein. If successful,
SPA can completely break a cryptographic implementation using very few traces.
SPA attacks are highly dependent on the exact details of the implementation.
Hence, they are often everything but simple, despite their name. The canonical
examples are mainly in the domain of public-key implementations but secret-key
implementations can also be vulnerable.
A naive example. Say a device is performing an RSA signing operation. This
operation essentially raises a public input m to a private exponent d to produce
the signature md (mod N). If the exponentiation uses a naive square-and-multiply
algorithm, then the sequence of performed square and multiply operations reveals
the secret exponent d. This sequence of operations may be distinguishable in the
power trace (say they are di erent code routines), and thus may be susceptible to
a SPA attack.
1.4.3 Di erential power analysis
Di erential power analysis (DPA) typically analyzes up to hundreds or millions
of traces to recover cryptographic secrets. DPA exploits the fact that the power
consumption is correlated with the data value being handled by the device.
DPA works by first modeling the power consumption when the device is handling
a concrete intermediate value. This modeling involves a guess of a key portion.
Then, the di erent key-dependent models are compared against measurements.
The key guess that leads to a better fit is deemed as the correct key candidate.
DPA has many attractive properties: it is resilient to noise (the success rate can
be amplified by using more traces) and does not require extensive computational
resources.
There are many variations on SPA and DPA. A very popular variant is Correlation
Power Analysis [BCO04]. One can consider profiled variants where the adversary
can perform a prior profiling with a study device under his control. These are called
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Template Attacks and were introduced at CHES 2002 by Suresh Chari, Josyula
R. Rao and Pankaj Rohatgi [CRR02]. Another variant is collision attacks. They
detect internal collisions during the executions to recover key material, and the
idea is due to Hans Dobbertin as Kai Schramm, Thomas Wollinger and Christof
Paar explained at FSE 2013 [SWP03].
1.4.4 A peek at the leakage causes
In this thesis we abstract away from the causes and work assuming that the power
consumption is somehow correlated with the data being handled by the device.
(Often, we do not even know what the precise relation is.) However, it is useful to
present the root causes of the data-dependent power consumption in static CMOS,
a very common logic style.
Three contributions. There are three main components in the power consumption
of CMOS circuits [Rab96]. They can be categorized into either static or dynamic
power consumption.
The static power consumption in CMOS is very low. It is caused by the leakage
current of transistors. Traditionally it has been neglected for side-channel analysis
purposes, but for forthcoming technologies it may bring interesting results, since
static power consumption increases as technology scales down.
The dynamic power consumption is more often exploited in side-channel analysis.
There are two components of dynamic power consumption: due to switching current
and short-circuit current.
• Switching current is due to the process of charging and discharging the
capacitance of internal nodes of a CMOS circuit. This current depends on
the internal parasitic node capacitance (mostly gate and wire capacitance).
Long buses, for example, exhibit large capacitance, requiring large amounts
of current to charge or discharge.
• Short-circuit current is due to a current path from power line to ground while
both nMOS and pMOS transistors are on. This only occurs for a very short
time and can be minimized if rise and fall times are kept low.
Thus, dynamic power consumption depends on the data handled in the circuit.
1.5 Masking
Masking is a countermeasure against power analysis attacks. Masking decouples
the processed values by the device from the intermediate values of a cryptographic
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algorithm. It does so by probabilistically splitting each bit of the original
computation into several shares, so that each of the shares considered individually
does not yield any information on the original, native bit. A crucial aspect is that
computation is carried out by handling shares only, without reconstructing the
original, native bit.
The IBM research proposal. At the same conference where SPA and DPA was
introduced, a team from the IBM Thomas J. Watson research center published a
“sound countermeasure” against power analysis attacks, namely masking [CJRR99].
Suresh Chari, Charanjit S. Jutla, Josyula R. Rao and Pankaj Rohatgi propose a
masked encoding of each original bit b into k shares
bü r1, r2, . . . , rk≠1, r1 ü · · ·ü rk≠1 (1.1)
where each ri is a random iid bit.
Furthermore, they provide a formal security proof arguing that this probabilistic
encoding makes power analysis attacks more di cult in terms of traces needed.
More precisely, the main result is that an adversary willing to distinguish between
two leakage distributions of masked bits b = 0 and b = 1 needs exponentially more
traces as ‡2k, where ‡ is the noise level and k the masking order. This proof is
given in the noisy leakage model (cf. page 45) and is valid asymptotically.
The duplication method. A similar concept of masking was introduced at CHES
1999 by Goubin and Patarin with the name “the duplication method” [GP99]. Hence,
masking is often credited to both the IBM team and Goubin and Patarin. Goubin
and Patarin give practical constructions for computing DES and RSA. For DES
they give essentially a table-based approach to compute the non-linear functions,
and provide some optimizations to reduce RAM usage. (The optimizations were
found later to be slightly flawed, see for example the 2007 article of Fumaroli,
Mayer and Dubois [FMD07].)
1.6 Other countermeasures against side-channel anal-
ysis
Filters. An obvious approach to mitigate power analysis attacks is to attenuate
the fluctuations in the power consumption by introducing analog filters in the
power line of the device. This requires analog circuitry, and normally attenuates,
but does not completely eliminate, exploitable leakage. Hence, it is rarely used as
the sole countermeasure. Note that this countermeasure is easily circumvented by
EM analysis. A related, ingenuous approach based on capacitors has been patented
by Shamir [Sha99].
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Adding noise. Another natural countermeasure to side-channel analysis is to add
noise to the side-channel signal so that it becomes harder to exploit. In the case
of power analysis, this can be done by running in parallel to the cryptographic
operations some dummy process that inserts noise in the power traces. The amount
of required noise has to be carefully calculated. Oftentimes, this countermeasure is
not implemented alone, but along with some other countermeasure that benefits
from noise (for example, masking.)
Special logic styles. It is appealing to try to solve the side-channel problem at
the circuit level. One approach is to use specially designed logic styles with (in
theory) data-independent power consumption. Examples of logic styles that aim at
data-independent power consumption are dynamic and di erential logic, such as
Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [TAV02a] or Wave Dynamic Di erential Logic
(WDDL) [TV04a]. Di erential logic means that the signal is encoded in a pair of
wires; dynamic logic evaluates a combinatorial circuit in two phases: precharge and
evaluation. The careful combination of both can lead to (theoretically) gates with
data-independent power consumption.
However, those logic styles often rely on assumptions (for example: symmetry,
or signal propagation characteristics) that are not fully met in practice. Those
imperfections may render these approaches vulnerable [SS06].
Protocol level. Another kind of countermeasure against side-channel analysis is
to limit the exposure of a cryptographic key, by rotating and changing it often
enough. The number of executions of the cryptographic implementation under a
given key is then limited by a fixed counter.
The typical setting is to periodically derive a session key ki = KDF(k, i) from a
master key k at epoch i. The session key ki is only used for a handful of times, after
that the session key is disposed of and another one is derived. The adversary is then
limited by the number of available measurements under the same key. Note that
the key derivation function KDF should also be protected, and that transmitter
and receiver have to be synchronized.
1.7 Outlook for the rest of this thesis
The rest of this thesis deals exclusively with masking. In Chapter 2 we provide
an introduction to the design of masking schemes. In Chapter 3 we provide an
introduction to their analysis.
The scientific contribution of this thesis is based on publications. I selected five
representative publications to include in this dissertation:
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• Oscar Reparaz, Benedikt Gierlichs, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. Selecting time
samples for multivariate DPA attacks. In Emmanuel Prou  and Patrick
Schaumont, editors, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES
2012 - 14th International Workshop, Leuven, Belgium, September 9-12, 2012.
Proceedings, volume 7428 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 155—
174. Springer, 2012.
• Josep Balasch, Benedikt Gierlichs, Oscar Reparaz, and Ingrid Verbauwhede.
DPA, Bitslicing and Masking at 1 GHz. In Tim Güneysu and Helena
Handschuh, editors, Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES
2015 - 17th International Workshop, Saint-Malo, France, September 13-16,
2015, Proceedings, volume 9293 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
599–619. Springer, 2015.
• Oscar Reparaz, Sujoy Sinha Roy, Frederik Vercauteren, and Ingrid
Verbauwhede. A masked ring-lwe implementation. In Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems - CHES 2015 - 17th International Workshop, Saint-
Malo, France, September 13-16, 2015, Proceedings, pages 683—702, 2015.
• Oscar Reparaz, Begül Bilgin, Svetla Nikova, Benedikt Gierlichs, and Ingrid
Verbauwhede. Consolidating Masking Schemes. In Rosario Gennaro and
Matthew Robshaw, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015 - 35th
Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 16-20, 2015,
Proceedings, Part I, volume 9215 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
764—783. Springer, 2015.
• Oscar Reparaz. Detecting flawed masking schemes with leakage detection
tests. In Thomas Peyrin, editor, Fast Software Encryption, 23rd International
Conference, FSE 2016, Bochum, Germany, March 20-23, 2016, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, 20 pages. Springer, 2016.
These five papers deal with particular masking schemes tailored toward specific
cryptographic algorithms as well as with generic masking schemes that could be
applied more generally to a wider class of cryptographic algorithms. In these
selected five papers we address practical design issues as well as the analysis of
masking schemes. A map of the representative publications included in this thesis
can be found in Figure 1.1, along the mentioned two criteria.
The complete list of publications can be found on page 67.
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Figure 1.1 – Map of representative publications included in this
thesis.
Chapter 2
Design of masking schemes
This chapter intends to provide a general overview of the various masking schemes
present in the literature. We first give a general definition of a masking scheme in
Section 2.1, and then present first-order techniques in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. We
finally describe higher-order techniques in Section 2.6.
Our contributions to the design of masking schemes are described in Section 2.8.
2.1 What is a masking scheme?
A masking scheme is a specific countermeasure designed to make side-channel
attacks more di cult to carry out. A masking scheme defines a data representation
mechanism and a computation procedure to operate on masked data.
Data representation. The masked data representation is a reversible probabilistic
mapping x ‘æ m(x) used to represent a data value (string of bits) x. The mapping
is such that if an adversary gets a noisy version of the masked representation
m(x) + ÷, it is di cult for him to recover the underlying native value x.
A common mapping is Boolean masking. Boolean masking splits a variable1
x œ GF(2) into a set of shares (x1, . . . , xn) œ GF(2)n such that
1. the shares sum to x,
q
xi = x; and
2. no proper subset of {x1, . . . , xn} gives any information on x.
1To be mathematically precise, the following description should be in terms of random variables.
However, for simplicity we adopt a more informal language, and abuse notation to denote with
the same term a random variable and its realization.
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a b
a  b a0   b0 a1   b1
a0 a1 b0 b1
a0   b0 a1   b1
a0 a1 b0 b1
1
2 3
Figure 2.1 – Left: an unmasked circuit. Center: a masked circuit.
Right: an unbalanced masked circuit.
Boolean masking can be extended to mask bit vectors (words) by applying the
same principle component-wise. Another common mapping is arithmetic masking.
Arithmetic masking splits a k-bit variable x œ GF(2k) into a set of shares
(x1, . . . , xn) œ GF(2k)n such that the shares sum to x, and no proper subset
of shares provides information on x.
Data computation. The computation procedure F is an algorithm description
to compute a specific function f in the masked domain, that is, accepting and
returning data in the m-representation. An important requirement on F is that
this m-representation should be preserved throughout the whole computation. In
other words, all intermediates appearing in the computation of F should also be
represented in the m-domain.
2.2 A simple example
Let us explain the basic concept with a simple example. This toy example allows
us to exhibit some important properties of masking.
Perhaps the simplest masked data representation mechanism is first-order Boolean
masking. We probabilistically split each native bit b into two bit shares m(b) =
(b0, b1) such that the shares sum to b0 ü b1 = b and each share bi is uniformly
distributed in {0, 1}. To perform this initial sharing, a source of randomness is
required. This masking satisfies the two properties of Boolean masking laid out
above. Observe that even if we give out all information on (only) one share bi, the
adversary learns nothing about the underlying native bit b.
Consider a simple masked computation procedure. Suppose we want to compute
the xor between two bits f(a, b) = a ü b. This computation is represented in
Figure 2.1, left. Assume that the input bits a and b are secret. The masked
computation procedure could be something like F (m(a),m(b)) = (a0 ü b0, a1 ü b1).
This is represented in Figure 2.1, middle. This construction clearly computes the
correct result, since m(a)üm(b) = a0 ü b0 ü a1 ü b1 = aü b.
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE 17
We will see now why this splitting increases the resistance against side-channel
attacks in di erent scenarios of increasing complexity.
Security of individual nodes. Suppose for the moment that the adversary can
sni  on a single node and recover its average value (for example, via averaging the
side-channel signal), but does not learn anything from a single observation. The
goal of the adversary is to recover the underlying native, unmasked value. The
unmasked input stays constant across measurements, but the masks are fresh for
each measurement.
It is easy to see that every intermediate variable occurring in the masked
computation is indeed in the masked representation. The intermediates are of
the form ai, bi or ai ü bi. The expected average power consumption for each
intermediate variable is constant for each unmasked input value, and thus does not
reveal anything about the secret inputs.
For example, let us focus on the node 2 in Figure 2.1, middle. The expected
value of the value a1ü b1 is 0.5, irrespectively of the value of a or b. Hence, sni ng
a1 ü b1 gives no information on the inputs.
(More precisely, when the adversary probes a1 ü b1, he actually gets L(a1 ü b1)
where L is a (potentially unknown) leakage behavior function that captures the
leaking e ect of the device. Note that as long as L is linear, the security results
hold.)
Superposition of leakage. It is a bit unrealistic to assume that the adversary
can record the power consumption of single wires. (Very localized EM
measurements could achieve this, but standard power measurements cannot.)
Typical measurements contain the superposition of contributions of individual
nodes.
Suppose that the adversary sees the (additive) superposition of several nodes. (Say
node 2 and 3 .) Still, the average signal that the adversary observes does not
depend on any secret value. The average signal of each contribution does not
depend on any secret value, and hence the average signal of the superposition
neither depends on any secret value.
Unbalanced nodes. Suppose now that the circuit is built in a technology with
little control over the circuit symmetry. Suppose that the power consumption of
a certain branch is dominant, as Figure 2.1, right, shows. It is easy to see that
the observations of the previous paragraph also apply. Namely, the average power
consumption of this circuit will not reveal anything about any underlying value,
even if the superposition is “unbalanced.”
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Assumptions on leakage behavior. In this example we can already spot an
important property of masking. Masking relies on a few assumptions on the leakage
behavior. Unlike other approaches, such as di erential logic styles, masking does
not require that each node consumes the same amount of energy (balanced power
consumption). This is highly relevant in practice, since it is di cult to design
circuits (ASICs or FPGAs) with balanced power consumption. Masking requires
that there is no interaction between di erent nodes nor second-order terms in the
power consumption.
Assumptions on the RNG. Masking requires fresh random numbers for each
execution. Moreover, this randomness is secret for the adversary. If it is possible
to predict somehow the RNG output, masking provides no security.
Where masking breaks: joint leakage, cross-talk. It is also interesting to see
where masking breaks. Suppose that there is a cross-talk component in the power
consumption between node 2 and 3 . That is, the power consumption contains
a term proportional to the product of the individual contributions 2 and 3 .
The average of the cross-talk term L(a1 ü b1) · L(a2 ü b2) depends (in the general
case) on the value of the unmasked output bit c = aü b, and hence can be used
to recover the secret value c. Similar observations apply if there are second-order
terms for example in node 1 .
Note that the second-order e ect can be created by the circuit or can be enforced
by the adversary by means of a suitable processing of the measured traces. That is,
the leakage behavior L can be enforced to be actually L1 ¶ L2, where L1 is a non-
linear post-processing applied by the adversary. This is the essence of higher-order
attacks.
2.3 Construction of linear operations
Designing a masked computation procedure is, in general, not trivial. In the next
two sections, we will describe masked computation procedures.
The easiest operations to mask are linear ones. We can generalize the construction
of the previous example. To perform a linear operation y = L(x) (with respect to
the group operation used to mask the underlying variable x) on masked data xi, it
su ces to apply the operation individually to each share, yi = L(xi). It is obvious
that the result is correct, that is,
q
yi = L(
q
xi). This follows straight from the
definition of linearity.
In Boolean masking, this means that the xor operation is e cient and easy to mask.
This operation is ubiquitous in secret-key algorithms. For example, in AES all
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Figure 2.2 – Left: the linear operation to be masked. The input x
is split into two shares x1 and x2. The output y is also split into two
shares y1, y2. If the function L is linear, the output can be computed
as simply yi = L(xi).
the operations are GF(2)-linear except for the pseudo-inversion in GF(28) inside
SubBytes.
Arithmetic masking is compatible with modular addition. There are a few secret-
key algorithms that rely on modular arithmetic for some parts (IDEA and MAC
constructions based on MDx or SHA among others); arithmetic masking is thus
e cient on those parts. There are plenty of public-key algorithms as well that rely
on modular arithmetic.
The hard task is to mask non-linear operations. There are many constructions that
we describe in the sequel.
2.4 Generic first-order masking constructions
In this section we describe di erent first-order masking constructions for non-linear
functions. The constructions in this section are generic in the sense that they can
be applied to mask, in principle, any Boolean function.
Definition of first-order masking. We define “first-order masking” as a masking
scheme that is designed to withstand first-order DPA attacks. First-order DPA
attacks are defined in Section 3.1.1 as attacks exploiting information residing in
the mean power consumption.
2.4.1 Masked tables
Paul C. Kocher, Joshua M. Ja e and Benjamin C. Jun from Cryptography Research
filed a patent in June 1998 [KJJ98a,KJJ98b] already hinting at masked tables. The
IBM research team also suggests masked tables [CJRR99] in 1999, and Thomas S.
Messerges reports masked implementation of the AES finalists using masked tables
at FSE 2000 [Mes00a] for a 32-bit ARM processor.
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The principle is quite natural. It is suitable mainly for software implementations
and can result in reasonably fast code. Suppose we want to perform the Sbox
lookup S. We first pre-compute a table SÕ as
SÕ[x] := S[xümin]ümout. (2.1)
This table SÕ accepts inputs that are masked with the mask min and outputs values
masked with the mask mout. By construction SÕ “unmasks” the input, performs
the table S lookup and “masks” the output; all the three steps happen in a single
shot without producing side-channel leakage of unmasked intermediates.2
Note that the table SÕ is tied to a specific value of the input and output masks
(min,mout), and thus SÕ has to be recomputed each time new masks are drawn.
Ideally, this happens at the beginning of each execution. This re-computation of
the table SÕ incurs a performance overhead. Note also that in a typical smart-card
the table SÕ has to be stored in RAM memory since its entries change over time.
This limits the size of the table S.
2.4.2 Gate-level masking
The idea of gate-level masking is to mask each logic gate present in the circuit. The
main advantage is that it decouples the design of the digital circuit from the issue
of providing resistance against side-channel attacks. In other words, the problem is
(in theory) reduced to masking a small set of logic gates. These masked gates can
be freely composed to build any logic circuit.
Trichina gate. Trichina proposes in [Tri03] a masked AND gate. This is one of
the earliest proposals of gate-level masking. This idea also appears in a paper by
GoliÊ and Menicocci [GM04].
The basic idea to design the masked AND gate is to apply the distributive property
of multiplication over addition to the unmasked output bit c = ab. Say a and b are
input bits shared into (a0, a1) and (b0, b1), and c is the output bit. Then
ab = (a0 + a1) · (b0 + b1) (2.2)
= a0b0 + a0b1 + a1b0 + a1b1. (2.3)
(Here variables are bits, product is AND and addition is XOR.) Trichina notes
that if the masked output bit is a0b0, then the correction term (other share) is
a0b1 + a1b0 + a1b1. She even proposes to use an extra fresh random bit r as
the output mask. This small modification, although not explicitly noted in the
2This already suggests an ideal side-channel countermeasure: implementing the whole
computation in a single look-up table. However, the size of the table is normally prohibitive.
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Figure 2.3 – Masked AND as per Trichina.
manuscript, allows to compose these masked gates. She proposes one output share
c0 to be the fresh random bit and accordingly modify the second output share c1:
c0 = r (2.4)
c1 = (a0b0 + r) + a0b1 + a1b0 + a1b1. (2.5)
This computation is represented in Figure 2.3. Please note the importance of
calculating the individual operations in the correct sequential order. This is
unusual in conventional design tools and requires manual intervention by the digital
designer.
Infineon masked gates. Franz Klug, Oliver Kni er and Berndt M. Gammel from
Infineon patented [KKG02] in early 2002 several AND, OR, NOR, NAND and
MUX masked gates. They compose those masked gates to construct a full adder.
A remarkable feature of their solution is that all inputs to masked gates share a
common mask. The output is as well protected by the same mask. This opens
the possibility of using a single 1-bit mask for the whole circuit, reducing the
requirements in area and on the randomness needed (albeit making second-order
attacks easier.)
Motorola masked MUX. Thomas S. Messerges, Ezzat A. Dabbish and Larry
Puhl from Motorola filed in July 1999 a patent [Tho01] for a generic masking
method that can be applied at the gate level. The structure and working principle
of this method is fairly simple and elegant.
The core of the method is a masked MUX description with a masked selection
signal. A masked MUX is described in Figure 2.4. For the implementation of this
masked MUX, they use cross-bar switches3 and (unmasked) MUXes.
3A 2-bit cross-bar switch takes 2 input bits, one control bit and outputs two bits. If the control
bit is o , the output is simply a copy of the input; if the control bit is active the output is the
swapped version of the input bits.
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f(0)
f(1)
rout
rin
a  rin
f(a)  rout
Figure 2.4 – Masked MUX as per Motorola.
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f(0)
f(1)
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a  rin
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f(0)
f(1)
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rin
a  rin
f(a)  rout
f(0)
f(1)
rout
rin
a  rin
f(a)  rout
rin = 0 rin = 1
a = 0
a = 1
Figure 2.5 – The four possible signal paths in the Motorola MUX
construction.
The selection signal of the MUX is randomized with a mask. To ensure the
correctness of the output, the input to the MUX is “corrected” with the cross-bar
switch. The selection signal of the cross-bar switch is randomized as well. A nice
feature is that the input and output masks are decoupled, and thus the output
mask does not interfere in the computation. The four possible signal paths in this
construction are depicted in Figure 2.5.
From here, one can mask any Boolean function by decomposing it into 2-to-1 MUX
operations by recursively applying Shannon’s decomposition [Sha49]. The expected
circuit size is, however, quite large. The authors present applications to DES.
Infineon glitch-aware masked gates. Glitches occurring in standard CMOS may
render masking insecure. This is explained in Section 3.3.1 (page 42). Wieland
Fischer and Berndt M. Gammel study at CHES 2005 [FG05] gate-level masking in
the presence of glitches. In a theoretical study, they show that there is no set of
universal masked gates with 2 input bits and 1 output bit split into 2 shares that
resist glitches in their model.
On the further assumption that the gate delay is equalized, and the output
capacitances are equal, they do give constructions for masked AND and OR
gates. The construction is very similar to Trichina’s; the interesting part here is
the theoretical treatment and modeling of glitches.
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Figure 2.6 – ISW secure AND (secure against single probe).
Ishai—Sahai—Wagner private circuits. Ishai, Sahai and Wagner published at
CRYPTO 2003 [ISW03] (the “private circuits paper”) a generic approach to secure
computation in the presence of a probing adversary. Their main contribution is
a secure AND gate at any order, along with a convenient framework to prove its
security. The secure gates (“gadgets” in their terminology) can be freely composed
and are built from ideal logic gates.
The basic idea is the same as the Trichina gate: if we want to compute the product
c = ab from the shares ai and bi, we first compute all cross-products aibi and then
carefully xor them along with some fresh randomness. The trick here is to very
carefully select which cross-products to xor together, and in which order to add
the randomness. A smart choice allows to build an elegant security proof.
In Figure 2.6 we draw the circuit secure against adversaries using a single probe. The
general construction is described in pseudo-code in Figure 2.7. In the description,
brackets are important and show the order that the computation should follow.
An intermediate state of the computation is shown in Figure 2.8.
The main contribution of the ISW paper is the simulation-based proof of security.
This proof is given in the probing model. (This model is treated in Section 3.5.1.)
A very powerful property of the proof is that it ensures that the composition of
gadgets is still secure.
While theoretically sound, private circuits can lead to insecure implementation
if implemented in hardware that glitches. Nevertheless, ISW strongly influenced
other higher-order masking schemes. This is discussed in Section 2.6.2.
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Require: s-shares a and b
Ensure: s-shares c satisfying c =
ab
for i from 1 to s do
for j from i+ 1 to s do
zij Ω rnd()
zji Ω (zij ü aibj)ü ajbi
end for
end for
for i from 1 to s do
ci Ω aibi
for j from 1 to s, j ”= i do
ci Ω ci ü zij
end for
end for
Figure 2.7 – ISW
algorithm in pseudo-
code for an AND gate.
a1b1 z12 z13
z23a2b2
a3b3
c1 = a1b1 + z12 + z13
(z12 + a1b2)
+a2b1
c2 = a1b1+
c3 = a3b3+
+(z12 + a1b2) + a2b1
+(z13 + a1b3) + a3b1
+z23
+(z12 + a1b2) + a2b1
(z13 + a1b3)
+a3b1
(z23 + a2b3)
+a3b2
Figure 2.8 – Intermediate
state of the ISW computation
for s = 3.
2.4.3 Threshold implementations
Threshold Implementations were introduced by Svetla Nikova, Christian Rechberger
and Vincent Rijmen in 2006 [NRR06]. (See also the journal publication [NRS11].)
For an extensive treatment of the subject, we refer to the PhD thesis of Begül
Bilgin [Bil15].
Central idea. The central idea of threshold implementations is the concept of
non-completeness. A combinational circuit is non-complete if it is possible to
partition it in a way such that each subcircuit does not see all input shares of the
original circuit.
Resistance against glitches. The non-completeness property is stronger than
just the “properly masked” property (= all intermediate variables masked.) This
property implies protection against DPA even if the combinational blocks glitch (cf.
Section 3.3.1). This guarantee applies irrespectively of the exact glitching behavior.
Security argument. An elegant feature of threshold implementations is its simple
security argument to provide security in the presence of glitches. Glitches originate
from a combinational block. Each combinational block does not see all input shares,
hence each combinational block knows nothing about the (secret) underlying native
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(unshared) value. Therefore, glitches cannot provide any information on the native
value.
Assumptions. There are standard assumptions in place. Mainly, each sub-circuit
leaks independently of others (in particular, this means there are no second-order
e ects such as crosstalk). These assumptions are standard in masking.
From combinational circuits to sequential logic. In practice, almost all
cryptographic algorithms are implemented with memory elements. A threshold
implementation ensures that each combinational stage is non-complete. The
composition of several combinational stages (with registers in between) needs not
to be non-complete, as the registers serve as a synchronization mechanism and do
not further propagate glitches. However, an important precondition is that each
stage sees a uniform sharing at the input. This can be achieved by remasking, or
can be ensured by the previous stage. In this case, the previous stage is called a
uniform sharing.
Uniformity. A requirement of threshold implementations is that the input shares
have full entropy (this is called “uniform sharing” in some publications). If the
output shares of a combinational stage have also full entropy, then the output can
be directly plugged into the next combinational stage. This is convenient since it
avoids a refreshing. However, not all non-complete sharings satisfy this property
(preserving full entropy input/output). The sharings that satisfy this property are
called uniform.
Example: synthesis of an AND gate. We illustrate here the design process of
a threshold implementation of the 2AND function. Suppose we start with three
input shares and three output shares. The native function c = f(a, b) we want to
share is c = a · b.
The input bit a is shared into three bits a1, a2, a3 such that
q
ai = a (respectively
b.) The output bit c will also be shared into three bits c1, c2 and c3 such thatq
ci = c. The problem is to define three component functions f1, f2 and f3 that
compute c1, c2 and c3 such that non-completeness is preserved.
The sum of the output shares is easy to express as function of the input shares.
We have that
c1 + c2 + c3 = a1b1 + a1b2 + a1b3+ (2.6)
+ a2b1 + a2b2 + a2b3+ (2.7)
+ a3b1 + a3b2 + a3b3. (2.8)
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This is enforced by the construction of f , and by the fact that the output should be
correct. Now the problem is to distribute the right hand side terms into di erent
buckets for c1, c2 and c3, such that non-completeness is preserved. For example:
c1 = a2b2 + a2b3 + a3b2 (2.9)
c2 = a1b3 + a3b1 + a3b3 (2.10)
c3 = a1b1 + a1b2 + a2b1. (2.11)
We note that ci = fi(ai+1, bi+1, ai+2, bi+2) does not depend on ai nor bi. The
reader can extend this reasoning to other f functions and other numbers of input or
output shares. The trick is to express the algebraic normal form of f as a function
of the input shares, and to distribute accordingly each term into the output shares.
Implementations. There are many threshold implementations proposed. We
list here a few: Noekeon [NRS09], Keccak [BDPV10], Present [PMK+11],
AES [MPL+11], and all 3 ◊ 3 and 4 ◊ 4 S-boxes [BNN+12].
2.5 Particular masking constructions
There are masking schemes specifically tailored towards concrete cryptographic
algorithms. They typically benefit from specificities of the algorithm to achieve a
better performance when compared to generic methods.
We can classify the specific masking constructions into two large groups: those
suitable for secret-key algorithms and those more adequate for public-key algorithms.
Two prominent secret-key algorithms are the AES and DES block ciphers. Masking,
when applied to public-key algorithms is often referred to as blinding. Blinding
is a related concept to masking, and refers to “the use of random, but invertible,
transformations that are neutral to the cryptographic operation.” [KLL+11]
2.5.1 Particular constructions for AES
Rijndael is the de facto universal standard block cipher. Rijndael was first published
in 1998 and selected as the US AES in 2001 after a public selection process by
NIST. Rijndael is designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen.
The only non-linear component of the AES is the Sbox. It is based on the finite
field (pseudo-)inversion4 x ‘æ x≠1; this construction is due to Nyberg [Nyb93].
4This pseudo-inversion maps 0 to 0.
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Software. There are several proposals that exploit the algebraic structure of the
Sbox. The problem is to compute the masked inversion (x≠1 +m2,m2) from a
masked value (x,m1). Mehdi-Laurent Akkar and Christophe Giraud propose in
CHES 2001 [AG01] to switch between Boolean and multiplicative masks. This
multiplicative masking is compatible with inversion, after the inversion the masking
is reverted to Boolean. This countermeasure is e cient in software. However, it is
vulnerable to first-order DPA since it does not mask the zero value, as shown by
several sources (GoliÊ and Tymen [GT02] at CHES 2002; Akkar and Goubin [AG03];
Trichina, De Seta and Germani [TSG02] at CHES 2002.) There are approaches to
circumvent this.5
Hardware. In hardware there are many alternatives. Most of them rely on subfield
arithmetic to perform the inversion in GF(28). The basic idea is to compute the
inverse in GF(22k) with arithmetic in GF(2k), by representing GF(22k) as an
extension field of GF(2k). The problem is then reduced to masking operations in
smaller fields. (This idea can be applied as well to design small area unprotected
Sboxes.) See the work of Elisabeth Oswald, Stefan Mangard, Norbert Pramstaller
and Vincent Rijmen [OMP04, OMPR05] or the work of Elena Trichina [Tri03,
TKL04].
2.5.2 Particular constructions for DES
DES and its variants such as triple DES are popular legacy block ciphers. They are
still widely used in the banking sector (see for example the 2006 specifications of the
EMV payment standard [Con08]); yet, triple DES is typically slower and provides
less security than AES. It was designed by a team at IBM (and subsequently
modified by the NSA) in the early 1970’s.
The Sboxes of DES do not feature any (public) structure. Hence, one typically
resorts either to generic methods or algebraic interpolation.
Sboxes as polynomial functions. The idea here is to express the Sbox as a
polynomial function x ‘æq aixi over a finite field, where ai is a set of coe cients
(found via interpolation) fixed for a given Sbox. This evaluation can be performed
with additions, multiplications with constant, squarings and multiplications. The
di cult operation is the multiplication, and one typically resorts to ISW-like
schemes. This principle can be applied to any Sbox. For the special case of the DES
Sboxes, see the series of papers by Claude Carlet, Louis Goubin, Emmanuel Prou ,
Michaël Quisquater, Matthieu Rivain at FSE 2012 [CGP+12]; the improvement
of Arnab Roy and Srinivas Vivek at CHES 2013 [RV13]; and the follow-up paper
5The idea is to detect when the input is 0, and react accordingly, without leaking. Similar
observations have been made in the multi-party computation literature [DK10].
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by Jean-Sébastien Coron, Arnab Roy and Srinivas Vivek at CHES 2014. [CRV14,
CRV15]
2.5.3 Particular constructions for RSA and DH
For systems based on modular exponentiation, such as RSA and Di e-Hellman, a
solution was already hinted by Kocher in 1996 [Koc96] using the principle behind
David Chaum’s 1982 blind signatures [Cha82]. (One might think of blind signatures
as tangentially related to Shamir’s no-key protocol for key exchange, aka Shamir’s
three-pass protocol [MvOV96, p. 500], also originating in the early 1980’s.)
Basis blinding. The basic idea of basis blinding goes as follows. Suppose we
would like to protect the exponentiation gx (mod p) where the basis g and the
modulus p are public and the exponent x is secret. The core idea is to randomize
the input g to the exponentiation, such that the adversary can no longer make
hypotheses on intermediates of the exponentiation. A random, secret and ephemeral
value r is generated prior to the exponentiation and the value (r≠1)x (mod p) is
computed. The input g is multiplied by the random value r and then the product
is exponentiated (r · g)x (mod p). Note that in this exponentiation the basis r · g is
unknown to the adversary, and hence predictions on intermediate variables are hard
to make. Finally, the output (r · g)x (mod p) from the exponentiation is corrected
by multiplying by (r≠1)x (mod p) to yield the intended result (r≠1)x · (r · g)x
(mod p) = gx (mod p).
Other blindings. Due to the industrial relevance of the RSA, Di e-Hellman and
DSA algorithms, there are many variants and optimizations of this basic idea. In
addition, the mathematical structure of these algorithms allows e cient blinding
countermeasures. The previous idea can be extended to also randomize the exponent
or the modulus. A good overview can be found in the 2013 BSI publication by
Dirk Feldhusen, Guntram Wicke, Arnold Abromeit and Lex Schoonen [FWA+13].
2.5.4 Particular constructions for ECC
Not surprisingly, due to the rich mathematical structure of elliptic curves, there is
ample room for randomized computations. In CHES 1999 [Cor99] Coron already
proposes three di erent randomization mechanisms: scalar blinding, base point
blinding and Z-coordinate randomization.
Scalar blinding. Scalar blinding consists of adding a random multiple of the curve
order #E to the secret scalar before performing the secret scalar multiplication.
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The result is preserved, kP = (k+r#E)P for a random r and no further correction
is required.
Base point blinding. The second countermeasure consists of randomizing the
point P into P +R. First the computation k(P +R) is performed, and then kR is
subtracted from k(P + R) to yield kP . The point kR can be cheaply computed
across multiple scalar multiplications.
Z-coordinate randomization. Projective coordinates represent the point (x, y)
as (X : Y : Z) such that x = X/Z and y = Y/Z. Here the Z coordinate can be
randomized for each execution and thus the intermediate results are randomized.
Joye and Tymen [JT01] propose two other randomizations at CHES 2001. They
apply (randomly chosen) isomorphisms to perform the computation on another
curve, and at the end of the computation invert the morphism.
A good overview of many attacks and countermeasures for elliptic curve
cryptography can be found in the survey of Fan, Guo, de Mulder, Schaumont,
Preneel and Verbauwhede [FGM+10] (see also the updated version [FV12].)
2.5.5 Particular constructions for ring-LWE
We provide the first masking of the ring-LWE algorithm in a paper published at
CHES 2015 “A masked ring-LWE implementation”. See Section 2.8.2 of this thesis
for more details. We also published an alternate masking technique in PQCrypto
2016. See Section 2.8.3 for more details.
2.6 Higher-order masking constructions
First-order masking provides basic protection against side-channel attacks. Yet,
more sophisticated, higher-order attacks have been proposed to attack first-order
masking.
Definition of higher-order masking. A d-order masking is defined as a masking
construction designed to withstand up to d-order attacks. A d-order attack
makes use of d-order statistics. For example, a second-order DPA attack exploit
information residing on the variance (and co-variance). Higher-order attacks will
be studied in Section 3.1.
The construction of generic higher-order masking schemes is a very di cult problem.
The constructions are very delicate. The historical track of higher-order masking
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schemes is full of proposals and subsequent breaks. For example, the scheme
by Schramm and Paar of 2006 [SP06] was broken one year later [CPR07], the
“provably secure” scheme by Rivain and Coron of 2010 [RP10] was (academically)
broken three years later [CPRR13] and the scheme of Balasch, Faust, Gierlichs and
Verbauwhede published in 2012 [BFGV12] was broken in 2014. [PRR14]
2.6.1 Higher-order masked tables
Schramm–Paar table recomputation extension. Kai Schramm and Christof Paar
published at CT-RSA 2006 [SP06] a masked table lookup method for Boolean
masking claiming higher-order security. The showcase the authors use is AES.
Suppose the input shares are M0,M1, . . . ,Md and the Sbox output shares are
N0, N1, . . . , Nd such that N0 üN1 ü . . .üNd = S[M0 üM1 ü . . .üMd] Now build
a table Sú such that
Sú[x] = S
C
xü
dn
i=1
Mi
D
ü
dn
i=1
Ni (2.12)
and then perform the lookup N0 := Sú(M0). The construction of the table Sú
should be performed with care. The idea is to progressively build Sú from shifted
versions of S.
This countermeasure was found to be flawed by Coron, Prou  and Rivain at
CHES 2007 [CPR07]. Coron et al. found a third-order flaw irrespective of the
security parameter of the original scheme.
Rivain–Dottax–Prou  second-order proposals. Matthieu Rivain, Emmanuelle
Dottax and Emmanuel Prou  propose in FSE 2008 [RDP08] several solutions for
second-order masked Sbox lookup. They describe two methods: one is based on
the table recomputation method and the other is based on comparisons.
Coron proposal. Coron proposed at EUROCRYPT 2014 [Cor14] a generic table
recomputation method at any order. The construction can be related to that of
Schramm and Paar. It uses di erent output masks and several invocations of a
refreshing block. The main appealing feature of this approach is that it comes with
a proof of security in the probing model (cf. Section 3.5.1).
2.6.2 ISW-derived constructions
Rivain–Prou  construction. Rivain and Prou  published at CHES 2010 [RP10]
a generic method to mask the AES at any order. Their main approach is to mask
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the addition and multiplication over GF(28), and express the AES computation in
terms of these basic operations. For the pseudo-inversion, they use the identity
x≠1 = x254 in GF(28) and build an addition chain using 4 multiplications.
The core of the method is a masked GF(28) multiplication. It is based on the
Ishai—Sahai–Wagner construction.
This approach was shown to be (academically) flawed by Coron, Prou , Rivain
and Roche in FSE 2013 [CPRR13]. They show an attack of order Ád2Ë+1 when the
scheme is supposed to be d-th order secure. The flaw arises when composing several
building blocks. Nevertheless, as the authors argue this seems to be a theoretical
flaw that would be di cult to exploit in practice.
Extensions. There are many extensions of the CHES 2010 work. HeeSeok Kim,
Seokhie Hong and Jongin Lim propose at CHES 2011 [KHL11] to use subfield
arithmetic to compute the masked Sbox. This incurs in a substantial execution
time speed-up since now many operation can be tabulated.
Claude Carlet, Louis Goubin, Emmanuel Prou , Michaël Quisquater and
Matthieu Rivain generalize the Rivain—Prou  approach in an FSE 2012
publication [CGP+12] to mask any Sbox. Their approach is based on computing a
k-bit Sbox lookup as the evaluation of a polynomial over GF(2k). This polynomial
can be derived for example by Lagrange interpolation.
2.6.3 Higher-order threshold implementations
Higher-order threshold implementations were introduced by Begül Bilgin, Benedikt
Gierlichs, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov and Vincent Rijmen at ASIACRYPT
2014 [BGN+14].
Core idea. The core idea is the concept of d-th order non-completeness. A circuit
is d-th order non-complete if it is possible to partition it in a way such that the
union of any d sub-circuits sees at most all but one input shares.6
The advantage of this definition is that security in the probing model follows
immediately by construction.
Constructions. Bilgin et al. give a construction for the block cipher KATAN. The
only non-linear component in KATAN is a 2-bit-input AND gate. The idea is
similar to first-order threshold implementations: express the function in Algebraic
6A related concept, although in a di erent context, appears in the work of Prou  and Roche
at CHES 2011 [PR11].
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Normal Form (sum of products), share the input bits and then rearrange the
resulting terms.
Issues with composition. In the original proposal it was claimed that no
additional randomness is needed during the computation, if the masked function
satisfies some requirements. This would mean that the randomness requirements
are much lower than for other schemes.
This was shown to induce a security flaw by Reparaz et al. at CRYPTO
2015 [RBN+15]. This is a contribution of the present thesis (see p. 151).
Improvements. We also improved on the required number of input shares to
achieve a more compact implementation. For more details, see p. 47.
2.7 Theoretic considerations
2.7.1 Secret sharing
The representation mechanism of masking corresponds to secret sharing. Secret
sharing was introduced in 1979 by Blakley [Bla79] and independently by Shamir in
a short paper [Sha79]. A perfect secret sharing allows to split a secret in n pieces
such that any k Æ n pieces can be used to reconstruct the secret, and k ≠ 1 pieces
give no information about the secret.
Shamir construction. The idea is very elegant: given k points in the plane with
di erent abscissæ, there is only one polynomial of degree k≠ 1 that passes through
the k points. To share a secret value a0, one builds a degree k≠1 random polynomial
f with f(0) = a0 and distributes n points (i, f(i)) (i = 1, . . . , n). The polynomial
f (and hence the secret a0) can be recovered with the knowledge of any k points
using interpolation.
2.7.2 Connections with multi-party computation.
Informally speaking, secure multi-party computation enables a set of parties to
jointly compute a function while keeping their respective inputs private. For
example, two millionaires may be interested in knowing who is wealthier without
revealing their exact net worth to each other. Multiparty computation allows this
kind of computation. The analogy between MPC and the side-channel problem is
straightforward. Ideally, we would like to evaluate the AES function (say) when
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the sensitive information is spread over several parties without revealing anything
but the (final) output, in such a way that each party learns nothing more than its
corresponding secret share.
The STOC 1988 Ben-Or–Goldwasser–Wigderson protocol. In a 1988 STOC
publication, Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [BOGW88] build a generic MPC
protocol that computes on shares split according to Shamir’s system. The abstract
contains a concise description of the main result of the paper: “Every function of n
inputs can be e ciently computed by a complete network of n processors in such a
way that if no faults occur, no set of size t < n/2 of players gets any additional
information (other than the function value)”. The tricky part of their approach is
to perform the multiplication operation. There are other claims regarding faults
that are outside the scope of this thesis.
Masking based on Shamir’s secret sharing. One application of the BGW
protocol to design a masking scheme is given by Prou  and Roche [PR11] in CHES
2011, and independently by Goubin and Martinelli at the same conference [GM11].
Both papers instantiate the AES algorithm (see also the extended version [RP12].)
For an implementation on an FPGA of an AES Sbox following the Prou –Roche
scheme see the work of Moradi and Mischke [MM13] at CHES 2013 or our work
on PRESENT [CBRN14]. Masking based on Shamir’s secret sharing is also called
polynomial masking, and can be understood as a generalization of a ne masking.
2.8 My contributions in this context
2.8.1 DPA, masking and bitslicing at 1 GHz
Problem statement. DPA is typically targeted at small- and medium-range
microcontrollers typically found in e. g. smart-cards. Recently, there is a paradigm
shift that moves the cryptographic functionalities traditionally running in specific
hardware components into software running on powerful general purpose processors,
as those found in e. g. smart-phones and tablets.
It is not clear whether DPA is still applicable to high-end processors. There are
substantial di erences: in high-end processors the clock speed is typically much
higher (in the GHz range), they run a full-blown multitasking operating system
and they feature many more peripherals (network, USB, radio).
Our contribution. In the first part of our paper published at CHES 2015 [BGRV15]
we demonstrate that DPA attacks are feasible even at high clock speeds. Our
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experimental platform comprises a Beaglebone Black featuring an ARM Cortex-A8
processor clocked at 1 GHz running Linux. We measure the EM emanation from
a decoupling capacitor in the ground path of the main processor. The software
implementation we attack is a constant-time constant-flow bitsliced AES. Although
secure against timing attacks, bitslicing does not protect against DPA as expected.
The main di erence with lower-end platforms is that alignment and post-processing
is harder.
In the second part of the paper, we tackle the issue of protecting the bitsliced
implementation against DPA. Bitsliced software is based on a hardware description
of the algorithm, hence, it seems reasonable to base our masking approach on
hardware techniques. We use the principles of gate-level masking to implement
masked versions of the XOR and AND instruction. Our masked bitsliced AES
boils down to writing secure masked versions of just a handful of instructions. We
reevaluate the implementation and confirm the gain in resistance against DPA
attacks.
2.8.2 A masked ring-LWE implementation
Context: post-quantum cryptography. Once a quantum computer is built,
Shor’s algorithm [Sho97] will render most of the currently used public-key
cryptography insecure. Problems based on factorization (RSA) or discrete
logarithms (Di e-Hellman, DSA and ElGamal, including elliptic curve variants)
will be easy to solve on a quantum computer.
There is an entire branch of cryptography that withstand attacks even when run
on a quantum computer; this branch is called post-quantum cryptography. Post-
quantum cryptography consists of algorithms meant to be run on today’s digital
computers.
Context: lattice-based post-quantum cryptography. Lattices are a powerful
tool for cryptographic constructions. Two advantages of lattice-based cryptography
are the security guarantees often provided and the e ciency of the constructions.
Some proposals o er strong security reductions to computationally hard problems,
and are relatively e cient to execute. However, key sizes are usually larger than
their established, non-quantum secure alternatives, yet still manageable for many
applications.
Problem statement. Post-quantum cryptography is still at its infancy. There
are already some proposals, but they are not as mature as deployed public-key
systems (RSA or ECC). Post-quantum schemes do not inherently protect against
side-channel analysis. There is thus the need to design e cient and side-channel
secure post-quantum public-key crypto-systems.
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Our research is focused on designing a masked ring-LWE public-key decryption
function. Ring-LWE is a promising and versatile cryptographic primitive. We focus
on the decryption operation since it handles long-term secrets susceptible to DPA.
Our contribution. In our paper at CHES 2015 [RRVV15] we present a masked
ring-LWE public-key decryption function. Our solution consists of two main
components: the first one is essentially arithmetic masking to perform polynomial
arithmetic operations; the second one is a custom masked decoder that performs a
threshold operation.
Arithmetic masking of the polynomial operations allows to recycle the arithmetic
co-processor of an unprotected implementation, making it easy to upgrade an
unmasked implementation to a masked one. (In our own design, we base the
arithmetic co-processor on Sujoy Sinha Roy’s CHES 2014 design [RVM+14].)
The bespoke decoder performs a thresholding operation in the masked domain.
The approach is original and not based on a previous design. The masked decoder
is probabilistic and the operation has to be repeated 16 times to achieve a negligible
impact on the system error rate. It outputs Boolean shares suitable for derivation
of, e. g. an AES-256 key (hybrid encryption).
Our design is not only theoretical. We implemented the whole design on a Virtex-II
FPGA. The overhead in area is quite small; in cycles the masked implementation
requires about ◊2.7 more time. We also verified the practical gain in security
against DPA attacks.
Follow-up work. An extended version of this paper was published in a special
issue of the Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (by invitation) [RRdC+16]. The
extension consists of a software implementation for ARM. This was performed with
the additional collaboration of Ruan de Clercq.
Another follow-up work is our publication in PQCrypto 2016 [RdCR+16] that we
describe next.
2.8.3 Additively homomorphic ring-LWE masking
Our contribution. In our PQCrypto 2016 paper [RdCR+16], we present a new
masking scheme for ring-LWE decryption. Our scheme exploits the additively-
homomorphic property of the existing ring-LWE encryption schemes and computes
an additive-mask as an encryption of a random message. Our solution di ers in
several aspects from the CHES 2015 approach; most notably we do not require a
masked decoder but work with a conventional, unmasked decoder. Hence, we can
secure a ring-LWE implementation using additive masking with minimal changes.
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Our masking scheme is also very generic in the sense that it can be applied to
other additively-homomorphic encryption schemes, and can be viewed as ciphertext
blinding.
2.9 Conclusion
We have seen that the design space of a masking schemes is very large. There are
many di erent approaches that can be followed to mask a given cryptographic
algorithm. We have presented an overview of these approaches.
Our contribution to the design of masking schemes are three new masking
approaches: a generic software approach tailored to a new platform (high-
performance embedded processors) based on gate-level masking and two proposals
for a recently-proposed public-key algorithm (ring-LWE).
History shows that the design of masking schemes is a delicate task. In the next
chapter, we tackle the issue of analyzing masking schemes.
Chapter 3
Analysis of masking schemes
In this chapter we deal with attacks on masking in Section 3.1 and with tools for
evaluating masked implementations in Section 3.2.
3.1 Attacks on masking
In this section we describe how a masked implementation can still be attacked.
However, it should not come as a surprise that attacking masked implementations
is hard, as that is precisely the whole point of masking. Rather than aiming
at unconditional security, a proper masked implementation makes attacks highly
impractical.
3.1.1 First-order attacks
Definition of first-order attacks. By first-order attacks we mean DPA attacks
that exploit information residing in on the mean power consumption. There
are many flavors of first-order DPA attacks: from Kocher’s single-bit DPA, to
Brier–Clavier–Olivier’s Correlation Power Analysis and many other variants.
In theory, first-order masking perfectly protects against first-order attacks. In
practice, a properly implemented and sound masking scheme makes first-order
attacks impractical. Hence, first-order attacks are often carried out to verify that
the masking was implemented properly.
37
38 ANALYSIS OF MASKING SCHEMES
3.1.2 Second-order attacks
Second-order attacks are the natural extension of first-order attacks to break
masking. We define second-order attacks as those that exploit information in the
variance or covariance (second-order statistical moments). Second-order attacks
were already suggested in the original DPA paper.
Simple example. We describe here a second-order attack against a first-order
masked implementation. Suppose the first-order masked implementation handles
the two shares V1 and V2 of a certain intermediate V such that V = V1üV2 at time
sample t1 and t2 respectively. A second-order attack combines the measurement
data L at timesamples t1 and t2 through a certain combination function c, for
instance c(L(t1), L(t2)) = L(t1)·L(t2), and then proceeds to correlate c(L(t1), L(t2))
against key-dependent predictions for L(V ). Note that while each L(t1) or L(t2) is
individually independent from V , the product L(t1) · L(t2) is not.
Properties of second-order attacks. While the procedure for second-order
attacks resembles first-order attacks (bar the pre-processing step), the number of
traces required to perform a second-order attack is substantially larger than the
number of traces that one would require to perform a first-order attack against an
unprotected implementation at the same noise level. This is the whole point of
masking. Asymptotically, the number of required traces grows as per ‡d, where ‡
is the noise level and d is the order of the attack.
Additionally, the adversary normally does not know in advance the exact location
of the timesample pair (t1, t2) corresponding to the handling of each share. Thus, if
the implementation handles the shares in di erent time instants, the second-order
attack has to be repeated over (potentially) all combinations of time sample pairs.
This incurs a significant computation burden.
Combination functions. There are many proposals for combination functions.
Two proposals are commonly used in practice: centered product and absolute
di erence. Prou  and Rivain proved, under a certain model, that the centered
product with the correlation coe cient distinguisher is optimal (yields maximum
correlation) [PRB09]. Another pre-processing function is the absolute di erence,
as proposed by Messerges [Mes00b].
Higher-order attacks. In the same spirit as second-order attacks, it is possible to
generalize and conceive third- or higher-order attacks. A d-th order attack exploits
information located in the d-th order statistical moment. Thus, higher-order attacks
are very sensitive to noise and become quickly impractical as the order increases.
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Higher-order attacks can be used to break higher-order masking schemes. A d-th
order masking is designed to withstand up to d-th order attacks. In theory, a d-th
order masking can always be broken with a (d+ 1)-th order attack.
3.1.3 Biasing the masks
Tiri and Schaumont [TS06] describe in 2006 the folding attack. This attack is a two-
stage procedure: first the attacker derives the mask value from each measurement
and classifies the measurements according to their mask value. Secondly, a first-
order DPA attack is performed on “folded” measurements. (Alternatively, a
first-order DPA attack can be performed on a subset of measurements.) A similar
idea is presented by Ja e in 2006 [Jaf06].
This attack requires that the mask has a noticeable impact on each individual
measurement. Thus, measurements should contain enough noise so that individual
shares are not directly visible on each measurement.
The work of Pan, den Hartog and Lu [PdHL09] focuses on masked software
implementations and follows the previous two-step procedure. However, the first
step is more elaborate and requires an additional horizontal DPA attack to recover
the mask.
3.2 Evaluating masking
One possible strategy to evaluate whether a masked implementation achieves the
security goals is to perform key-recovery attacks on each intermediate variable.
This can be an expensive process. An alternate strategy is to use leakage detection
tests.
3.2.1 Leakage detection tests
Leakage detection tests can be traced back to a 2000 publication of Jean-Sébastien
Coron, David Naccache and Paul C. Kocher. [CKN00] (See also a journal version
by the same authors [CNK04].) Recently leakage detection techniques have
been pushed for use in evaluation contexts by CRI [GJJR11], see also the
manuscript [CDG+13].
Leakage detection tests have a di erent goal than key-extracting DPA or SPA
attacks. Leakage detection does not focus on extracting keys, but on assessing
whether there is leakage or not. The presence of leakage is a necessary, yet not
su cient, condition for key-extracting attacks to work. Roughly speaking, if an
implementation fails a leakage detection test, there is a dependency between the
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side-channel signal and the data being processed. This dependency is likely to be
useful for key extraction. On the other hand, when an implementation passes a
leakage detection test, no data dependency is detected, and hence key-recovery
attacks will not work.
The outcome of a leakage detection test depends on the number of measurements
available. This means in particular that if more measurements are available, leakage
can start to be detectable. In other words, leakage detection tests detect leakage
“on the strength of the evidence presented” [CNK04].
Typical construction of a leakage detection test. In a typical leakage detection
test, the evaluator takes two sets of N measurements each. Measurements
from one set correspond to the (unmasked) plaintext value p1 and the other
set to the plaintext value p2 ”= p1. The collected measurements are input to
statistical hypothesis testing methods to check for di erences in the two conditional
distributions.
A common null hypothesis H0 is
H0: the mean power consumption of the two sets is the same.
If this hypothesis is true, the implementation is not vulnerable to first-order DPA
attacks. This hypothesis can be tested with the t-test [Stu08,Wel47]. This tests
for first-order security.
In the next paragraphs, an intermediate variable is active if the value it takes in
the two sets is di erent.
Specific and non-specific tests. Non-specific tests do not assume much on the
architecture or leaking behavior of the device. The plaintexts pi are chosen so that
all intermediate variables in all rounds are active. That is, the whole state is active.
Specific tests choose plaintexts to target and activate specific intermediate variables.
The advantage is that the evaluator gains more insight on what is leaking. Normally
the statistics converge faster and thus less traces are required. Of course, this
requires that one makes assumptions on the architecture of the implementation.
Furthermore, specific tests require to consciously craft the plaintext values pi. For
an exemplary list of input vectors for RSA we refer to the work of Ja e, Rohatgi
and Witteman [JRW11].
Fix vs. random or fix vs. fix. One way to make fewer assumptions on the leakage
behavior of a device is to randomize the plaintext value of one set. This results in
a fix vs. random test. If the practitioner is willing to make certain assumptions on
the leakage behavior, he may speed up the evaluation process by performing a fix
vs. fix test, as noted by Durvaux and Standaert [DS16].
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Figure 3.1 – Thought experiment for leakage detection.
Semifix vs. random. An inconvenience of non-specific tests is that they might
detect leakage from non-exploitable intermediate variables such as input plaintext
or output ciphertext. One can get rid of those if it is possible to set and change
the key on the device. (In this situation, one would also detect leakage from the
key schedule.) If this functionality is not available, one can resort to semifix vs.
random tests.
A semifix vs. random test randomizes the values from one set of measurements,
and for the other set it chooses plaintexts values from a “semifix” set. This set of
plaintexts is defined so that only a significant portion of the state is active in a
chosen inner round.
Higher-order extensions. Leakage detection tests can naturally be applied to test
leakage at any statistical order, by adequately pre-processing the measurements.
In this way, higher-order security claims of masking schemes can be verified.
Leakage detection vs. key extraction. Note that a leakage-detection test says
nothing about the feasibility of extracting keys. This is very easy to see in the
following thought experiment. Suppose the following construction in Figure 3.1:
on input x a box outputs the value AES(x, k) where k is a secret key. This value
is computed with a perfectly non-leaky hardware implementation F1. In parallel,
the value AES(x, kÕ) is computed (but the output discarded) with leaky hardware
F2. The second key kÕ is di erent and independent of k, and changes whenever k
is updated.
Here it is easy to see that a leakage detection test on the construction of Figure 3.1
will definitely fail (that is, detect leakage): by hypothesis F2 is leaky and this will
be detected. However, the computation of F2 is independent of the secret k, and
the only computation depending on k is non-leaky. Thus, no key-recovery attack
can succeed.
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3.3 Complications of masking
Masking is notoriously hard to implement in practice, both in hardware and in
software. In hardware, glitches can lead to exploitable first-order leakage, while in
software, the distance leakage behavior of registers and other components can as
well lead to defective masked implementations.
3.3.1 Glitches
History. Mangard, Popp and Gammel raised the issue at CT-RSA 2005 [MPG05]
that glitches occurring in standard CMOS may render masking insecure. They
theoretically derived their results and backed up their claims with simulations. A
bit later, Mangard, Pramstaller and Oswald at CHES 2005 [MPO05] presented
results attacking an actual masked hardware AES with the same principles.
What are glitches? A glitch is, in static CMOS, a spurious transition of nodes
in a combinational circuit within one clock cycle, resulting from di erent arrival
times of the input signals.
Solutions. The mitigation of glitches is a well-studied problem in digital design,
since they are not only inconvenient from a security point of view. Glitches are
useless transitions that consume extra energy and thus digital designers tend to
minimize them to achieve low-power and high-speed circuits. There are strategies
to reduce glitches (e.g., balancing the path delay using combinational tree-like
structures) or fully eliminate them (e.g. using dynamic logic styles, such as Domino
or dynamic di erential such as SABL [TAV02b] or WDDL [TV04b]).
There have been proposed many other solutions to cope with glitches in hardware.
See Section 2.4.2 for a glitch-conscious set of masked gates due to Infineon and
Section 2.4.3 for threshold implementations, a masking technique that aims at
providing security in the presence of glitches.
3.3.2 Distance issues
What is the problem? A careless software masked implementation may schedule
to store one share V1 in a certain register R1 and immediately later store the second
share V2 in the same register R1. This is bad for security.
The power consumption of a register is strongly related to the Hamming distance
between consecutive values held in the register. Hence, the power consumption
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may be strongly related to the unmasked value V = V1 ü V2, rendering masking
useless.
This kind of register allocation may be produced by a compiler. This is a reason
why masking is normally implemented in the lowest-level language to achieve
maximum control.
The same e ect can occur within other hardware components of the processor (for
example, buses), and highly depends on the architecture and implementation of
the processor. These details, critical for writing a proper masked implementation,
are usually not publicly documented in commercial o -the-shelf microcontrollers.
Solutions. The canonical solutions are to load a third, unrelated value in between
the two shares, for example a constant or a random value.
We also explore another solution in our publication “On the cost of lazy engineering
(for software masked implementations)” [BGG+14].
3.4 Randomness
Randomness is an essential part of masking. Indeed, if it is possible to tamper
with the randomness source, a masked implementation will not deliver its expected
security guarantees. In the extreme case, switching o  completely the randomness
source will switch o  completely the masking countermeasure.
Properties. There are some di erences between the properties expected from
a RNG suitable for masking and a RNG for producing cryptographic keys. For
masking, the randomness source is expected to have good statistical properties.
However, for masking the randomness source needs not to be a cryptographically
strong RNG. This is due to the fact that no part of the random stream of masks
leaves the device. That is, all masks are secret to the adversary. Thus, one typically
needs a RNG that
• fulfills statistical requirements, and
• if using a PRNG, its initial entropy is large enough to stop attacks based on
guessing the state.
How much randomness? It is hard to give bounds on how much randomness is
actually needed for a secure masked execution. A single-bit mask for the whole
circuit is theoretically su cient to withstand first-order attacks, if implemented
properly.
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Note that the RNG itself is a security-critical design, and should be protected
against manipulation from many other attacks. See for example the work of
Markettos and Moore at CHES 2009 [MM09].
3.5 Theoretic considerations
3.5.1 Probing model
Underlying concept. The probing model results from an abstraction of probing
attacks. Probing attacks are invasive attacks that place microscopic probes on top
of the integrated circuit to eavesdrop internal signals from the chip. It is not hard
to see that probing attacks have devastating consequences for security: it su ces
to eavesdrop the bus that transports the key to break the whole system. Having
access to a single bit of intermediate variables is usually also enough to break either
secret-key or public-key algorithms, as shown by Handschuh, Paillier and Stern in
1999 [HPS99]. (Modern security integrated circuits feature countermeasures that
make probing attacks harder, such as active shields, bus scrambling and glue logic.)
Masking in the probing model. Roughly speaking, a masking scheme secure
in the t-probing model means that even if the adversary has access to (any) t
intermediate variables appearing during the computation, the adversary learns
nothing.
A rough sketch of proofs in the probing model goes as follows. One proves that the
distribution of any t probe measurements can be simulated even without knowing
the secrets. Hence, probing provides no information about the secret. These proofs
normally build a simulator that emulates the behavior of the masked circuit, with
the exception that the simulator does not carry secrets, yet is able to emulate the
actual circuit.1
One advantage of the probing model is that the proofs are concrete. In contrast to
the noisy leakage model (cf. Section 3.5.2), the proofs hold for any noise level and
do not depend on the asymptotic behavior of certain parameters. An instructive
application of the probing model appears in the private circuits paper [ISW03].
The proof is very elegant.
A word of warning on proofs in the probing model. The probing model, however,
is deceptively simple. There are “proofs” in the probing model that turned out to
1Simulation based proofs have their foundations on the identity of indiscernibles, attributed to
Leibniz.
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be flawed, either because of technical reasons or incorrect modeling. See Section 2.6
for references of flawed proofs.
3.5.2 Noisy leakage model
The original proof of masking is given in the noisy leakage model. This model
assumes that the adversary is able to observe a noisy version of the leakage behavior
function of the device. What was proven in [CJRR99] is that it is exponentially
di cult to distinguish the distribution of a masked bit as the masking order
increases. More precisely, the amount of samples required to distinguish the two
distributions (corresponding to the two possible values for the unshared bit) grows
as ‡d, where ‡ denotes the noise level. The result, however, is asymptotic as
‡ æŒ.
3.5.3 Connections between them
In a way, the d-probing model loosely resembles a d-variate DPA attack. The
analogy is not exact, since there are ways to adapt a d-variate leakage to a univariate
leakage, for example by pre-processing the measurement traces.2
The probing and noisy leakage models turn out to be theoretically equivalent. For
more details, see the work of Sebastian Faust.
3.5.4 On provable security
Provable security aims at providing security proofs for cryptographic constructions.
The ultimate goal is to provide constructions that cannot be broken under a given
model. The concept of provable security is, without any doubts, laudable. It is
applied not only to secure implementations of cryptographic algorithms but to all
aspects of cryptography (for example, protocols).
The practice of provable security is a controversial topic in cryptography in general.
Provable security often gives a sense of psychological relief, but in many cases this
is misleading. The apparent mathematical rigour may hinder the healthy scientific
questioning process that allows to break schemes in new ways.
There are several reasons that limit the practical significance of security proofs
in our view. Often, security proofs are just flawed. This is understandable since
security proofs can be very complex constructions that are hard to grasp or verify
2This pre-processing may be performed by the own measurement setup (compres-
sion/convolution).
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even for experts in the field. Another reason is that the model taken in consideration
for writing the proof may not fully correspond to the actual implementation.
It is our view that security proofs may be a useful tool to spend more time
analyzing a side-channel countermeasure, but should not be considered as the
unique argument to judge the e ectiveness of a countermeasure.
3.6 My contributions in this context
3.6.1 Selecting time samples for multivariate DPA attacks
Problem statement. When attacking masked implementations, a common
assumption is that the evaluator knows the exact time samples corresponding
to the handling of several shares, so that he can feed those time samples into the
chosen higher-order DPA attack technique. This information is important since
otherwise the attack has to be iterated over all combinations of time samples,
leading to a combinatorial explosion in the computational requirements.
Prior work. This information is easy to get if the evaluator has access to the
code, or to an open sample that he can profile. In the general case, however, the
problem is much harder. Prior methods are highly heuristic or work under tight
assumptions.
Our contribution. Our publication at CHES 2012 [RGV12] solves this problem in
a systematic fashion (it will “always” output all exploitable tuples of time samples
that exist, given enough measurements), black-box conditions (no access to the
code nor implementation details are needed), under any leakage model (although
the evaluator can benefit if he knows details about the leakage behavior).
Our solution leads to a constant, yet substantial, speed-up in the computational
e ort required to carry out multivariate higher-order DPA attacks. In our
experiments, we measured improvements of two orders of magnitude, bringing
attacks that needed two weeks of computation to less than one day.
The solution is based on computing the mutual information between tuples of
traces and plaintext. There is no key guess involved, yet our method will output
tuples corresponding to exploitable time sample such as Sbox inputs and outputs.
In retrospect, our method can be understood as a multivariate leakage detection
test at any order.
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Follow-up work. We have extended the idea to exploit the information laying
on concrete statistical moments. This reduces the generality of the approach, but
vastly increases its performance. The work is under revision pending submission.
3.6.2 Consolidating masking schemes
Our contribution. In our paper at CRYPTO 2015 [RBN+15] we point out several
similarities between highly theoretical and practical masking schemes. These
observations allow to compare side-by-side di erent masking schemes. In this
comparison, subtle di erences arise.
We extend the ISW algorithm to compute other more complicated functions, and
to bring protection even in the presence of glitches.
These di erences allow us to break higher-order threshold implementations as
originally presented. We point out an issue with the composition of shared functions
and demonstrate in a proof-of-concept that higher-order threshold implementations
are not actually higher-order secure. We also give directions for mitigating this
inconvenience.
On the bright side, our comparative analysis also allows us to bring improvements
from one masking scheme to the other. We present threshold implementations that
use significantly less input shares (from td+ 1 to d+ 1, where t is the algebraic
degree of the function and d the security level.)
We point out also an application of the idea of non-completeness to ISW-based
software schemes. This can provide protection against distance-based leakage
behaviors.
Follow-up work. This work has been extended to give a higher-order masked
threshold implementation of the AES Sbox using d+ 1 shares with the additional
collaboration of Thomas de Cnudde. We present first- and second-order secure
implementations of the AES Sbox. Practical experiments with 100 million traces
confirm the validity of our approach. This results in the smallest up to date
threshold implementation of the AES Sbox. This work is under submission.
3.6.3 Detecting flawed masking schemes with leakage detection
tests
Problem statement. Many proposed masking schemes, even carrying “security
proofs”, are eventually broken because they are flawed by design. The security
validation process is nowadays a lengthy, tedious and manual process.
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Our contribution. In our FSE 2016 publication [Rep16] we report on a method
to verify the soundness of a masking scheme before implementing it on a device.
We show that by instrumenting a high-level implementation of the masking scheme
and by applying leakage detection techniques, a system designer can quickly assess
at design time whether the masking scheme is flawed or not, and to what extent.
(Note that one can still implement a sound masking scheme in an insecure fashion,
and thus this tool is no magic bullet.)
Our method requires not more than working high-level source code and is based
on simulation. Thus, our method can be used already in the very early design
stages. We validate our approach by spotting in an automated fashion first-, second-
and third-order flaws in recently published state-of-the-art schemes in a matter of
seconds with limited computational resources. We also present a new second-order
flaw in a table recomputation scheme, and show that the approach is useful when
designing a hardware masked implementation.
Chapter 4
Conclusion and future work
Predictions are hard (especially about the future). Nevertheless, we speculate in
the following on the future research developments of masking.
Masking in retrospective. Masking is a mature area of research that has received
over 15 years of continuous research e ort. This is exacerbated by intense industrial
interest. Thus, one could think that the topic lacks new ideas. We think that, on
the contrary, masking will continue being a fertile area of research.
On the one hand, it is clear that masking is a very delicate topic, where even
experts propose schemes that later turn out to be flawed. Thus, a first area of
future research is a thorough study of newly proposed masking schemes. There are
probably bugs in schemes that are already published, and a detailed study of their
relevance in practice would be desirable.
New masking schemes. On the other hand, there is room to develop more e cient
schemes for current algorithms. The primary reason may be economic: there is
a clear incentive from industry to optimize masking schemes in order to reduce
performance overheads.
On the more academic side, some masking schemes have been proposed focusing
not exclusively on performance but aiming at stronger security guarantees (beyond
Boolean masking). We think this will be another avenue of research.
Randomness. A study of the required randomness for masking schemes in terms
of quality and quantity would be very useful. Higher-order schemes usually are
very expensive in terms of randomness, but concrete bounds on the amount of
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randomness are fully understood yet. We leave as future work masking schemes
optimized for low entropy usage.
Masking on new platforms. It is inevitable that future cryptographic algorithms
run on di erent platforms than we know today. A current trend is to move
the cryptographic operations from dedicated hardware to powerful generic
microprocessors (such as phones and personal electronic gadgets.) This is done
in Host Card Emulation. However, the security requirements will probably stay
without major changes: side-channel protection will still be an issue.
The attack principles for side-channel security may well stay without major
modifications. It was refreshing to see that the DPA attack against the ARM
Cortex A8 used the same principles as DPA attacks on older platforms; and an
interesting fact was that the established principles of gate-level masking could be
recycled to mask the software implementation running on a new platform.
Masking in combination with other countermeasures. It will become very
interesting to design countermeasures that are e ective against a wide range of
attacks. When the platform of choice progressively moves from hardware to software,
tamper resistance may require to implement software protection mechanisms such
as obfuscation and white-box cryptography. The interplay between these is not yet
fully understood.
Masking on new algorithms. We believe that a migration towards post-quantum
algorithms in established protocols (such as EMV and TLS) will happen in the
near future. Those protocols will require secure implementation of post-quantum
algorithms that are also resistant against (among others) side-channel attacks. Our
first contribution in this field is the masking of ring-LWE; we believe that further
improvements will yield even more compact implementations.
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Abstract. Masking on the algorithm level, i.e. concealing all sensitive
intermediate values with random data, is a popular countermeasure
against DPA attacks. A properly implemented masking scheme forces
an attacker to apply a higher-order DPA attack. Such attacks are
known to require a number of traces growing exponentially in the
attack order, and computational power growing combinatorially in
the number of time samples that have to be exploited jointly. We
present a novel technique to identify such tuples of time samples
before key recovery, in black-box conditions and using only known
inputs (or outputs). Attempting key recovery only once the tuples
have been identified can reduce the computational complexity of the
overall attack substantially, e.g. from months to days. Experimental
results based on power traces of a masked software implementation of
the AES confirm the e ectiveness of our method and show exemplary
speed-ups.
Keywords: Time sample selection, multivariate side-channel attack, masking,
reverse-engineering.
1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks are used to break implementations of cryptographic algorithms
in embedded devices. Since the introduction by Kocher [Koc96] in the late nineties,
they have been refined and a series of countermeasures have been designed to
thwart them. A particularly popular countermeasure against Di erential Power
Analysis (DPA) attacks [KJJ99] is d-order masking [CJRR99,GP99], since it enjoys
a formal proof of security against higher-order DPA attacks [CJRR99,Mes00] of
order d or less. d-order masking is based on splitting every sensitive intermediate
value in d + 1 shares and we consider the case that they are manipulated at
distinct times, as is typical for software implementations. d+ 1-order DPA and
d+ 1-variate Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) attacks [GBPV10,PR09] (from
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now on referred to as multivariate attacks together) allow to break d-order masked
implementations by analyzing tuples of d+ 1 time samples, corresponding to all
shares of a masked sensitive variable, from each trace. However, multivariate attacks
are significantly more di cult to mount than univariate attacks for two reasons.
First, attacks exploiting higher-order moments are exponentially more sensitive
to noise as the masking order d increases [CJRR99,SP06]. As a consequence, the
number of traces required to mount a successful attack grows exponentially in
d. Second, multivariate attacks need to search over d+ 1-tuples of time samples.
The computational complexity of the attacks therefore grows combinatorially in
the attack order d+ 1. Hence, secure implementations use a masking order d in
combination with a suitable noise level to ensure that an attack will require a
su ciently large number of traces and a heavy amount of computation, such that
the attack becomes impractical.
Related work.
Most related works on non-profiled multivariate attacks start from the assumption
that the time samples where the shares of the targeted, masked sensitive variable
leak are known, and focus on the key recovery [GBPV10, JPS05,Mes00, PR09,
PRB09, SVO+10,WW04]. Few related works tackle the problem of identifying
(tuples of) interesting time samples before key recovery, and they do so with
heuristic approaches. Agrawal et al. [AARR02] describe a method to identify tuples
of time samples that requires a chosen input adversarial model and that can only
exploit the leakage of single bits. Their method is tailored to Boolean masking and
the measurements can not be re-used for key recovery, due to the way the inputs
are chosen. Oswald et al. [OMHT06] essentially propose an exhaustive search over
all d+1-tuples of time samples in a small time window that is selected based on an
educated guess. The interpretation of educated guess is left to the practitioner. Note
that the guess does not select tuples of time samples, but a window of time samples
that has to be searched for a tuple exhaustively in combination with key recovery.
This method can be applied with known inputs or outputs and, in principle, to any
masking scheme. The approach suggested by Lemke and Paar [LP07] and Gierlichs
et al. [GBPV10] is to examine the empirical variance of several power traces when
the input data is kept constant, i.e. it requires a chosen input adversarial model.
In an ideal case, the variance is then caused only by masking, and therefore time
samples with high variance mostly correspond to time samples where the masks
or masked variables are being processed. Note that also this method does not
identify tuples of time samples but a set of samples that has to be searched for a
tuple exhaustively in combination with key recovery. The measurements can not
be re-used for key recovery and, in principle, the method can be applied to any
masking scheme.
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In summary, the educated guess of Oswald et al. is the only method described in
the literature that can be applied in black-box conditions and with known inputs
or outputs.
Contribution.
We present a novel method for identifying interesting d+ 1-tuples of time samples
before key recovery. It is not heuristic but systematic and ranks all possible
d+ 1-tuples of time samples in a given window according to their dependency on,
informally speaking, “typical attack targets”. It does not provide a qualitative
yes/no decision, but instead ranks tuples with respect to a meaningful metric such
that there is a natural order in which to attack them. Our technique can lead to a
substantial improvement in the computational e ciency of multivariate attacks
compared to exhaustive search over the same window of time samples, since it
retains only a small fraction of all possible d + 1-tuples for key recovery. The
relative improvement depends on the size of the subkeys that are attacked. In
absolute terms, the improvement becomes more pronounced with increasing attack
order d+ 1, increasing size of the time window, and increasing number of traces.
Our approach is based on mutual information and is fully generic: it applies
to attacks of any order d + 1, including univariate attacks against unmasked
implementations, it applies to all possible masking schemes, it requires only a
known input or output scenario, it can traverse S-boxes, locate shares of the
masked S-box output, and it does not require any restrictive assumptions on
the device leakage behavior. In other words, our method does not require more
restrictive assumptions than a generic MIA attack [GBTP08].
Paper organization.
In Sect. 2 we introduce our notation, recall the basics of masking and discuss
state-of-the-art multivariate attacks. In Sect. 3 we present our technique together
with an analysis of how and why it works. We discuss its e ciency, impact, and
possible refinements in Sect. 6. In Sect. 5 we present experimental results that
validate our proposal and highlight some of its interesting properties. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we consider only non-profiled, multivariate attacks. Interesting tuples
are tuples of time samples that carry leakage of all shares of a masked variable
that is a (possibly keyed) function of the plaintext.
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2.1 Notation
Capital letters in bold face, e.g. M, denote random variables. Lowercase letters,
e.g. m, denote a specific value of M, e.g. M = m. Mi are mask bytes, P is
a plaintext byte, K is a key byte, and S-box is a cryptographic S-box. L(t) is
the random variable corresponding to the measured side-channel leakage at time
t. tM denotes the instant when the device is manipulating the random variable
M. I(A;B;C) denotes the multivariate mutual information between A, B and
C [BGP+11,GBPV10] and is computed as
I(A;B;C) = I(A;B)≠ I(A;B|C) . (1)
Note that, if A and B are independent, I(A;B) = 0 and I(A;B;C) Æ 0.
2.2 Masking
Masking was introduced by Goubin and Patarin [GP99] and by Chari et al.
[CJRR99] (together with a proof of security) as a sound approach to protect
implementations against first-order DPA attacks. In a d-order masked implementa-
tion, every sensitive variable Z is randomly split into d+ 1 shares M1, . . . ,Md,V
satisfying
M1 ı . . . ıMd ıV = Z , (2)
where ı is some suitable group operator.
The security of properly implemented masking schemes relies on the fact that even
if the adversary manages to know any information about up to d shares out of d+1
(for example, via side-channel leakage), he cannot learn any information about the
sensitive variable Z.
Throughout the paper we assume that the shares M1, . . . ,Md,V are manipulated
(and leak) separately at di erent time instants. Further, we assume that these time
instants and the values of the shares are unknown to the adversary.
2.3 Multivariate attacks
Masked implementations of order d can in theory always be broken by d+1-variate
attacks as originally proposed by Messerges [Mes00] and Chari et al. [CJRR99].
They exploit the statistical dependence between the leakage of the d+1 shares and
the sensitive variable Z. There are essentially two di erent methods for performing
multivariate attacks.
The first approach [CJRR99,JPS05,Mes00,OMHT06,PRB09,WW04] consists in
reducing the problem to a univariate scenario by preprocessing each trace, and then
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running a first-order attack on the preprocessed traces. The preprocessing generates
a new trace from all possible d+ 1-tuples of distinct time samples of the original
trace, where for each tuple the d+ 1 time samples are combined with a so-called
combination function (typically the absolute di erence [Mes00] or the centered
product [PRB09]). The second approach, proposed by Prou  and Rivain [PR09]
and Gierlichs et al. [GBPV10], does not rely on a preprocessing step but directly
uses multivariate MIA for the attack.
A major shortcoming of both methods is that they su er from the e ect known as
“combinatorial explosion” and hence combinatorial time complexity in d+ 1. Both
methods aim to recover subkeys while, at the same time, searching for a suitable
d+ 1-tuple of time samples in the traces. In the first approach, the preprocessed
traces are
! L
d+1
"
time samples long, where L is the trace length. These traces have
to be processed for each hypothesis on the subkey. In the second approach, the
distinguisher should be computed for each of the
! L
d+1
"
d+ 1-tuples, and for each
hypothesis on the subkey.
Hence, it is very important to identify the interesting tuples (or to narrow down a
window of time samples as much as possible) prior to key recovery in order to keep
the computational complexity of a multivariate attack at a feasible level.
3 Identifying interesting tuples of time samples
In this section we explain how to identify interesting d+ 1-tuples of time samples
prior to key recovery. Note that we focus our attention on this aspect and that key
recovery is not the primary focus of the paper. For clarity in the exposition, in
what follows we assume a first-order Boolean masking scheme (two shares) and a
noise-free scenario. The practical results presented in Sect. 5 are based on measured
power traces.
3.1 Core idea
Let us consider a scenario with fixed plaintext, fixed key, and sensitive intermediate
value Z = Fk(p), where Fk is some key-dependent function (for example, Fk(p) =
S-box(pü k)). The key observation is that the mutual information between the
leakages at time instants corresponding to the manipulation of the mask M1 and
the masked intermediate value V =M1 ü Fk(p) is non-zero. That is,
I(L(tM1);L(tV)) > 0 . (3)
The interpretation is straightforward: leakage at tV depends only onV, which varies
in function of only the mask M1 (since the plaintext and the key are fixed), and
some information about the mask is leaked at tM1 . Hence, the information shared
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between leakage at tM1 and tV is non-zero. On the other hand, the information
shared between leakage at two unrelated time samples t0 and t1 is zero
I(L(t0);L(t1)) = 0 (4)
because no relation exists between data handled at t0 and at t1. Thus, Eqs. (3)
and (4) allow us to distinguish pairs of time samples that contain leakage of
dependent variables (case of Eq. (3)) from those pairs that contain leakage of
independent variables, that are irrelevant for the multivariate attack (case of
Eq. (4)). Note that not all pairs of time samples that contain leakage of dependent
variables carry some information about the key. For example, if the same mask is
manipulated at t0 and t1, then I(L(t0);L(t1)) > 0.
We stress that the value of K need not be known, and no hypothesis on it be made.
The general case.
In the above example we required a fixed plaintext and thus a chosen plaintext
scenario. We can relax this assumption and instead work with known (varying)
plaintexts. Suppose that the device is manipulating the plaintext byte P, the mask
M1 and the masked intermediate value V such that V = M1 ü Fk(P) at time
instants tP, tM1 and tV, respectively. The natural extension of the core observation
to known varying plaintexts is that L(tP), L(tM1) and L(tV) are not independent,
and therefore the mutual information between them is non-zero
I(L(tM1);L(tV);L(tP)) ”= 0 . (5)
At three unrelated time samples t0, t1 and t2, on the other hand, the mutual
information is zero
I(L(t0);L(t1);L(t2)) = 0 . (6)
The interpretation follows the same lines as in the particular case. Leakage at tV
depends only on V, which now varies in function of the plaintext and the mask
(since the key is fixed), and some information about the mask and the plaintext is
leaked at tM1 and tP, respectively. Thus, the information shared between L(tM1),
L(tV) and L(tP) is non-zero.
Note that it is not necessary to search for tP, nor is it necessary for tP to physically
exist in the power traces. By assumption, the plaintext is known, so it is possible to
substitute L(tP) with the leakage of the known plaintext under some hypothesized
leakage model L˜(P). This makes the analysis faster since one has to search only
for a pair of time instants (tM1 and tV) instead of searching for a triplet. The
choice of L˜ will be discussed in Sect. 3.3.
We can hence use Eqs. (5) and (6) to distinguish dependent triplets from
independent triplets. In addition, and contrary to the particular case with fixed
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plaintext, all identified tuples are now interesting tuples and all relate to the specific
plaintext byte P. Most of them carry some information about the key and can
be useful for a key recovery attack. The only possible type of tuple that will be
identified as interesting although it does not carry some information about the key
is the one corresponding to all shares of the specific, masked plaintext byte. We
discuss this in more detail in Sect. 3.3.
3.2 Suggested workflow for multivariate attacks
The previous observations allow an attacker to identify interesting d+ 1-tuples of
time samples prior to key recovery. Again, we use d = 1 in the explanation. The
proposed workflow divides an attack in three phases:
Step 1. (Window selection) The adversary uses any available mean to narrow down
the time window to analyze. For example, the adversary could select a
small window based on an educated guess [OMHT06], if possible. Obviously,
care has to be taken to not discard too many time samples since the window
must contain at least one interesting d+ 1-tuple.
Step 2. (Tuple selection) The adversary estimates I(L(t1);L(t2); L˜(P)) for all
(t1, t2) with t1 > t2 in the remaining window, and keeps a list of pairs of
time samples yielding negative mutual information with large absolute
value.
Step 3. (Key recovery attack) The adversary performs the preferred strategy for a
bivariate attack on traces consisting only of the pairs of time samples in
the list. These traces consist of a few pairs of time samples, and hence the
key recovery step is much faster.
3.3 Which tuples of time samples pop up?
The adversary has freedom to choose the hypothesized leakage model L˜ for the
plaintext. Depending on the choice of L˜, di erent tuples of time samples will be
identified. In this section we analyze two cases.
L˜ is the identity function.
When the adversary computes the mutual information between time samples and
a plaintext byte, i.e. L˜(P) = P, he will be able to identify all tuples corresponding
to all shares of any (sensitive) variable of the form Z = Fk(P). In particular, the
method is able to identify the shares (M1,V) with V = PüM1, V = PüKüM1
and V = S-box(PüK)üM1, since the key is fixed.
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This result is useful, as it allows the attacker to locate both the masked variables
before the S-box (masked plaintext and masked S-box input) as well as the masked
variables after the S-box (masked S-box output). Note that it is irrelevant if the
masks before and after the S-box are the same. If the mask does not change, the
identified tuples of time samples will share one component.
L˜ is an approximation of the device leakage behavior.
If the attacker chooses L˜ as an approximation of the leakage behavior L, he will
be able to identify all tuples of time samples corresponding to all shares of any
(sensitive) variable of the form Z = Fk(P) appearing before the S-box (e.g. masked
plaintext and masked S-box input). For a typical S-box, he will not be able to
identify tuples of time samples corresponding to shares of sensitive variables after
the S-box. The intuitive reasoning behind this is that knowledge of the distribution
of the plaintext’s leakage does not give su cient information for guessing the
distribution of the S-box output’s leakage. The advantage of this choice, compared
to the identity function, is the ease of estimation, see Sect. 4.1. Disadvantages are
that one cannot locate shares of masked variables after the S-box and that one
relies on an assumption about the device leakage behavior.
Note that we compute the mutual information according to Eq. (1), and not as
I((L(t0),L(t1)); L˜(P)) =
I(L(t0); L˜(P)) + I(L(t1); L˜(P))≠ I(L(t0);L(t1); L˜(P)) ,
(7)
where the last of the three terms is in turn given by Eq. (1) [BGP+11]. The
reasoning for this choice is straightforward. The first two terms of Eq. (7) capture
first-order leakage of variables that depend on L˜(P), e.g. unmasked plaintext,
unmasked S-box input and, depending on the choice of L˜, unmasked S-box output.
By assumption, the masking scheme is properly implemented and there is no
first-order leakage of sensitive variables. Hence, the only first-order leakage that
these terms could capture is that of the unmasked plaintext, which is of no use
for our purpose. By omitting the two terms and using Eq. (1) we ensure that only
interesting tuples yield non-zero mutual information.
Moreover, Eq. (1) allows us to target very specific tuples. For our interesting
tuples it holds that I(L(tM1),L(tV)) = 0 such that interesting tuples yield strictly
negative mutual information, see (1).
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4 Discussion
In this section we discuss several aspects of the proposed workflow for multivariate
attacks, such as its e ciency, refinements and additional applications.
4.1 E ciency analysis
We evaluate the e ciency of the proposed workflow with respect to the running
time and the number of traces needed, and we compare these numbers to those of
a “classical” multivariate MIA attack that uses exhaustive search instead of step 2.
Although the proposed method is not limited to a particular multivariate attack
technique for step 3, using multivariate MIA here allows us to draw important
conclusions regarding the e ciency of the proposed workflow, since the numbers
can be directly compared. In both cases we focus the attacks on the (masked)
S-box output. According to the previous section, this choice implies that step 2
of the proposed workflow uses the identity function L˜(P) = P. We analyze two
di erent scenarios:
(a) Unknown leakage behavior. Step 3 of the proposed workflow and the “classical”
MIA both use the identity leakage model, or possibly some truncated identity
leakage model in case of a bijective S-box. The point here is that both step 3
and the “classical” MIA use the same leakage model.
(b) Known leakage behavior L equal to Hamming weight leakage. Step 3 of the
proposed workflow and the “classical” MIA both use the Hamming weight
leakage model.
Running time.
We assume that after step 1 the traces are L time samples long and contain at
least one tuple of time samples corresponding to all shares of the masked S-box
output. We further assume that all attacks are provided with su ciently many
traces, i.e. there are no PDF estimation problems.
In scenario (a) the running time of the “classical” MIA attack is given by
! L
d+1
"◊
–◊ |K|, where ! Ld+1" is the number of d+ 1-tuples of time samples to analyze, –
is the time it takes to compute the MIA distinguisher for one d+ 1-tuple of time
samples and one subkey hypothesis using the identity leakage model, and |K| is the
number of subkey hypotheses. In scenario (b) the running time of the “classical”
MIA attack is
! L
d+1
"◊ — ◊ |K|, where — is the time it takes to compute the MIA
distinguisher for one d+ 1-tuple of time samples and one subkey hypothesis using
the Hamming weight leakage model.
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Table 1 – Running time of MIA attacks using the proposed and the
“classical” workflow.
Proposed workflow “Classical” MIA Improvement factor
Scenario (a)
! L
d+1
"◊ –+ |K|◊ –◊ “ ! Ld+1"◊ –◊ |K|
¥ ! Ld+1"◊ – ¥ |K|
Scenario (b)
! L
d+1
"◊ –+ |K|◊ — ◊ “ ! Ld+1"◊ — ◊ |K|
¥ ! Ld+1"◊ – ¥ |K|◊ —/–
In scenario (a) the running time of step 2 of the proposed workflow is given by! L
d+1
"◊ –, and the running time of step 3 is |K|◊ –◊ “, where “ is the number of
d+1-tuples in the list of interesting tuples generated in step 2. We have that “ Ø 1
and typically “ is much smaller than L. The combined running time of steps 2 and
3 is
! L
d+1
"◊ –+ |K|◊ –◊ “. In scenario (b) the running time of step 2 is again! L
d+1
"◊– and the running time of step 3 is |K|◊—◊“. The combined running time
of both steps is
! L
d+1
"◊ –+ |K|◊ — ◊ “. Note that in both scenarios (a) and (b),
the total running time of the proposed workflow is dominated by step 2. Table 1
summarizes these numbers and shows that the proposed workflow essentially runs
|K| times faster.
So far we have limited this analysis to attacks against a single subkey. For attacking
multiple subkeys, it may be that only recovering the first subkey is hard and that
the interesting tuples of time samples related to the other subkeys can be easily
guessed once the tuple related to the first subkey has been found. But it may also
be that recovering the other subkeys requires basically the same computation as
recovering the first subkey. In either case, the improvement factor is essentially |K|.
In the latter case, this improvement applies to recovering each subkey, which is not
obvious since we express the improvement as a factor. Further, we note that the
improvement factor is independent of the masking order d and the window size L.
However, in absolute terms the running time improvement increases substantially
with increasing attack order d+ 1, L and the number of traces. Finally, we point
out that the analysis holds independently of the method used to estimate the
mutual information, as long as we assume that all involved estimations of mutual
information use the same method.
Number of traces needed.
It is not straightforward to make a precise but general statement about the number
of traces needed for our method to successfully locate interesting tuples. Many
factors play a role. We make a brief assessment and describe two of the e ects that
have to be considered.
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First, we consider an idealized scenario where steps 2 and 3 succeed as soon as
the same precision for the estimations is achieved. In this case, in scenario (b)
(Hamming weight leakage model), step 2 may require more traces to pinpoint the
interesting d + 1 tuples of time samples than step 3 to recover the key. This is
due to the fact that, in the attack step, the estimation of I(L(tV);L(tM);HW(Z))
with Z = S-Box(Pü k) for a hypothesized k requires generally less traces than an
equally precise estimation of I(L(tV);L(tM);P) in the tuple selection step. This
is because of the di erent number of classes for HW(Z) and for P. In the case
of AES, there are 256 di erent possible values for P, while there are only nine
di erent possible values for HW(Z). Nevertheless, since step 2 requires a larger
number of traces, these traces must be obtained and may be used in step 3. A
“classical” d+ 1-variate MIA attack requires the same (smaller) number of traces
as step 3.
In scenario (a) ((possibly truncated) identity leakage model) the previous e ect is
typically less pronounced and thus the di erence in the number of traces required
in each step is smaller. The same holds for the di erence in the number of traces
needed for step 2 and a “classical” d+ 1-variate MIA attack.
Second, the precision of the mutual information estimates required in step 3 to
distinguish the correct key hypothesis from incorrect ones may not be the same as
the precision required to distinguish an interesting tuple from a non-interesting one
in step 2. The relation between these precisions can be almost arbitrary. However,
it should typically hold that the precision required by an attack against the S-box
output in step 3 is not higher than the precision required in step 2.
Summarizing, in scenario (a) the proposed workflow o ers a running time
improvement factor in the order of magnitude of |K|, possibly at the cost of
an increased number of traces. In scenario (b) the proposed workflow requires
more traces than a “classical” attack but still o ers an interesting running time
improvement factor. It o ers a trade o . Whether the trade o  is attractive
depends on the ratio —/– in the running time improvement factor, and on how
many more traces are required.
4.2 On the S-box
The fact that the method can distinguish all d + 1 tuples corresponding to all
shares of any (sensitive) variable of the form Z = Fk(P) can be used to traverse
bijective S-boxes without making any hypothesis on the subkey. This is because
the S-box input is a keyed permutation of the plaintext, and the S-box output is
a permutation of the S-box input. Both permutations are transparent to mutual
information when using the identity function L˜(P) = P.
It is less obvious, nevertheless true, that the method also works in the case of
non-injective S-boxes, as for instance in DES. The reasoning is similar to the above.
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The S-box input is a keyed permutation of the plaintext. The S-box output is not
a permutation of the S-box input, but a non-injective function of it. Therefore,
if we use the identity function and condition on the plaintext, the S-box can be
traversed just like a bijective S-box, and interesting tuples of time samples after
the S-box can be identified. Note that a non-injective S-box cannot be traversed
from output to input in the same way.
4.3 Additional applications
The method described in this paper is fully generic and does not place any restrictive
assumption on the specific targeted implementation. However, the method benefits
from the available specificities of the implementation. For example, an adversary
could mount the following strategy if he knows that the device’s leakage behavior
is close to the Hamming weight model. Using the Hamming weight model, the
adversary first locates tuples corresponding to the S-box input to narrow down the
time window. Then, using the identity function, he searches in that window for
the S-box output.
The adversary could also locate tuples corresponding to the S-box input of the
next S-box lookup to further narrow down the time window.
Bit-tracing [JO05] is a technique used to track the time instants when a predictable
variable is handled in the execution flow of an unknown implementation. This is
a useful technique to reverse-engineer unknown implementations. The ideas in
Section 3.1 can be exploited to track masked variables during the execution of an
algorithm. Note that the fact that the proposed method can traverse S-boxes (by
the arguments given in Sect. 4.2) can also lead to a significant speed-up in the
bit-tracing process of masked implementations.
4.4 Estimation of mutual information
We note that any suitable method for estimating the mutual information or
the required probability distributions, e.g. histograms [GBTP08], kernel density
estimation [PR09], B-splines [Ven10], statistical moments [LB10], parametric
methods [PR09], and any similar metric, e.g. Kullback-Leibler divergence [VS09],
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [VS09], Cramér-von-Mises test [VS09], can be used.
Available knowledge about the device leakage behavior, e.g. close to the Hamming
weight model, can be used to speed up the estimations. Here we do not refer to
the choice of L˜ but to the leakage variables.
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4.5 Key recovery step
By construction, our method identifies tuples of time samples that correspond to
all shares of a masked (sensitive) variable. It does so irrespective of the particular
dependencies between each share and its side-channel leakage. Therefore, a generic
multivariate MIA attack with (possibly truncated) identity leakage model appears
to be most suited to exploit the unknown dependencies, in general. However,
if standard assumptions approximate the leakage behavior good enough or the
specific leakage behavior is known, the identified tuples can be exploited more
e ciently with adapted multivariate MIA or higher-order DPA attacks.
The proposed method can identify interesting tuples that relate to a specific
plaintext byte, but it cannot per se focus on interesting tuples that correspond to
a specific function of that plaintext byte. As a consequence, the method will in
general not discriminate between interesting tuples that correspond to all shares of
the masked plaintext, the masked S-box input or the masked S-box output. Clearly,
the latter is preferable for an attack. In our experiments we noted that enough
interesting tuples corresponding to all shares of the masked S-box output appeared
at the top of the ranked list.
5 Experiments
In this section we present experimental results of our method, insight on its
computation and a performance evaluation. We note that all “numbers of
traces” reported in this section cannot be generalized to other platforms and
implementations.
5.1 Measurements
We use an 8-bit microcontroller of Atmel’s AVR family in a smart card plastic body
as platform for our experiments. The microcontroller runs a first-order Boolean
masked implementation of AES-128 encryption that follows the lines of [HOM06].
This concrete implementation uses six independent mask bytes for one encryption.
Before the SubBytes operation, all state bytes are protected by the same mask
M0. After the SubBytes operation, all state bytes are protected by the same mask
M1. Before MixColumns, each column of the state is remasked with M2, . . . ,M5.
After MixColumns, each column of the state is masked with MÕ2, . . . ,MÕ5 that
depend on M2, . . . ,M5. Shiftrows does not a ect the masking and after the next
AddRoundKey operation, all state bytes are again protected by M0 due to the
masked key schedule. Note that the six masks are re-used to protect all rounds.
There are no additional countermeasures.
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We obtained 50 000 power traces from encryptions of randomly chosen plaintexts
with a fixed key and random masks. The card was clocked at 4MHz and we used a
sampling frequency of 200MS/s.
5.2 Selection of a time window: step 1
To reduce the computational burden, we restricted the measurements to cover
only the first 1.5 rounds of the encryption. This was done based on an educated
guess on the SPA features present in the power traces. Then, we compressed the
traces by integration to one point per clock cycle. As a result, each compressed
trace comprises 800 points. The subsequent analyses were carried out on these
compressed traces.
5.3 Computation of the method: step 2
To show the full potential of the method, we chose L˜ to be the identity function.
In what follows, P refers to the third plaintext byte, an arbitrary choice. We
estimate densities with histograms (using nine bins for each dimension unless
otherwise stated, because we expect a leakage behavior close to the Hamming
weight/distance model) and we useˆto indicate estimates, e.g. Iˆ is an estimate of
I. The computation of step 2 is split into two terms:
Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1);P) = Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1))≠ Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)|P) . (8)
In our experiments, we noted that a straightforward computation of this expression
can result in inconvenient estimation errors. The reason lies in the di erent number
of traces used to estimate each term on the right side of Eq. (8). Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)) is
computed with all available traces, say T . The second term is computed as
Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)|P) =
255ÿ
p=0
Pˆr(P = p)Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)|P = p) (9)
and for the computation of each summand about T/256 traces are used. This
di erence in the number of traces translates into di erent estimation accuracies for
each term in Eq. (8), burying the small relevant di erence between them due to
the e ect of P in the larger di erence due to the di erent estimation accuracies.
To amend this, since we have that I(L(t0);L(t1)) = I(L(t0);L(t1)|D) for a uniformly
distributed dummy random variable D that is independent of the leakages and
taking values in {0, . . . , 255}, we can compute Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)) in a way that resembles
Eq. (9) and approximate it by
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Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)|D) =
255ÿ
d=0
Pˆr(D = d)Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)|D = d) . (10)
This leads to equally (in-)accurate estimates for both terms in Eq. (8) and the
di erence between them is mostly due to the e ect of P.
To illustrate the e ectiveness of step 2 we compute Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)|D) and
Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)|P) from 50 000 measurements using the same bin distributions for
both terms. We use this relatively large number of traces to present aesthetically
pleasant figures. Far less traces are su cient for the method to work.
Figure 1 (left) shows a plot of the values of the first term of Eq. (8), i.e.
Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)) computed as Eq. (10), for t0, t1 œ {1, . . . , 800} and t0 ”= t1. It
is obviously su cient to compute the values only for t0 < t1 or t0 > t1. The x- and
y-axes both denote time. We plot a mean trace next to each of them for orientation.
The values of mutual information are represented by di erent colors according to
the color bar on the left side. We blank out most pairs of time samples, those that
yield small values of mutual information, by plotting them in white. All pairs that
yield mutual information values above a certain threshold are plotted in black.
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Figure 1 – Left: Matrix of Iˆ(L(t0);L(t1)) values. The color bar is in
units of bits. A mean trace is plotted next to the axes. Right: Above
diagonal, ‘x’: 100 pairs of time samples where a multivariate MIA
attack succeeds. Below diagonal, ‘+’: 100 top ranked pairs in the list
of step 2.
We can see that the locations of the pairs have a clear structure and could possibly
aid reverse-engineering of the implementation. Since we know the implementation,
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we can easily relate parts of the figure to operations: AddRoundKey (approx. index
100 to 150), SubBytes (approx. index 200 to 300), remasking (approx. 300 to 350),
four parts of MixColumn (approx. index 350 to 500), AddRoundKey (approx. index
550 to 600), followed by SubBytes and remasking in round two. These pairs are,
however, not yet interesting pairs because it is not clear if they can be exploited
by an attack (see the discussion of Eqs. (3) and (4)).
Next, we rank the list of pairs according to the result of Eq. (8). The 100 top
ranked pairs in the list, i.e. negative mutual information and large absolute value,
are depicted in the lower triangle of Figure 1 (right) with ‘+’ symbols.
For the sake of comparison, we include in the upper triangle of the figure the 100
pairs of time samples where a multivariate MIA attack on the third key byte (using
the Hamming weight leakage model on predicted S-box output values and 50 000
traces) achieves the largest nearest-rival distinguishing score [WO11], marked with
‘x’ symbols.
The partial match between the upper and the lower triangular matrix serves as a
first visual evidence for the e ectiveness of the method. In particular, the method
is able to identify pairs corresponding to both shares of the S-box output of a
specific state byte (here the third) without making any hypothesis about the key.
5.4 Performance evaluation of step 2
This section details the performance of the proposed method in finding the pairs that
can be exploited for key recovery. Informally, we aim to decouple the performance
of the proposed method from the performance of the key recovery attack itself,
which is not the focus of this paper. To do so, we first define a set of good pairs of
time samples that can be attacked and then we analyze the performance of the
method in identifying good pairs among all possible pairs.
More precisely, we define sets of good pairs by running an attack on all pairs using
50 000 measurements and retaining the 100 resp. 290 pairs that lead to key recovery
and have highest nearest-rival distinguishing score. Our choice for the size of the
sets is somewhat arbitrary. The idea is simply to define one smaller set of very good
pairs and a larger set that contains additional good pairs with lower nearest-rival
distinguishing score. Since di erent attacks may favor di erent pairs, we define
such sets for three cases: multivariate MIA on the S-box output, Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) [BCO04] with centered product combination function [PRB09] on
the S-box output and CPA with same combination function on the S-box input
(all using the Hamming weight leakage model). In total, we hence define six sets of
good pairs.
Once the sets of good pairs are defined, we run step 2 parametrized by the number
of traces. For each number of traces, we repeat the run of step 2 on 100 randomly
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chosen sets of traces and, each time, keep the position of the best ranked good pair
in the list generated by step 2. In other words, we test the pairs in descending order
of their ranking (rank 1 is best) and stop as soon as a pair is good. This ranking
position is the minimum size of the list from step 2 required for step 3 to succeed
in that particular run for a given attack technique. Recall that, by definition, an
attack on a good pair succeeds with a comfortable nearest-rival distinguishing score
(albeit the absolute margin for a CPA attack on the S-box input is a lot smaller).
We hence evaluate only the performance of step 2.
The distributions of the ranks of the best ranked good pairs are shown as boxplots
in Fig. 2 (sets of 100 good pairs) and in Fig. 3 (sets of 290 good pairs). For both
figures, the used attack techniques are, from left to right: MIA S-box output, CPA
S-box output and CPA S-box input.
In the boxplots, the central mark is the median (2nd quartile) and the box edges
(solid) represent the 1st and the 3rd quartile. The whiskers (dashed) extend to
q3+1.5(q3≠ q1) and q1≠1.5(q3≠ q1), where q1 and q3 are the 1st and 3rd quartiles,
respectively. Outliers are marked with ‘+’ symbols.
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Figure 2 – Distribution of the ranking of the first good pair in the
list of step 2. Left to right: MIA S-box output, CPA S-box output,
CPA S-box input, hypothetical random method. 100 good pairs.
For comparison, the rightmost boxplot in each figure shows the distribution that
a hypothetical method that ranks the pairs at random, instead of step 2, would
produce. These distributions are independent of an attack technique and only
relate to the number of good pairs among all pairs, here 100 resp. 290 out ouf
800◊ 799/2 = 319 600.
One can observe that the proposed method begins to identify good pairs (i.e. to
perform better than a random guess) that are exploitable by multivariate MIA or
CPA attacks on the S-box output when 3 000 traces or more are available. As the
number of traces increases, the medians of the distributions become smaller, i.e.
good pairs move steadily toward the top of the list.
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One can also observe that our method ranks good pairs for multivariate MIA
slightly higher than good pairs for CPA on the S-box output. On the other hand,
the method is not able to identify good pairs for a CPA attack on the S-box input
better than a random guess. We note that both behaviors are not a property of
our method but probably related to our test platform and the implementation.
In the case of larger lists of 290 good pairs, the previously made observations
mostly hold. As expected, the medians of the distributions are smaller than in the
case of 100 good pairs, simply because even a random guess becomes more likely
to succeed. In addition, we can observe that the method now ranks good pairs for
multivariate MIA and CPA on the S-box output almost equally well.
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Figure 3 – Distribution of the ranking of the first good pair in the
list of step 2. Left to right: MIA S-box output, CPA S-box output,
CPA S-box input, hypothetical random method. S sets containing
290 pairs.
5.5 Practical attacks
The above results highlight important properties of our method and demonstrate
that it is e ective. In practice, one is however less interested in the exact rank of
the first good pair in the sorted list, and more interested in the success rate of an
attack end-to-end. This clearly involves the performance of our method and the
e ciency of the attack used in step 3.
Table 2 shows success rates for steps 2 and 3 together. First we use a given number
of randomly chosen traces to compute step 2. Then we attack the “ = 10 resp.
100 best ranked pairs with multivariate MIA, CPA on the S-box output and CPA
on the S-box input (as described before) in step 3, using the same traces. We
repeat this procedure 100 times. For the numbers in the first row of the table, we
considered an attack successful if the correct key leads to the smallest correlation
(or mutual information) value (negative sign and highest absolute value), over all
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Table 2 – Success rates for steps 2 and 3 together, for several
parameters: number of traces, size “ of the list of step 2, key recovery
attack.
Number of traces 2k 3k 4k 5k 10k 2k 3k 4k 5k 10k
MIA S-box output “ = 100 3 15 59 83 100 “ = 10 0 3 34 53 100
CPA S-box output 11 41 75 95 100 1 11 48 66 100
CPA S-box input 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0
MIA S-box output “ = 10 0 2 15 35 100 “ = 10 0 0 7 17 90
CPA S-box output factor 1.5 0 3 28 52 98 factor 2 0 0 10 17 78
CPA S-box input 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
evaluated “ pairs. For the numbers in the second row of the table, we additionally
required the correct key to stand out at least by a factor of 1.5 compared to the
nearest rival (left) and by a factor of at least 2 (right).
A first observation is that a CPA attack on the S-box input does not work in
our concrete scenarios. CPA attacks on the S-box output converge slightly faster
toward 100% success rate than multivariate MIA attacks on the S-box output. We
can further see that, given enough traces, both attacks in step 3 eventually reach
100% success, even if we attack only the top ten pairs of step 2 and require the
correct key to stand out by a factor of at least 1.5. These results confirm that
the combination of steps 2 and 3 works in practice, and that step 2 is able to
identify exploitable pairs of time samples. Interestingly, one can further see that
multivariate MIA attacks on the S-box output have a small advantage over CPA
attacks on the S-box output, if we require the correct key to stand out by a factor
of at least 2.
5.6 Computational e ciency
In Tab. 3 we present empirical execution times for our implementations of the
proposed workflow (steps 2 and 3) and the strategy that uses exhaustive search
instead of step 2. Step 3 of the proposed workflow was performed with multivariate
MIA on the S-box output (using the Hamming weight leakage model and list size
“ = 100). For the exhaustive search strategy we evaluated two variants: multivariate
MIA on the S-box output (using the Hamming weight leakage model) and CPA
on the S-box output (with centered product preprocessing). All implementations
were executed on the same processor on a single core. We note that the absolute
execution times are heavily implementation-dependent and thus relative speed-ups
are more interesting, since they are less tied to the particular implementation used.
A first observation regarding Tab. 3 is the speed-up achieved by the proposed
workflow, compared to exhaustive search, when multivariate MIA is used for key
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Table 3 – Empirical execution times for steps 2 and 3 (“ = 100) of
the proposed workflow and several attacks using exhaustive search.
Number of traces step 2 + step 3 Exhaustive search Improvement factor
5 000 2m30s + 2s MIA-HW 1h48m 43
CPA 2h 48m 68
50 000 10m24s + 19s MIA-HW 17h18m 97
CPA 23h32m 132
recovery. This is a directly interpretable result that corresponds to scenario (b) in
Sect. 4.1. The improvement factor in this case is of 43 when 5 000 and 97 when
50 000 traces are used, respectively. We observe that, for our implementations, the
factor —/– depends on the number of traces.
One can further see that, for our implementations, applying the proposed workflow
is even advantageous if exhaustive search is done with CPA. It achieves an
improvement factor of 68 in the running time of the attack when 5 000 traces
are used, and an improvement factor of 132 when 50 000 traces are used. However,
we stress that this result is not universally valid. The speed-ups are heavily a ected
by the relative e ciency of our implementations of linear correlation and mutual
information estimation.
As a final observation concerning Tab. 3, we remark the validity of the approximation
we made in Tab. 1: the running time of the proposed workflow is dominated by
step 2. Step 3 contributes at most 3% to the total running time if the list size is
“ = 100.
6 Conclusion
Multivariate DPA attacks can su er from the e ect known as “combinatorial
explosion” and hence combinatorial time complexity in the number of time samples
that have to be exploited jointly. We presented a novel technique to identify such
interesting tuples of time samples before key recovery. Compared to previous work
on this topic, our method is not heuristic but systematic and works in black-box
conditions using only known inputs (or outputs). Our technique can lead to a
substantial improvement in the computational e ciency of multivariate attacks
compared to exhaustive search over the same window of time samples, since it
retains only a small fraction of all possible tuples for key recovery. Our approach
is based on mutual information and is fully generic, i.e. it does not require more
restrictive assumptions than a generic MIA attack. Experimental results based
on power traces of a masked software implementation of the AES confirm the
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e ectiveness of the technique, highlight some of its interesting properties and attest
attractive running time improvements. An aspect that is not fully explored in
this paper and left for future work is a thorough analysis of the number of traces
needed for the technique to work.
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Abstract. We present DPA attacks on an ARM Cortex-A8 processor
running at 1 GHz. This high-end processor is typically found in
portable devices such as phones and tablets. In our case, the processor
sits in a single board computer and runs a full-fledged Linux operating
system. The targeted AES implementation is bitsliced and runs
in constant time and constant flow. We show that, despite the
complex hardware and software, high clock frequencies and practical
measurement issues, the implementation can be broken with DPA
starting from a few thousand measurements of the electromagnetic
emanation of a decoupling capacitor near the processor. To harden
the bitsliced implementation against DPA attacks, we mask it using
principles of hardware gate-level masking. We evaluate the security
of our masked implementation against first-order and second-order
attacks. Our experiments show that successful attacks require roughly
two orders of magnitude more measurements.
Keywords: Side-channel analysis, DPA, ARM Cortex-A8, bitslicing,
gate-level masking.
1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks allow to extract secrets, such as cryptographic keys or
passwords, from embedded devices with relatively low e ort. Kocher reported
in his seminal paper [Koc96] extracting cryptographic keys from the observation
of the execution time taken by an implementation of Di e-Hellman, RSA or
DSS. A common characteristic of side-channel attacks is that they target concrete
implementations, and thus they are oblivious to the intrinsic mathematical security
of the algorithm. They can be readily applied to implementations of algorithms
that are resistant to traditional mathematical attacks.
Apart from timing, many other side-channels have been discussed in the literature.
Most notably, the instantaneous power consumption is a powerful side-channel
for embedded devices [KJJ99], and e cient exploitation mechanisms, such as
Di erential Power Analysis (DPA), are known. DPA requires access to the target
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device to collect a number of instantaneous power consumption traces while the
device is running the cryptographic implementation. The key can be derived from
the statistical analysis of the power consumption traces.
A popular variant of power analysis attacks are Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA)
attacks [GMO01,QS01]. EMA attacks measure the electromagnetic emanations
from the device and subsequently apply similar statistical techniques as DPA.
An advantage is that electromagnetic measurements do not require to establish
electrical contact, thus EMA can be less invasive than conventional power analysis.
Side-channel attacks on small embedded devices, such as microcontrollers and
cryptographic co-processors, are nowadays a well-understood threat and a fruitful
field of academic research. However, there are only a few studies of side-channel
attacks on more powerful general-purpose systems. This is highly relevant to the
gradual paradigm shift towards moving the cryptographic operation to the main
processor, as proposed in mobile payments and host card emulation.
In this paper we investigate the DPA susceptibility of block-cipher implementations
on high-end embedded devices. As an illustrative test case, we focus on the
Advanced Encryption Standard [AES01] (AES) and an ARM Cortex-A8 processor.
This processor core is found in portable consumer electronic devices, such as
phones (Apple iPhone4, Samsung Galaxy S, Google Nexus S), tablets, set-top
boxes, multimedia entertainment systems (Apple TV, Apple iPod Touch 4th gen),
home networking or storage appliances and printers.
The Cortex-A8 is a powerful and complex processor that features significant
di erences with typical targets of side-channel attacks. It is a 32-bit processor with
a 13-stage pipeline, dynamic branch prediction, L1 and L2 cache memories, a rich
ARMv7 instruction set and a separate SIMD execution pipeline and register file
(NEON). It can run at up to 1 GHz clock frequency. At the software level, there
is normally a full multi-tasking operating system with shared resources, di erent
competing processes and interrupts. It is not clear if DPA can be successfully
applied to such target devices. One goal of our work is to fill this gap.
1.1 Related work
AES on high-end embedded devices. An e cient option for AES software
implementations on high-end processors is the T-table approach due to Daemen
and Rijmen [DR02]. Its core idea is to merge three of the four AES transformations
(SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns) into four lookup tables. At the cost of
storing 4 kbytes, this method allows to compute an AES-128 encryption using
only 160 table lookups and 44 XOR operations. Since the four lookup tables are
rotations of each other, it is possible to reduce the memory requirements to 1 kbyte
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by storing a single table. For architectures with inline barrel shifter such as ARM,
this characteristic can be used without performance loss [OBSC10].
While e cient, implementations based on lookup tables are a target for side-
channel attacks on processors with cache memories. Exploiting cache-related timing
variabilities was already mentioned by Kocher [Koc96], and further elaborated on by
Kelsey et al. [KSWH00] and Page [Pag02]. In recent years, several practical attacks
against the T-table AES implementation of OpenSSL have been published, see for
instance the works of Bernstein [Ber05], Bonneau and Mironov [BM06] and Osvik
et al. [OST06]. The root of the problem stems from the di culty to load array
entries into the CPU registers without this depending on the index pointer. As
suggested by Bernstein et al. [BLS12], a secure library should systematically avoid
loads from addresses that depend on secret data. While one could always resort
to computing the AES S-Box to achieve constant execution time, the performance
penalties of straightforward implementations would be considerable.
It is in this context that bitsliced implementations rise as an attractive alternative
for AES in software. Originally proposed by Biham [Bih97] to improve the
performance of DES in software, the idea behind bitslicing consists in describing
a cryptographic algorithm as a sequence of Boolean operations which can be
implemented with only bitwise instructions. Since there are no table lookups,
bitsliced implementations are inherently resilient to cache timing attacks. The
first bitsliced software implementation of the AES for x64 processors is due to
Matsui [Mat06]. An alternative implementation for 64-bit platforms is presented
by Könighofer [Kön08]. The advent of Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD)
extensions on Intel Core2 processors has enabled a more e cient usage of the 128-bit
XMM registers. Matsui and Nakajima [MN07] were first to take advantage of this
and proposed a high-speed bitsliced implementation of the AES at 9.2 cycles/byte,
albeit conditioned to input data blocks of 2 kbytes. More recently, Käsper and
Schwabe [KS09] proposed the fastest implementations of AES-CTR and AES-GCM
up to date, running at 7.59 cycles/byte and 10.68 cycles/byte, respectively.
Side-channel attacks on high-end embedded devices. With the notable
exception of cache timing attacks, the susceptibility of high-end embedded
processors to side-channel attacks has received only little attention in the literature,
particularly when compared to the attention that has been given to less complex
platforms. Gebotys et al. [GHT05] showed how to attack Java implementations of
AES and ECC running on a PDA equipped with a “mid-range” 32-bit ARM7TDMI
at 40 MHz. The authors performed a di erential EMA attack in the frequency
domain in order to deal with the issue of trace misalignment. A follow-up work
by Aboulkassimi et al. [AAF+11] similarly used di erential EMA to attack AES
implementations. The target device was a mobile phone with a 32-bit processor
running at 370 MHz. Kenworthy and Rohatgi [KR12] applied Simple Power
Analysis (SPA) and leakage detection techniques to show the susceptibility of
several implementations to EMA. Although no processor frequency is specified, the
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acquisition bandwidth of the setup used was limited to 60 MHz. Finally, Nakano
et al. [NSN+] performed SPA attacks on ECC and RSA implementations running
on an Android Smartphone clocked at 832 MHz.
Masking countermeasures. A popular and well-studied countermeasure to
thwart power analysis attacks is masking [CJRR99, GP99]. Contrary to other
approaches, masking is a provable sound countermeasure and widely employed in
practice. In its simplest form, masking consists of splitting every key-dependent
intermediate s that appears throughout the computation into two shares (s1, s2)
such that s1 ı s2 = s. The group operation ı is typically XOR. The splitting is
such that each share si is statistically independent of the intermediate s. This
condition should be preserved throughout the entire masked computation, and
implies that knowledge of any individual si does not reveal any information about
the intermediate s, and thus about the key.
Masking can be applied at di erent abstraction levels: from the algorithmic
level (public key cryptography algorithms [Cor99,MDS99] as well as symmetric
key algorithms such as DES [GP99] or AES [AG01]) to the gate level [Tho01].
Algorithm-level masking can result in more compact implementations. However,
this masking method is not a general approach as it is tied to a specific algorithm.
On the other hand, gate-level masking performs the splitting at the bit level and
provides the implementer with a set of secure logic gates to compute on. It it thus
a versatile method to securely implement any given circuit.
1.2 Contributions
Our first contribution is to investigate the feasibility of DPA attacks on modern
gigahertz embedded processors. Our experimental platform is a Sitara ARM
Cortex-A8 32-bit RISC processor mounted on a Beaglebone Black (BBB) platform
and running a complete Ångström Linux distribution. Our test application is a
bitsliced implementation of AES-128 encryption immune to cache timing attacks.
Our experiments show that the most di cult part of an attack is of practical nature
(measurement point, triggering, alignment) and that basic DPA attacks succeed
with a few thousand measurements. For the sake of reproducibility, we describe all
steps carried out in our analysis in detail.
Our second contribution is to apply gate-level hardware masking to protect our
implementation. We show that it is not di cult to equip an unprotected bitsliced
implementation with masking. In addition we fully implement a masked AES on the
same platform and test its resistance to first-order and second-order attacks. Our
experiments show that breaking our masked implementation requires roughly
two orders of magnitude more measurements than breaking the unprotected
implementation.
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2 A bitsliced AES implementation
Our test application is a bitsliced implementation of the AES based on the
construction of Könighofer [Kön08]. We adapted it for our 32-bit processor. Note
that this is a poor decision if one aims for performance, i.e. bitsliced implementations
pay o  in software contexts only if the target processor contains large (and possibly
many) registers. Nevertheless, our aim is neither to propose nor to achieve high-
throughput implementations, but rather analyze bitsliced implementations from
the DPA-security standpoint. In fact, and as will become clear later, our insights
also apply for larger wordsize architectures such as e.g. NEON.
Hardware description of AES. In the following we focus on AES-128 encryption.
The first step towards a bitsliced description consists in describing all cipher
transformations (AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns) as a fixed
sequence of Boolean operations. The goal is to employ only bitwise operations i.e.
an equivalent gate representation in hardware contexts. The main di culty of this
process consists in finding an e cient way to compute the non-linear part of the
AES S-Box.
There exist many hardware flavours of AES depending on whether they aim for
throughput, area, low-power, etc. For bitsliced contexts, we are interested in
compact implementations. Most successful designs in this direction compute
the inverse in GF (28) using subfield arithmetic, as originally suggested by
Rijmen [Rij01]. This is the case of the works due to Rudra et al. [RDJ+],
Wolkerstorfer et al. [WOL02] and Satoh et al. [SMTM01], the latter building
also on the tower-field representation of Paar [Paa94]. As in [Kön08], we employ
the AES S-Box representation by Canright [Can05] illustrated in Figure 1.
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multiplier
l1
GF(24) 
multiplier
Figure 1 – AES S-Box representation due to Canright.
Bitsliced format. In the standard AES representation a 128-bit input message
block A is described as a 4◊ 4 byte matrix. This is illustrated in the upper left
hand side of Figure 2. Each byte is addressed as Ai. The cipher transformations
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are commonly defined at byte level in order to operate on the matrix representation
of the state, e.g. either at element level (AddRoundKey and SubBytes), at row level
(ShiftRows) or at column level (MixColumns). This representation is however
inadequate for bitsliced implementations, as all steps are defined at bit level.
Therefore, one needs to find a di erent representation of the cipher state. The most
straightforward option consists in arranging the state as a vector of 128 elements,
each corresponding to a bit. This choice is however unsuitable in practice, as the
state cannot be fully kept in registers and memory accesses easily become a major
bottleneck.
An alternative bitsliced representation uses a more compact state of 8 ele-
ments [KS09, Kön08, Mat06], each containing a particular bit of the 16 state
bytes Ai. Let us denote the bitsliced state elements by Ri. Going to the bitsliced
domain requires to split the bytes Ai and store the bits, from LSB to MSB, to
the corresponding registers, R1 to R8. Note that one input message block A fills
only 16 bits in each Ri. Therefore several input messages can be processed in
parallel, e.g. by storing bits from several input message blocks into each register.
This is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case of 32-bit registers. In this case, a second
plaintext B is processed concurrently with A.
... 
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... 
... 
... 
... 
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Bi = [bi8, bi7, bi6, bi5, bi4, bi3, bi2, bi1]
Figure 2 – Layout of bitsliced AES registers.
Coding style. We have coded our bitsliced AES implementation in C language
and mimicked the concept of hardware gates by using software macros for all atomic
operations. This approach allows us to write our program as a fixed sequence of
calls to five main macros: bitwise operations (XOR, AND and NOT), data transfers
(MOV) and left rotates (ROTL):
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#define XOR(c,a,b) c = a ˆ b;
#define AND(c,a,b) c = a & b;
#define NOT(c,a) c = ˜ a;
#define MOV(c,a) c = a;
#define ROTL(c,a,l) c = (a π l) | (a ∫ (32 - l));
The main benefit of this approach is that protecting the implementation with gate-
level masking requires only rewriting the macros. This point will be elaborated on
in Section 4.
3 Developing an attack
The BBB is a complex single board computer. The main component is a high-
performance TI AM3358 Sitara System on Chip (SoC) based on the ARM Cortex-A8
core. To give an idea of the complexity, we point out that the main processor can
be clocked up to 1 GHz and that the SoC features a DDR3 memory controller, a 3D
graphics engine, a vast array of peripheral support (incl. USB, ethernet) and two
32-bit sub-processors (technically, programmable real-time units) for time-critical
tasks, among others.
3.1 Strategies for side-channel measurements
From all the components of the single board computer, we are mostly interested
in the side-channel leakage of the ARM processor. An obvious way to access it
would be to measure the SoC’s power consumption. However, performing a power
measurement on a BGA package is not straightforward, as the pins are covered by
the package and not easily accessible.
A second strategy might be to measure the power consumption of the entire single
board computer. At least, doing the actual measurement should not be di cult as
the entire board is powered by a single 5 V supply (via USB or a dedicated connector,
e.g. if more than 500 mA is needed). But we expect the global power consumption
to be very noisy (many active components on the board). Furthermore, there is a
dedicated power management IC and numerous decoupling capacitors between the
power supply and the SoC. The high operating frequencies of the processor require
capacitor banks that can deal with low, medium and high frequencies.
The third approach is the one we actually followed. We opted for a “contact-less
power measurement”. To clarify, others have used the same technique and called it
“electromagnetic measurement”. We do use an electromagnetic pen probe but we
do not aim at measuring emanations from the ARM processor. Rather, we measure
the EM field around di erent components on the board that are somehow involved
in the current loop to the ARM core. In general, voltage regulators and decoupling
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capacitors [DO09,OC12] are promising candidates. In our case, the dedicated
power management IC is quite complex and physically located far away from the
ARM core. For these reasons, we do not think that it would provide a useful signal.
Therefore the decoupling capacitors are the best candidates. In general, the closer
the capacitor is to the processor, the better signal it can provide. In summary, we
use an electromagnetic probe to measure a signal that is correlated with the chip’s
power consumption. We therefore think of the technique as a contact-less power
measurement.
3.2 Experimental setup
Our experimental setup comprises:
• a stock BBB platform running a complete Linux Ångström distribution. We
did not modify the software or the hardware and operate the board in its
factory configuration. The Linux distribution is based on Debian 7 with
kernel version 3.8.13-bone47 (root@imx6q-wandboard-2gb-0). This is a
preemptive multitasking operating system with plenty of simultaneously
running processes. We did not switch o  any running service. The command
ps aux reports 102 processes running on the system. Among others, we
found running the Xorg graphical server (with the onboard HDMI driver
output activated), the apache2 webserver (including the nodejs server-side
javascript runtime environment, to our surprise) and the sshd server (with
an open session running throughout all experiments for monitoring purposes).
We power the board via the USB connection from the measurement PC. We
did not make any e ort to supply the board with a particularly clean voltage.
The board is connected to the measurement PC via ethernet-over-USB. We
did not disable the blinking blue leds that indicate activity.
• A Langer magnetic near field probe, model RF-B. The reported frequency
bandwidth is from 30 MHz to 3 GHz [EMV].
• A wideband 30 dB low-noise amplifier from Langer, model PA 303. The
reported frequency bandwidth goes from DC to 3 GHz.
• A Tektronix DPO70404C 8-bit oscilloscope with an analog bandwidth of
4 GHz. Most of the time we sampled at 6 GS/s to make full use of our setup’s
bandwidth (Nyquist rate).
We use the Linux command cpufreq-set -f 1000 MHz to bring the system into
a high-performance state. In this state the board cannot enter low-power mode
and the processor core is permanently clocked at 1 GHz, which is well within the
bandwidth of our measurement setup. Figure 3 shows a photo of our experimental
setup (left) and a representation of our EM probe and the field orientation it is
able to register (right) [EMV].
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Figure 3 – Photo of our setup (left) and EM antenna schematic
(right).
3.3 Approach
Our first step is to find a suitable measurement position for the EM antenna.
The EM antenna tip is small enough (we measured a diameter of 2 mm) to allow
us to get in between components and to measure individual components’ EM
field without picking up too many signals from neighboring components. For the
purpose of locating an appropiate position for the EM antenna, we wrote a short
C program that exercises memory accesses and ran it on the BBB in a loop. The
program executes 1000 NOPs, then repeatedly fills a bu er in memory with the
value 0x00000000 and then with the value 0xffffffff 1000 times, followed by
again 1000 NOPs. We manually move the antenna over the PCB surface and slowly
from component to component. We carefully monitor the sampled signal on the
oscilloscope for a pattern that looks correlated to the execution of our C code. We
begin doing this by trial and error, and we focus on the capacitors in the SoC’s
power supply as explained above. Note that this is a tedious task because we
need to get not only the probe’s tip in the right location but we also need to get
the probe in the right orientation (see Fig. 3 right). As the search was very time
consuming we had a look at the BBB PCB schematics [bbb]. We identified a bank
of capacitors in the SoC’s VDD core supply. They should be good candidates for
measurement points as their EM fields should contain a lot of useful signal about
the processor core’s activity. Next we locate these decoupling capacitors on the
PCB and manually scan them with the EM probe one by one.
We did not find a useful signal around these capacitors (that does not mean there
is no useful signal) and reverted to trial and error testing of other decoupling
capacitors in the SoC’s supply network. Eventually we found a good signal near
C66 (see Appendix A in the full version of this paper [BGRV15]), a 0.1 µF multilayer
ceramic capacitor in a 3.3 V supply rail. We used this probe position and orientation
for all measurements and did not further explore the board for other useful signals.
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Now that we found a suitable measurement point, the next step is to deal with the
timing and triggering. We run our bitsliced implementation of AES-128 encryption
from Section 2 on the BBB. We can send the inputs from the measurement PC and
read back the outputs as well. Recall that we keep an SSH connection open between
the measurement PC and the BBB for this purpose and for monitoring. After
some trial and error work we find a good pattern (related to I/O) to trigger the
oscilloscope on. Figure 4 shows the plot of an overview measurement. Note that we
need to substantially lower the sampling rate for some of these long measurements.
The execution of our C program causes the dense pattern in the middle of the
plot. The isolated peaks left and right of the dense pattern are caused by other
processes.
Figure 4 – Overview measurement of our unprotected AES.
Figure 5 shows the plot of a more focused measurement. We see patterns caused
by the reception of 34 bytes (two plaintext blocks of 16 bytes each and two control
words) followed by patterns caused by the AES encryption in the middle of the
figure. We do not know what causes the “block” pattern on the figure’s right hand
side.
Figure 6 shows a zoom on the patterns caused by the AES operation. It is tempting
to let the human eye search for patterns of the ten AES rounds, but in fact the
AES makes only a small part of this measurement (as marked by the dotted red
rectangle in the figure). We are not sure what the other processing is. We know
that some of it is the conversion of plaintexts to the bitsliced format, and from
bitsliced format to ciphertexts.
Figure 7 shows a plot of a measurement with the actual AES-128 encryption in the
middle of the plot. One would expect to see a sequence of nine very similar patterns
(the first nine AES rounds) followed by a di erent pattern (the tenth round without
MixColumns). However, in this figure we see a sequence of only eight very similar
patterns followed by a di erent pattern. It seems that our measurement is missing
one normal round. Our experiments confirm that what we recognize corresponds
to rounds two to ten. The execution of the first AES round leads to a pattern that
is more scattered over time, but it fills up the instruction cache so that the next
rounds are executed much faster which leads to a more dense and clear pattern.
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Figure 5 – Overview measurement of our unprotected AES.
When we execute several encryptions in a batch, the second and all following
encryptions typically run from cache and show clear patterns also for the first
round that we can use for alignment. Figure 8 shows the single-sided amplitude
spectrum of a measurement. The spectrum shows a clear and sharp peak at 1 GHz.
Even though we found a seemingly stable trigger, the measurements of the AES
encryption are actually heavily desynchronized. Recall that we are working with a
high-end ARM processor on a complex SoC and that our C program is only one of
more than 100 running processes (and we do not run it with elevated priority!).
Therefore, filtering out mis-triggered measurements and carefully aligning the
remaining measurements is crucial. In fact, we spend about seven times more time
on the post-processing than on the measurement.
3.4 Attack
We aim to break our unprotected implementation with a first-order correlation DPA
attack [BCO04] against the first round. The next step is to try to find a pattern
in the traces that is related to the (S-box computation in the) first round, and to
align all useful traces on that pattern. Finally we try to attack the implementation
with 10 000 aligned measurements.
We need to think about a power model because the implementation is bitsliced. A
typical byte-oriented implementation uses an S-box table in memory and processes
the AES state byte by byte. The key point here is that all 8 bits of an S-box output
are computed (or looked-up) at the same time. Hence one can expect all bits of
the S-box output to leak at the same time and this gives rise to the commonly
used “Hamming weight of the S-box output” power model. This is di erent for
our bitsliced implementation. The eight S-box output bits are computed one after
the other and stored in eight di erent registers. So if we assume for a moment
that the implementation processes one plaintext block at a time, each of the eight
registers holds 16 bits. For instance register R1 stores the 16 LSBs of the 16 state
bytes. With the usual divide and conquer approach we aim to recover the key
110 DPA, MASKING AND BITSLICING AT 1 GHZ
Figure 6 – Measurement of our unprotected AES.
byte by byte. If we make a guess about one key byte we can predict one S-box
output but the eight bits are spread over eightregisters that are not processed at
the same time. For a normal univariate attack we can therefore exploit only one
bit e ectively. The other 15 bits in the same register are algorithmic noise. If we
want to exploit more bits in the same register we need to guess more key bytes,
which quickly becomes computationally expensive. Alternatively we can think to
attack each of the eight bits of one S-box output separately and then perform some
majority voting, but we did not investigate this approach.
Now in our implementation the situation is similar but it actually processes two
plaintext blocks in parallel. This means for instance that register R1 stores 32
LSBs, 16 of one plaintext and 16 of the other. As the key is fixed both plaintext
blocks get encrypted under the same key. Making a guess on one key byte we can
attack both encryptions at the same time and predict two bits in a register (2 out
of 32 instead of 1 out of 16 in the example above). Our power model is hence
the Hamming weight (HW) of two bits in a register that are a ected by the same
sub-key. We stress that this observation has an important consequence: processing
more plaintext blocks in parallel does not make an attack harder if the adversary
is aware of the bitsliced implementation. In fact, the ratio of predicted bits and
processed bits, and hence the ratio of signal to algorithmic noise, is constant.
Figure 9 shows an exemplary result of a 2-bit attack against one key byte. The plot
on the left hand side shows the correlation traces for all key hypotheses obtained
using 10 000 measurements. The trace for the correct key hypothesis is plotted in
black. The plot shows that the correct key hypothesis leads to a distinguishable
and clear correlation peak. The plot on the right hand side shows the highest
and lowest correlation value for each key hypothesis (from the overall time frame)
over the number of measurements. In addition we also plot the 99.99% confidence
interval for sample correlation equal to zero (dashed lines). The plot shows that
only few thousand measurements are required for the correct key (black line) to
stand out and hence for the attack to succeed.
Attacks targeting the same (other) key byte(s) using the leakage of other (the
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Figure 7 – One of the first measurements of our unprotected AES.
same) register(s) give very similar results. Surprisingly full key recovery is hence
possible using only a few thousand measurements!
4 Masking a bitsliced AES implementation
Since a bitsliced software implementation mimics a hardware circuit, gate-level
masking appears as a very attractive candidate to protect our AES implementation.
Applying gate-level masking to an already existing implementation can actually be
done in a pretty straightforward manner. It only requires to protect the design’s
elementary Boolean functionalities, while the original sequence of operations remains
unmodified. A direct consequence of this is that any optimization performed
in the unprotected implementation, e.g. to improve the design’s throughput, is
automatically inherited by the protected implementation.
Generally, linear functions such as the XOR gate, are trivial to mask by just
computing on each share independently. The challenging part of gate-level masking
is to provide a construction for non-linear gates. One of the first works tackling
this problem is due to Trichina [Tri03]. Trichina gives a secure AND gate that
takes two shares of each input bit a, b and produces two output shares of c = a · b.
The secure AND gate consumes one fresh random bit r. If the input bit a (resp.
b) is shared into a1 and a2 (resp. b1 and b2), the two output shares c1, c2 of the
Trichina gate are defined as
c1 = r (1)
c2 = (((a1b1 ü r)ü a1b2)ü a2b1)ü a2b2. (2)
It is easy to verify that this AND gate description is correct, namely, that the
output shares XOR to a ·b. The description is also secure against first-order attacks:
each variable occurring during the execution is independent of any unshared value
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Figure 8 – Single-sided amplitude spectrum of a measurement.
a, b or c. Note however that the order of partial computations of c2 is relevant for
the security of the gate.
Masked bitsliced format. Applying first-order Boolean masking requires to
split any sensitive intermediate variable s into two shares such that s = s1 ü s2.
For our implementation, this implies that each of the eight original state registers
Ri becomes a pair (R1i ,R2i ) such that Ri = R1i üR2i . We denote R1i as mask state
and R2i as masked state. The plaintext in bitsliced format is shared in this way at
the beginning of the execution.
Masked operations. Our original bitsliced implementation employs only five
operations which are described as macros. These are: XOR, AND, NOT, MOV and
ROTL. Our masked implementation substitutes each occurrence of these by its
secure equivalent: SXOR, SAND, SNOT, SMOV and SROTL, respectively. The secure
equivalents operate sequentially on the mask state R1i and the masked state R2i .
The implementations of SXOR, SMOV and SROTL are trivial, as they consist of
implementing the corresponding XOR, MOV or ROTL twice: one for R1i and another
for R2i . In a similar way, the secure SNOT is simply computed by applying NOT
to one of the shares. The implementation of SAND is more elaborate and follows
closely the lines of the Trichina gate. A circuit representation of the gate is shown
in the left part of Figure 10, while its macro representation is given in the right
part of Figure 10.
In contrast to the original bitsliced macros, each variable in the macro is now an
array of 2 elements: mask state and masked state. Each of the two input arrays
(a, b) is thus composed of two registers (a[0],a[1]) and (b[0],b[1]), respectively.
Two temporal registers (t0 and t1) are additionally used to preserve the correctness
of the macro in case one of the source registers is also the destination, e.g. to
prevent errors when the macro is called as SAND(a,a,b). The result is placed in
the output array c composed of registers c[0] and c[1].
Randomness generation. The two operations that require randomness in the
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Figure 9 – Result of attack against unprotected implementation.
masked bitsliced implementation are the initial plaintext sharing and each SAND
operation. We use the kernel’s /dev/urandom cryptographic RNG to obtain the
required randomness. We do not read a single byte each time a random byte
is needed, instead, we read a chunk of randomness and place it in an internal
bu er at the beginning of each encryption. Then, during the actual encryption
the randomness is simply taken from this internal bu er. We implemented this
mechanism to minimally interrupt the execution of the encryption and get clean
measurements.
We note that masking typically does not need cryptographically strong random
numbers for the masks. Although we used a cryptographically strong source of
randomness for the masks, a lighter RNG can be used if needed, e.g. for performance
reasons. When we later report that the RNG is switched o , we fill the internal
bu er from /dev/zero instead of from /dev/urandom.
Performance. We have compiled our implementations directly in the BBB using
the compiler version available in the Ångström Linux distribution, i.e. gcc version
4.6.3. No special flags have been used. The throughput loss of the protected
implementation is roughly a factor 5 compared to the unprotected implementation.
Further, the RAM usage increases by 32 bytes because of doubling the register
state size. Our internal bu er for storing random numbers holds 2048 bytes. The
only macro in our implementation that consumes randomness is SAND, which is
used 37 times during the calculation of SubBytes. Taking into account that 32
bytes are required to mask the input plaintexts, this gives 32+10◊ (37◊ 4) = 1512
random bytes per AES execution, or equivalently, 756 bytes per plaintext block.
5 Evaluation of masked implementation
In this section we evaluate the DPA resistance of our bitsliced and first-order
masked AES implementation.
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b0
r
c0 #define SAND(c, a, b){
t0 = a[0] & b[0];
t1 = a[0] & b[1];
c[0] = RAND();
t0 = t0 ˆ c[0];
t0 = t0 ˆ t1;
t1 = a[1] & b[0];
t0 = t0 ˆ t1;
t1 = a[1] & b[1];
t0 = t0 ˆ t1;
c[1] = t0;}
Figure 10 – Left: Trichina construction for the masked AND gate.
Right: pseudocode for the SAND operation following the Trichina AND
construction.
5.1 Attack when RNG is o 
We first attack the implementation with the RNG switched o . In this case the
implementation is e ectively unprotected and we aim to break it with the same
first-order attack as before: we guess one key byte and use the HW of the two
a ected bits in a register as power model. Since the code is di erent, the shape of
the measurements is di erent as well, and we need to work through trial and error
again to find a good pattern for trace alignment. And this is where the fact that
the implementation is e ectively unprotected helps. We should be able to break
it easily, and we can use the attack result to judge and improve the discarding of
mis-triggered measurements and the alignment step until we are satisfied. As a
side note we also mention that we need to take longer measurements because in
particular the S-box computation takes more time.
Figure 11 shows the result of an exemplary attack against one key byte. The plot on
the left hand side shows that using 10 000 measurements the correct key hypothesis
leads to a clear correlation peak. The plot on the right hand side confirms that,
if the RNG is switched o , our masked implementation is as insecure as the
unprotected implementation and can be broken with a few thousand measurements.
Also in this case attacks targeting other key bytes and using the leakage of other
registers give similar results. Full key extraction with a first-order attack is possible
with a few thousand measurements.
5.2 Attack when RNG is on
Now we switch on the RNG and evaluate how much protection our masked
implementation provides. Having performed the attacks with the RNG switched
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Figure 11 – Result of attack against masked implementation with
RNG o .
o  has two important advantages. First, we can keep all settings for triggering, for
discarding mis-triggered measurements, and for alignment because the executed
code is exactly the same and the general shape of the measurements does not
change. And second, we know exactly when the S-box computations are performed
and we can therefore narrow down the time window to analyze (including some
margin).
It is well known that implementing masking securely in software is very di cult,
and we do not expect our first attempt to mask a bitsliced implementation to
provide a high level of resistance to attacks. Nevertheless, to ensure that we have
enough measurements at hand to break our implementation we acquired 2 000 000
measurements. We stress that trace acquisition is rather quick, but in contrast
to most academic works we have to deal with the computationally intensive and
hence slow post-processing (discarding mis-triggered measurements and alignment).
After post-processing we are left with about 1.2 million aligned measurements.
We applied the same 2-bit first-order DPA attack as before in various settings,
targeting di erent key bytes and registers. The results di er a lot depending on the
specific setting. To give an idea of the range, we provide two results in Figure 12.
They target di erent key bytes and registers. While in the upper plots the attack
clearly succeeds and requires about 600 000 measurements, the attack in the lower
plots fails even if using 1.2 million traces. Nevertheless, we confirmed that, using
alternative combinations of target key byte and register, full key extraction with
first-order DPA and using 1.2 million measurements is possible.
Considering the well known di culties with masking in software and the surprisingly
easy attacks against the unprotected implementation, we expected attacks against
our masked implementation to succeed with much less traces. Our results are
therefore promising and good news for the idea to combine bitsliced software and
gate-level masking. Recall that our implementations are coded in C, processed by
a compiler and we have little control over the code that will be eventually executed.
Also, we stress that this is our first attempt to mask the implementation. The
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fact that the result of each individual Boolean operation is registered in a bitsliced
implementation probably helps. Glitches that are an issue for masked hardware
implementations [MPG05] are no threat here.
We also performed a few exemplary univariate and bivariate second-order
attacks using all available 1.2 million measurements. Concretely, we processed
the measurements to combine each pair of time samples using the absolute
di erence combination function [Mes00] or the centered product combination
function [PRB09]. This combination step yields a combinatorial blow-up in the
number of time sample pairs to be analyzed jointly and makes these attacks very
computationally expensive.
We then applied the same 2-bit attack to the combined measurements. Figure 13
depicts the results of an exemplary attack using the absolute di erence combination
function. The plot on the left hand side shows the maximum absolute value of the
correlation coe cient for each key byte hypothesis across all pairs of time samples.
The correct value (indicated by a dashed vertical line) clearly stands out against all
competing hypotheses. For the plot on the right hand side we restrict the analysis
to the single pair of time samples for which the correct key guess gives maximal
correlation. It shows that the attack can be successful starting from around 400 000
measurements if the adversary already knows which pair of time samples to analyze.
In other words, a more realistic attack will very likely require more measurements
to succeed. However, a more extensive analysis over all pairs of time samples is
computationally expensive.
Our results lead to two interesting observations. First, the second-order attack
only works when we use the absolute di erence combination function. A similar
attack using the centered product combination function is unsuccessful. This is in
contrast with theoretical results proving the optimality of the centered product
combination function for second-order attacks [PRB09] assuming Hamming weight
leakage and Gaussian noise. We speculate that our scenario does not meet these
assumptions su ciently and that the absolute di erence combination function is
more robust. And second, the number of measurements required for a successful
first-order attack is not substantially lower than the number of measurements
needed for our “idealized” second-order attack. A converse result would indicate a
flaw in the masked implementation.
6 Conclusion
The threat of side-channel attacks to the security of microcontrollers and
cryptographic co-processors appears to be well understood by both industry and
academia. Yet the same cannot be said for high-end embedded processors as used
in phones and tablets. In this situation one may naturally wonder whether such
complex, high-performance devices operating in the GHz range and executing
REFERENCES 117
multitasking operating systems are at all vulnerable to DPA. In this work we
answer this question positively. By means of experiments we show that DPA
attacks against constant-time bitsliced implementations of the AES running on
a 1 GHz ARM Cortex-A8 processor are not only possible, but in fact rather
easy to mount. The most challenging parts of an attack are triggering and trace
alignment. Finally, we mask our implementation inspired by gate-level masking
and evaluate its resistance against first-order and second-order DPA attacks. Our
results indicate that the implementation is more secure than we anticipated and
therefore highlight the potential of combining bitsliced software implementations
and gate-level masking.
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Figure 12 – Results of first-order attacks against masked
implementation with RNG on.
Figure 13 – Result of second-order attacks against masked
implementation with RNG on.
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Abstract. Lattice-based cryptography has been proposed as a
postquantum public-key cryptosystem. In this paper, we present
a masked ring-LWE decryption implementation resistant to first-order
side-channel attacks. Our solution has the peculiarity that the entire
computation is performed in the masked domain. This is achieved
thanks to a new, bespoke masked decoder implementation. The
output of the ring-LWE decryption are Boolean shares suitable for
derivation of a symmetric key. We have implemented a hardware
architecture of the masked ring-LWE processor on a Virtex-II FPGA,
and have performed side channel analysis to confirm the soundness of
our approach. The area of the protected architecture is around 2000
LUTs, a 20% increase with respect to the unprotected architecture.
The protected implementation takes 7478 cycles to compute, which is
only a factor ◊2.6 larger than the unprotected implementation.
1 Introduction
Once the quantum computer is built, Shor’s algorithm will make most current
cryptographic algorithms obsolete. In particular, public-key cryptosystems that
rely on number-theoretic hardness assumptions such as integer factorization (RSA)
or discrete logarithms, either in Zúp (Di e-Hellman) or in elliptic curves over finite
fields, will be insecure. On the bright side, there is an entire branch of postquantum
cryptography that is believed to resist mathematical attacks running on quantum
computers.
There are three main branches of postquantum cryptosystems: based on
codes, on multivariate quadratic equations or on lattices [BBD08]. Lattice-
based cryptographic constructions, founded on the learning with errors (LWE)
problem [Reg05] and its ring variant known as ring-LWE problem [LPR10], have
become a versatile tool for designing asymmetric encryption schemes [LPR10],
digital signatures [DDLL13] and homomorphic encryption schemes [FV12,BLLN13].
Several hardware and software implementations of such schemes have appeared
in the literature. So far, the reported implementations have focused mainly on
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e cient implementation strategies, and very little research work has appeared in
the area of side channel security of the lattice-based schemes.
It comes as no surprise that implementations of postquantum algorithms are
vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks, as introduced by
Kocher [Koc96], exploit timing, power consumption or the electromagnetic
emanation from a device executing a cryptographic implementation to extract
secrets, such as cryptographic keys. A particularly powerful side-channel technique
is Di erential Power Analysis (DPA), introduced by Kocher et. al. [KJJ99]. In a
typical DPA attack, the adversary measures the instantaneous power consumption
of a device, places hypotheses on subkeys and applies statistical tests to confirm or
reject the hypotheses. DPA attacks can be surprisingly easy to mount even with
low-end equipment, and hence it is important to protect against them.
There are plenty of countermeasures against DPA. Most notably, masking [CJRR99,
GP99] is both a provably sound and popular in industry. Masking e ectively
randomizes the computation of the cryptographic algorithm by splitting each
intermediate into several shares, in such a way that each share is independent
from any secret. This property is preserved through the entire computation. Thus,
observing any single intermediate (for example, by a side-channel, be it known
or unknown) reveals nothing about the secret. However, there are not many
masking schemes specifically designed for postquantum cryptography. In [BGL+14]
Brenner et. al. present a masked FPGA implementation of the post-quantum
pseudo-random function SPRING.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on protecting the ring-LWE decryption operation
against side-channel attacks with masking. The decryption algorithm is considerably
exposed to DPA attacks since it repeatedly uses long-term private keys. In contrast,
the encryption or key-generation procedures use ephemeral secrets only [RRVV14].
Our contribution. In this paper we present a very compact masked
implementation of the ring-LWE decryption function. The masking countermeasure
adds very limited overhead compared to other previous approaches, thanks to a
bespoke probabilistic masked decoder designed specifically for our implementation.
We implemented the design on a Virtex-II FPGA and tested the side-channel
security with practical experiments that demonstrate the validity of our approach.
Organization. The paper is structured as follows: we provide a brief mathematical
background of the ring-LWE encryption scheme in Section 2 and describe a high-
level overview of the proposed masked ring-LWE decryption in Section 3. In
the next section we construct the masked decoder and in Section 5 we show the
experimental results. We analyze the error rates of the decryption operation in
Section 6 and apply error correcting codes. We dedicate Section 7 for the side
channel evaluation.
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2 Preliminaries
Notation. The Latin letters r, ci indicate polynomials. When we want to explicitly
access a coe cient of the polynomial we write r[i]. Multiplication of polynomials
is written as r ú c1. Coe cient-wise multiplication is denoted as r · c1. The letter
m denotes a string of bits, and q is an integer. Letters with prime xÕ or double
prime xÕÕ represent shares of variable x. Depending on the context, these shares are
split either arithmetically x = xÕ + xÕÕ (mod q) or Boolean x = xÕ + xÕÕ (mod 2).
A polynomial r is shared into (rÕ, rÕÕ) by additively sharing each of its coe cients
r[i] such that r = rÕ + rÕÕ.
Ring-LWE. For completeness, we give in this section a description of the three
major algorithms of the ring-LWE public-key cryptosystem [LPR10]: key-generation,
encryption and decryption.
The ring-LWE encryption scheme works with polynomials in a ring Rq =
Zq[x]/(f(x)), where f(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree n. During the key
generation, encryption and decryption operations, polynomial arithmetic such as
polynomial addition, subtraction and multiplication are performed. In addition,
the key-generation and encryption operations require sampling of error polynomials
from an error distribution (typically a discrete Gaussian.)
The ring-LWE encryption scheme is described in this way:
• In the key generation phase, two error polynomials r1 and r2 are sampled
from the discrete Gaussian distribution. The secret key is the polynomial r2
and the public key is the polynomial p = r1 ≠ g ú r2. After key generation,
there is no use of the polynomial r1. The polynomial g is globally known.
• In the encryption operation of a binary message vector m of length n, the
message is first lifted to a ring element m¯ œ Rq by multiplying the message
bits by q/2. The ciphertext is computed as a pair of polynomials (c1, c2)
where c1 = gúe1+e2 and c2 = púe1+e3+m¯ œ Rq. The encryption operation
requires generation of three error polynomials e1, e2 and e3.
• The decryption operation uses the private key r2 to compute the message as
m = th(c1 ú r2 + c2). The decoding function th is a simple threshold decoder
that is applied coe cient-wise and is defined as
th(x) =
;
0 if x œ (0, q/4) ﬁ (3q/4, q)
1 if x œ (q/4, 3q/4) (1)
E ciency improvements. To achieve an e cient implementation of the
encryption scheme, the irreducible polynomial f(x) is taken as xn + 1 where
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Figure 1 – General data flow of the masked ring-LWE decryption.
rÕ and rÕÕ are the arithmetic shares of the private key r; c1 and c2 are
the input unmasked ciphertext; mÕ and mÕÕ are the Boolean shares of
the recovered plaintext.
n is a power of two, and the modulus q is chosen as a prime number satisfying
q © 1 mod 2n [PG14,RVM+14]. In this setting, polynomial multiplications can
be e ciently performed in O(n logn) time using the Number Theoretic Transform
(NTT).
Following [RVM+14], we keep the ciphertext polynomials c1 and c2 in the NTT
domain to reduce the computation cost of the decryption operation. The decryption
operation thus computes the decrypted message as
m = th
!
INTT(c˜1 · r˜2 + c˜2)
"
. (2)
Here the symbol r˜ represents the NTT of a polynomial r, and INTT(·) represents
the inverse NTT operation. The multiplication of c˜1 ·r˜2 is thus performed coe cient-
wise (as well as the addition c˜1 · r˜2+ c˜2.) For convenience, we drop the tildes in the
rest of the paper and work with c1, c2 and r2 in the NTT domain. We furthermore
refer to r˜2 simply as r. (We recall that the INTT is a linear transformation applied
to the n coe cients of a = r · c1+ c2.) The decoding function th applies a threshold
function to each coe cient of a as defined in Equation 1 to output n recovered
message bits.
3 High-level overview
In this section, we give a high-level view of the masked ring-LWE implementation.
The most natural way to split the computation of the decryption as Equation 2
is to split the secret polynomial r additively into two shares rÕ and rÕÕ such that
r[i] = rÕ[i] + rÕÕ[i] (mod q) for all i. The n coe cients of rÕ are chosen uniformly
at random in Zq in each execution of the decryption.
MASKED DECODER 129
The bulk of the computation from Equation 2 is amenable to this splitting,
since by linearity of the multiplication and INTT operation, we have that
INTT(r · c2 + c1) = INTT(rÕ · c2 + c1) + INTT(rÕÕ · c2). Thus, we can split
almost the entire computation from Equation 2 into two branches, as drawn in
Figure 1. The first branch computes on rÕ to determine the polynomial
aÕ = INTT(rÕ · c2 + c1) (3)
and the second branch operates on rÕÕ to determine
aÕÕ = INTT(rÕÕ · c2). (4)
The advantage of such a high-level masking is that the operations of Equation 3 and 4
can be performed on an arithmetic processor without any particular protection
against DPA. (This is because any intermediate appearing in either branch is
independent of the secret r. This situation is very similar to, for example, base
point blinding in elliptic curve scalar multiplication.) We can reuse an existing
ring-LWE processor for these operations, and leverage the numerous optimizations
carried out for this block [PG14,RVM+14].
The final threshold th(·) operation of Equation 2 is obviously non-linear in the base
field Fq, and hence cannot be independently applied to each branch (Equation 3
and 4). There are generic approaches to mask arbitrary functions. For instance,
in [BGL+14] an approach based on masked tables was used. However, these generic
approaches are usually quite expensive in terms of area or randomness. In the
following Section 4, we pursue another direction. We design a bespoke masked
decoder that results in a very compact implementation.
4 Masked decoder
In this section we describe a very compact, probabilistic masked decoder. In the
sequel, a denotes a single coe cient and (aÕ, aÕÕ) its shares such that aÕ + aÕÕ = a
(mod q). The decoder computes the function th(a) from the shares (aÕ, aÕÕ). We
also drop the symbol (mod q) when obvious.
First crack. The key idea of the e cient masked decoder is that we do not need to
know the exact values of the shares aÕ and aÕÕ of a coe cient a in order to compute
th(a). For example, if 0 < aÕ < q/4 and q/4 < aÕÕ < q/2 then a = aÕ + aÕÕ is
bounded by q/4 < a < 3q/4, and thus th(a) = 1. That is, we learnt th(a) from only
a few most significant bits from aÕ and aÕÕ. We can use this idea to substantially
simplify the complexity of the masked th function.
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Figure 2 – Idea for the masked decoder. Elements in Zq are shown in
a circle. Adding two elements translates into adding their respective
angles. Left: case 0 < aÕ < q/4, q/4 < aÕÕ < q/2, and therefore
th(a) = 1. Center and right: case 0 < aÕ < q/4, 0 < aÕÕ < q/4, which
does not allow to infer th(a).
4.1 Rules
Figure 2, left, illustrates the situation from the last paragraph. In this case,
0 < aÕ < q/4 and q/4 < aÕÕ < q/2 so obviously a can range only from q/4 to 3q/4,
and hence th(a) = 1. Analogously to this rule, we can formulate 3 other rules:
• If q/2 < aÕ < 3q/4 and 3q/4 < aÕÕ < q then q/4 < a < 3q/4 and thus
th(a) = 1.
• If q/4 < aÕ < q/2 and q/2 < aÕÕ < 3q/4 then a belongs to (0, q/4) ﬁ (3q/4, q)
and thus th(a) = 0 (quadrants I and IV, left half of the circle).
• If 3q/4 < aÕ < q and 0 < aÕÕ < q/4 then a belongs to (0, q/4) ﬁ (3q/4, q) and
thus th(a) = 0.
There are 4 other rules that result from interchanging aÕ with aÕÕ in the above
expressions. (This follows straight from the symmetry of the additive splitting.)
Essentially, with the only information of the quadrant of each share aÕ and aÕÕ
we can, in half of the cases, deduce the output of th(a). (For the explanation
simplicity, we obviated what happens in the boundaries of the quadrant intervals.
Similar conclusions hold when including them.)
What if no rule is hit? In roughly half of the cases, we can apply one of the 8
rules previously described to deduce the value of th(a). However, in the other half
of the cases, none of the rules applies. A representative case of this event is shown
in Figure 2, center and right. In both cases, 0 < aÕ < q/4 and 0 < aÕÕ < q/4. This
situation is not covered by any of the 8 rules previously described. We see that in
the center sub figure th(a) = 0 while in the right sub figure th(a) = 1, so in this
case the quadrants of each share aÕ and aÕÕ do not allow us to infer th(a).
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Figure 3 – The masked decoder.
The solution in this case is to refresh the splitting (aÕ, aÕÕ), that is, update
aÕ Ω aÕ +  1 and aÕÕ Ω aÕÕ ≠  1 for certain  1. (This refreshing naturally
preserves the unshared value a = aÕ + aÕÕ.) After the refreshing, the 8 rules can
be checked again. If still no rule applies, the process is repeated with a di erent
refreshing value  i. Note that in each iteration of the step, roughly half of the
possible values of (aÕ, aÕÕ) œ Zq ◊Zq are successfully decoded, and thus the amount
of pairs (aÕ, aÕÕ) that do not get decoded shrinks exponentially with the number of
iterations. In our implementation, N = 16 iterations produces a satisfactory result.
This will be studied in detail in Section 6.1.
Optimal cooked values for  i. One can determine a sequence of  i values
that maximizes the number of pairs successfully decoded after N iterations. We
performed a first-order search for such a sequence of  i values. Each  i maximizes
the number of successfully decoded pairs after i≠ 1 iterations. For q = 7681 the
sequence of  i shown in Section 9 on page 145 was found.
Architecture. The hardware architecture for the masked decoder follows from the
previous working principle description. Our implementation is shown in Figure 3.
From left to right, we see the first refreshing step by the constants  i. The constants
 i vary from iteration to iteration. After the refreshing step, the quadrant function
is applied to each share aÕ, aÕÕ. This quadrant function outputs x if a belongs to the
x-th quadrant, and thus the output consists of 2 bits. These blocks are essentially
13-bit comparators, and thus relatively inexpensive in logic.1 The subsequent rule
checking on (qÕ, qÕÕ) is performed by a masked table lookup that is described in
the following section. The whole process is repeated N = 16 iterations, and this
1Note that in the special case that q is a prime close to a power of two the construction of the
quadrant block can be further simplified.
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number of iterations stays fixed even if the decoding is successful after the few first
iterations.
4.2 Masked table lookup
The final step in the masked decoder is a masked table lookup. This table
implements the rules described in Section 4.1, and essentially maps the output
of each quadrant qÕi and qÕÕi (2 bits each) after the i-the iteration (i œ [1, N ]) to
a (Boolean) masked output bit value (mÕi,mÕÕi ). In our specific implementation,
we have other inputs: the result of the decoding from the previous iteration
(mÕi≠1,mÕÕi≠1) and an extra randomness bit r (fresh at each of the N iterations for
each of the n coe cients).
This is a well-studied problem that arises in other situations (for instance, when
masking the sbox lookup in a typical block cipher) and there are plenty of approaches
here to implement such masked table lookup. We opted for the approach of masked
tables as in [Tri13]. We set mÕi Ω r and we compute mÕÕi Ω f(r, qÕi, qÕÕi ,mÕi≠1,mÕÕi≠1).
The function f essentially bypasses the previous decoded value when no rule applies
to qÕi, qÕÕi by setting the output mÕÕi to r +mÕi≠1 +mÕÕi≠1 (refreshing the content of
the output registers). If a rule applies to qÕi, qÕÕi , it sets the output mÕÕi accordingly.
By doing this, we can register always the output of this table and no control logic
to enable such output register is needed (it is implicitly integrated into this masked
table.) This is the reason why the table sees also the previous decoded value mÕi≠1
and mÕÕi≠1.
The usual precautions are applied when implementing f . For our target FPGA
platform, we carefully split the 7-bit input to 1-bit output function f into a balanced
tree of 4-bit input LUTs, in such a way that any intermediate input or output of
LUTs does not leak in the first order. Note that here we are assuming that each
LUT is an atomic operation. If stronger security guarantees are needed, other
approaches to implement such function f should be followed. When implemented
in an ASIC, it may be preferable to store this masked table in ROM (since the
contents of the table are immutable and the size is small.)
The output of this table is (Boolean) masked, and thus no unmasked value lives
within the implementation. This is suited for consumption of a masked AES module
(say) after some preprocessing as will be detailed later. We stress that we use
masked tables on the output of the quadrants. This is the key for our reduced area
requirements, as will be explained in the next Section 5.
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5 Implementation results
We implemented the fully masked ring-LWE decryption system with the parameter
set (n, q, s) = (256, 7681, 11.32) first introduced in [GFS+12], corresponding to
a medium-term security level. The target platform is a Xilinx Virtex-II xc2vp7
FPGA. The HDL files were synthesized within Xilinx ISE v8.2 with optimization
settings set to balanced and KEEP HIERARCHY flag when appropriate to prevent
optimization of security-critical components. We base our arithmetic processor on
the design from [RVM+14].
5.1 Area
In our case, a single arithmetic coprocessor performs serially the computations of
Equation 3 and then that of Equation 4. This incurs in a very slight area overhead
(only the control microcode is slightly modified, plus the masked decoder), at the
obvious cost of an increased execution time. In comparison to the unprotected
version, our protected decryption scheme consumes more memory as now we store
two shares rÕ and rÕÕ of the secret polynomial r, and the two output polynomials
aÕ and aÕÕ from the two INTT operations.
In Table 1, we can see that the proposed masking of the ring-LWE architecture
incurs an additional area overhead of only 301 LUTs and 129 FFs in comparison
to the unprotected version. 2 This additional area cost is mostly due to a pair
of masked decoders. Due to its low area overhead, we chose to keep two masked
decoders in parallel, decoding two coe cients simultaneously. (This nicely fits
with the memory organization of the arithmetic coprocessor, since it fits two 13-bit
coe cients in each memory word.) Thus, we use two addition and subtraction
circuits for the refreshing with  i (accounting for 160 LUTs) and two masked
tables (90 LUTs in total.)
We note that we could straightforward reduce the additional area cost by reusing
the 13-bit addition and subtraction circuits present in the arithmetic coprocessor.
Since during a decoding operation, the arithmetic coprocessor remains idle, reusing
of the addition and subtraction circuits do not cause any increase in the cycle
count. For simplicity, we did not implement this approach.
5.2 Cycle count
The cycle count for our approach is decomposed in the computation of Equation 3,
Equation 4 and the masked decoder. Equation 3 takes 2840 cycles (one unprotected
2Note that these results are not directly comparable with [RVM+14], since the latter were
obtained from a more advanced Virtex-6 FPGA, which has 6-bit input LUTs and superior routing
mechanisms in comparison to our target FPGA.
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Implementation LUTs/FFs/DSPs Freq Cycles/Time(µs)
Algorithm (MHz) Decryption
Unprotected RLWE 1713/830/1 120 2.8k/23.5
Protected RLWE 2014/959/1 100 7.5k/75.2
Table 1 – Performance and Comparison on Xilinx Virtex-II xc2vp7
FPGA.
ring-LWE decryption), Equation 4 takes 2590 cycles, slightly less than Equation 3
since there is no addition present in the second branch.
The two-way parallel masked decoder takes 12 ◊ n ◊ N + ‘ cycles to decode all
the coe cients into message bits. In our case with n = 256, N = 16 the masked
decoder takes 2048 cycles. Thus in total, a masked decryption operation requires
7478 cycles. The arithmetic coprocessor and the masked decoder run in constant
time and constant flow.
5.3 Comparison with an elliptic-curve cryptosystem
We compare our protected decryption scheme with the unprotected high-speed
elliptic curve scalar multiplier architecture proposed by Rebeiro et al. in [RRM12].
The architecture for the field GF(2233) consumes 23 147 LUTs and computes an
unprotected scalar multiplication in 12.5µs on a more advanced Virtex-4 FPGA.
Thus the scalar multiplier has an area ◊ time product of approximately 289 337.
Our protected ring-LWE decryption (for a similar security) achieves an area ◊
time product of approximately 151 452 on a Virtex-2 FPGA; thus achieving at
least 1.9 times better figure of merit.
5.4 Trade-o s
The previous figures are subject to trade-o s. If smaller latency is desired instead of
a compact implementation, two coprocessors can perform the two computations of
Equation 3 and 4 in parallel. Trade-o s also apply to the masked decoder, and the
parallelization could be extended easily to reduce latency in this stage. Since the
BRAMs present in the Xilinx FPGAs support reading of multiple consecutive words,
we could keep more pairs of masked decoders in parallel and reduce the number
of cycles. Another alternative is to keep the masked decoder in pipeline with the
polynomial arithmetic block. Such type of setting is suitable for systems where
many decryption operations are performed in a chain. While the masked decoder
works on the coe cients of a previous computation, the polynomial arithmetic unit
processes new ciphertexts. Since the masked decoder is faster than the polynomial
arithmetic unit, the cycle count of the masked decoder is not an overhead in such
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type of setting. But of course, in this situation we could not reuse the arithmetic
circuitry of the arithmetic coprocessor for the refreshing operation of the masked
decoder.
5.5 Maximum frequency
We note that the arithmetic coprocessor is a very optimized unit with a complex
pipeline organization. We thus insert two pipeline stages in the masked decoder
to match the maximum frequency of the whole system to that of the arithmetic
coprocessor. In this way, the design can run up to almost 100 MHz. The critical
path is inside the arithmetic multiplier.
6 Discussion
6.1 Error rates
Cryptosystems based on ring-LWE are inherently probabilistic. This means
that there is a non-zero probability that the recovered plaintext after ring-LWE
decryption is not exactly the plaintext before encryption. In our case, due to the
probabilistic nature of our masked decoder approach, there is a second source of
noise. Since the number of iterations of the masked decoder is finite, there are
some pair values (aÕ, aÕÕ) that will not get decoded within the fixed finite number
of iterations. In this section, we first explain the error rate of the probabilistic
decoding in isolation, and then we switch to the global system error rate and point
out strategies to mitigate it.
Errors due to the probabilistic decoding. In this section, we assume that the
plaintext bit is 1 and the unmasked input a to the masked decoder is in (q/4, 3q/4).
The additional error due to the probabilistic masked decoder is the probability pe
that (aÕ, aÕÕ) does not get successfully decoded. Let us write ps = 1≠ pe.
This probability ps is influenced by two distributions. We have that
ps =
ÿ
Pr[successful decode|a] · Pr[a] (5)
where the sum is taken over a œ (q/4, 3q/4). On the one hand,
Pr[successful decode|a] is the probability that the decoder successfully decodes
a. On the other, Pr[a] is the probability with which a takes various values in
(q/4, 3q/4).
The distribution of the decoder success probability Pr[successful decode|a] as
a function of the unshared input value a to the decoder can be easily
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Figure 4 – Left: empirical success distribution for the masked decoder.
Right: Distribution of a when plaintext is 1.
computed by averaging over all possible pairs (aÕ, aÕÕ) such that aÕ + aÕÕ =
a. Since for any given value of a, its shares aÕ or aÕÕ are (individually)
equiprobable, we compute Pr[successful decode|a] as Pr[successful decode|a] =
1
q
q
aÕ+aÕÕ=a Pr[successful decode of (aÕ, aÕÕ)].
The distribution Pr[successful decode|a] is shown in Figure 4, left. We see that the
decoder performs best when a ¥ q/2, in which case all possible inputs get decoded
correctly. Only when the input value a approaches q/4 or 3q/4, the performance
degrades. When using a larger number of iterations N = 16 this e ect is less
pronounced when compared to N = 2 iterations, as Figure 4 shows.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that not all unshared inputs a to the decoder
are equally likely. By the construction of the ring-LWE decryption function, the
unshared input to the decoder a is either centered around q/2 (resp. 0) when the
message bit is 1 (resp. 0). This distribution Pr[a] is plotted in Figure 4, right.
These two observations combined produce a nice interaction between the
prior distribution Pr[a] of a (given by the ring-LWE decryption) and
the success distribution of the masked decoder Pr[successful decode|a] as in
Equation 5. Namely, values of a that are di cult to decode (those with low
Pr[successful decode|a]) are quite unlikely to appear as input to the masked decoder
(their Pr[a] is also low). This positive interaction keeps the global error rate of the
system quite low. This is precisely quantified in the next paragraph.
Global error rate and number of iterations. We performed simulations to
estimate the global error rate and determine the required number of iterations N
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Iterations pg [◊10≠5] pg/pbaseline
N =2 332.24 91.41
3 178.44 49.09
4 25.36 6.97
5 20.77 5.71
6 16.22 4.46
8 6.97 1.91
16 4.32 1.19
24 4.06 1.11
30 3.87 1.06
Figure 5 – Global error
rates with
the probabilistic decoder.
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Figure 6 – Evolution of
the ratio pg/pbaseline as the
number of iterations N
grows.
in our design. Over 106 bits, the average error per bit using a deterministic decoder
was pbaseline = 3.634375◊ 10≠5. This is a baseline error intrinsic to the ring-LWE
construction. When we plug in the probabilistic decoder, the global, end-to-end,
error rate per bit pg increases. (We have pg = pbaseline + pe.) In Figure 5, we
can find the global error rate for di erent values of the number of iterations N
of the decoding. At N = 3, for instance, the error rate is pg = 1.7844 ◊ 10≠3,
which is ¥ 49 times larger than pbaseline. As already hinted, the error rate quickly
decreases with N (roughly exponentially, as can be see in Figure 6). In our design,
we set N = 16 (we iterate 16 times per coe cient) as a balanced tradeo  between
cycle count and error rate. The impact of the masked probabilistic decoder on the
global error rate is quite low, adding less than 20% to the intrinsic error rate when
compared to a deterministic decoder, as it can be see in Figure 5.
6.2 Comparison with other decoding strategies
We are only aware of a similar masked decoder, the one presented in [BGL+14].
There the authors resort to a generic masking method, namely masked tables, to
perform the decoding. Translating the ideas of [BGL+14] in our context, we would
need two tables of 213 bits (one of them random). For a smaller group Zd with
d = 257 the authors report an utilization of 1331 slices on a Virtex 6 FPGA. While
the results in slices are not directly comparable with ours, we point out that the
size of the masked table following the approach of [BGL+14] grows linearly in the
group size q, while for our solution the size of the masked table stays constant
(independent of q), and the quadrant blocks grow only logarithmically in q. The
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cycle count, however, is larger in our solution. The critical observation of our
masked decoder is that we can compress the input coe cient shares aÕ and aÕÕ
to a mere two bit per share (the output of each quadrant) and then perform the
decoding based on the information of the two quadrants (4 bits.)
6.3 Post-processing
Albeit the computation from Equation (2) is commonly referred as the “ring-
LWE decryption”, the decryption process should include a post-processing on the
recovered message m. This post-processing consists of error correction and padding
verification.
Linear codes with masking. One approach to deal with the probabilistic nature
of the ring-LWE decryption system is to use forward error correcting codes (FEC).
The message prior to encryption is encoded using a FEC and the resulting composite
is ring-LWE encrypted. The output of the ring-LWE decryption should be corrected
for errors, preferably in the masked domain. For syndrome decoding of linear codes,
this can easily be done by masking the syndrome table.
Padding schemes. As presented, the ring-LWE system is malleable. CCA security
can be achieved with a padding mechanism. The Fujisaki-Okamoto [FO13] padding
scheme is known to work with ring-LWE [Pei14]. This padding scheme makes use
of standard symmetric cryptographic constructions whose masked implementations
are well studied. We point out that key-encapsulation mechanisms may result in a
more compact and simpler implementation.
6.4 Extension to higher-order security
We point out that the approach laid out in Section 3 scales quite well with the
security order. To achieve security at level d + 1, one would need to split the
computation of Equation 2 into d branches analogously to Equation 3. The masked
decoder can follow the same principles with the appropriate modifications. The
complexity of this decoder obviously grows. Generic approaches to perform this
computation have been discussed in [Cor14,BGN+14,RBN+15].
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7 Evaluation
For the purposes of a side-channel evaluation, we implemented the full design
on a SASEBO G board. The design was clocked at 18.75 MHz and the power
consumption was sampled at 500 MS/s. This platform is very low noise.
We provide a very advantageous setting for the adversary: we assume that the
evaluator knows the details about the implementation (for example, pipeline stages).
In addition, we assume that while guessing a subkey, the adversary knows the rest of
the key. These assumptions allow to comfortably place predictions on intermediates
arbitrarily deep into the computation. While this may represent a very powerful
attacker and somewhat unrealistic, the algebraic structure of such cryptosystem
may help the attacker to predict deep intermediates with relatively low e ort. We
refer the reader to the extended version of this paper for an attack on half-masked
ring-LWE decryption that uses these ideas. This stresses the necessity of masking
the decoding function entirely.
The evaluation methodology to test if the masking is sound is as follows. We first
proceed with first-order key-recovery attacks when the randomness source (PRNG)
is switched o . We demonstrate that in that situation the attacks are successful,
indicating that the setup and procedure is sound. Then we switch on the PRNG
and repeat the attacks. If the masking is sound, the first-order attacks shall not
succeed. In addition, we perform second-order attacks to confirm that the previous
first-order analyses were carried out with enough traces.
We test 4 di erent points which covers all the relevant parts of the computation.
The targets are the first 13-bit coe cient of rÕ · c1 + c2, the first 13-bit coe cient
of rÕÕ · c1, the first input coe cient to the shared decoder and the first output
bit. We modeled the power consumption of a register as the Hamming distance
between two consecutive values held in the register, and used Pearson’s correlation
coe cient to compare predictions with measurements [BCO04].
7.1 PRNG o 
We first begin the experiments when the PRNG is o . That is, the sharing of r into
rÕ and rÕÕ on each execution is deterministic. This would not happen in practice,
as an active PRNG would randomize the representation of r in each execution. In
our setting, this would mean that the masking is switched o .
In Figure 7 we draw the result of correlating against the 4 intermediates with
10 000 traces. On top, we draw a mean trace for orientation. The correlation values
are, from top to bottom, 0.25, 0.3, 0.27 and 0.21, respectively. This means that the
attacks are successful, and confirms the soundness of our setting. In Figure 8 we
can see the evolution of the correlation coe cient as the number of traces increases
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for the first two intermediates. We can see that starting from hundred traces the
attack is successful. Similar behavior was observed for other intermediates.
7.2 PRNG on
In Figure 9 we draw the result of the previous analysis when the masks are switched
on. This corresponds to the situation that an adversary would face in reality. We
can see that the correct key guess is no longer distinguishable, even when using
10 000 traces. We repeated the same experiments for other intermediates and other
intermediate positions with identical results.
7.3 Second-order attacks
To confirm that we used enough traces in our previous analyses, we perform here
second-order attacks on the masked implementation with the PRNG on. We will
focus on the masked decoder. In Figure 10 we draw on top a mean curve in the
region of 7 400 to 7 700 cycles, corresponding to the end of the masked decoding.
We target one output bit of the decoding: m[254].
In Figure 10 we first begin by correlating against masks and masked values. This
is a test scenario, since for this attack we need to know the masks, something
that would not happen in a real deployment. Correlation with masks or masked
value yield high correlation as expected (ﬂ = 0.32 and ﬂ = 0.34, respectively). In
contrast, when correlating against the unshared value (in light blue), the correlation
coe cient does not traverse the confidence interval for ﬂ = 0. This indicates that
the masking is e ective. We can repeat the same attack against centered and
squared traces [CJRR99,PRB09]. This is e ectively a second-order attack, and is
expected to work. It is shown in magenta in Figure 10, and we can see that the
attack succeeds. Using the centered absolute value to pre-process traces also works
as expected, as shown in yellow.
In Figure 11 we can see the evolution as a function of the number of traces. We can
see that starting from ¥ 2000 measurements this second-order attack is successful.
This confirms that the first-order attacks of Section 7.2 were carried out with
enough traces, since a second-order attack is already successful starting from
¥ 2000 measurements.
We remark that the relatively low number of traces required for the second-order
attack is due to the very friendly scenario for the evaluator. The platform is low
noise and no other countermeasure except than masking was implemented. In
practice, masking needs a source of noise to be e ective, and consequently the
higher-order attacks would be harder to mount, requiring more traces [CJRR99]
and more computation [RGV12].
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7.4 Horizontal DPA attacks
During the decoder operation, the input coe cients are refreshed N ≠ 1 = 15
times with publicly known o sets  i. The device thus handles consecutively the
values aÕ, aÕ + 1, ..., aÕ + 1 + . . . + 15. This may enable a horizontal DPA
attack [PdHL09] during the operation: the adversary may collect a single trace,
split it into 16 chunks and then perform a DPA on these 16 chunks to recover the
mask aÕ. Once the masks from all traces are discovered, a first-order, vertical DPA
applies.
There are two factors that mitigate this threat. First, we note the adversary is
given a very limited number of traces to recover each mask (namely, N = 16).
Secondly, this attack can be easily prevented by shu ing the public coe cients  i.
This randomizes the order of execution of each refreshing with  i, and thus the
exposure to horizontal DPA attacks is minimized.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we described a practical side-channel protected implementation of the
lattice-based ring-LWE asymmetric decryption. Our solution is based on the sound
principles of masking and incurs in a manageable overhead (in cycles and area). A
key component of our solution is a bespoke masked decoder. Our implementation
performs the entire ring-LWE decryption computation in the masked domain.
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9 Optimal values of  i for q = 7681
 (i) = (960, 1440, 480, 1680, 240, 720, 1200, 1800, (6)
120, 360, 600, 840, 1080, 1320, 1560, 1860, (7)
60, 180, 300, 420, 540, 660, 780, 900, 1020, (8)
1140, 1260, 1380, 1500, 1620, 1740, 1890, (9)
30, 90, 150, 210, 270, 330, 390, 450, 510, (10)
570, 630, 690, 750, 810, 870, 930, 990, 1050, (11)
1110, 1170, 1230) (12)
These values were found by exhaustive first-order search. The value  i is chosen
so that it maximizes the number of pairs that get decoded after i iterations.
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10 Attack on half-masked variant
In this section, we analyze the security of a masked ring-LWE variant where the
intermediates just before decoding are unmasked, and the decoding is performed
in the unmasked domain. This alternative is definitely cheaper than full masking.
In the following, we provide evidence to show that this clearly does not provide
enough security in our case.
(A seemingly similar situation appears in [BGL+14]. However, there are important
di erences—namely it is not possible to choose ciphertexts. In the following, we
are not analyzing the variant of [BGL+14] but only the half-masked ring-LWE.)
A common argument is that after key-di usion is complete, prediction of the
intermediates is not possible and hence standard DPA attacks to the half-masked
ring-LWE do not apply. We will see that this is not strictly true, if the attacker
can choose ciphertexts.
Assume that the coe cients of the polynomial a = INTT(r · c1 + c2) appear
unmasked in the implementation. Let the adversary collect measurements with
chosen ciphertext. The ciphertext c1 has the following structure: all the coe cients
fixed except c1[0] randomly varying. The ciphertext c2 has the same structure.
Then observe that due to linearity of the INTT operation, a[0] can be written as
a[0] = –(r[0] · c1[0] + c2[0]) + —, where
• – is a public constant determined by the INTT transformation.
• — is a secret constant that is a function of the other (unknown) key coe cients
r[1], . . . , r[255]. Note that by construction — is constant within the set of
collected traces.
Thus, an attacker can perform a DPA attack targeting the intermediate a[0] and
placing predictions on (r[0],—). The adversary recovers r[0] and proceeds to recover
other key coe cients. We have verified this attack in simulations, even when using
th(a[i]) as intermediate.
(It may seem that the high number of hypotheses, 226 may produce a cumbersome
attack. However, one can apply techniques of partial correlation [BCO04] to
alleviate the computational e ort of DPA on large word sizes [THM+07]. And we
have experimented that in practice it makes sense to first recover r[0] (this is easier
due to larger non-linearity of the modular multiplication) and then — (which may
be harder due to the low non-linearity of the modular addition), splitting the 226
e ort in two 213 steps.)
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Figure 7 – PRNG o . On top, black, one power consumption trace.
The di erent computational stages can be distinguished: first branch,
second branch and decoding. Next, in blue, the correlation trace for
the value rÕ[0] · c1[0] + c2[0]. The correlation achieves a maximum
value of ﬂ = 0.25. Below, in red, correlation for rÕÕ · c1 (max ﬂ ¥ 0.3);
in green: correlation for the input of the masked decoder aÕ[0]. At
the bottom: correlation with one message bit mÕ[0].
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Figure 8 – PRNG o . Evolution of the correlation coe cient as the
number of traces increases for the intermediates rÕ[0] · c1[0] + c2[0]
(left) and rÕÕ[0] · c1[0] (right). Correct subkey guess in red, all other
guesses in green. A 99.99 % confidence interval for ﬂ = 0 is plotted
in black discontinuous line. We can see that starting from hundred
measurements the attacks are successful.
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Figure 9 – Analogous to Figure 8, but with PRNG on. The correct
subkey is no longer identifiable. This is expected and means that the
masking is e ective.
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Figure 10 – Correlation traces for intermediates within the shared
decoder. On top, a power measurement trace showing the last 15
decodings. Below, correlation traces. The first two (masks and masked
values) assume that the adversary knows the masks. The third one,
in light blue, is a first-order attack without knowing the attack, and
is unsuccessful. In contrast, the second-order attack against the same
intermediate is successful, as the traces in magenta and yellow show.
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Figure 11 – Left: correlation as the number of traces increases for
the first-order attack (PRNG on), around clock cycle 7560. Right:
correlation for the second-order attack with masks on. The attack
begins to be successful with 2 000 measurements.
Figure 12 – Crosscorrelation trace. The x and y axes represent
time, flowing from the upper left hand side corner to the lower right.
The entire figure spans 7500 cycles (as Figure 7). It is possible to
distinguish the two branch computations (including its components)
and the decoding. Colors enhanced to improve contrast.
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Abstract. In this paper we investigate relations between several
masking schemes. We show that the Ishai–Sahai–Wagner private
circuits construction is closely related to Threshold Implementations
and the Trichina gate. The implications of this observation
are manifold. We point out a higher-order weakness in
higher-order Threshold Implementations, suggest a mitigation
and provide new sharings that use a lower number of input
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1 Introduction
Side-channel cryptanalysis allows to break implementations of mathematically
secure cryptographic algorithms running on embedded devices. Shortly after
the introduction of a particularly powerful branch of side-channel attacks,
namely Di erential Power Analysis (DPA) by Kocher et al. [KJJ99], di erent
countermeasures were proposed. An especially popular countermeasure used
today is masking, introduced in [CJRR99,GP99], mainly due to its theoretical
soundness. Contrary to other heuristic, ad-hoc approaches, masking carries a
proof of security [CJRR99]. A dth-order secure masking works by splitting every
sensitive variable (i.e. that depends on the key) into s shares, such that an
adversary probing at most d values during the computation gets no information
about any sensitive variable. This adversarial model is relevant in practice since
the adversary is not weaker than a dth-order DPA attack [DDF14,Cor14]. The
advantage of a properly masked implementation is that it forces the adversary
to use higher-order DPA attacks in order to break it. Higher-order DPA
attacks are substantially harder to launch, both in terms of data complexity and
computational resources [CJRR99,Mes00,RGV12]. Masking, however, comes with
a cost. Performing operations in the masked domain increases the computational
requirements on the target platform (area, time and randomness, among others),
thus in practice, it is crucial to design countermeasures that have a limited cost
impact.
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In this paper, we focus on Boolean masking, i.e. the intermediates are split additively
in a given finite field. The di culty is then reduced to masking functions that are
not linear with respect to addition.
1.1 Related works
There have been several e orts for constructing masking schemes —algorithms to
compute on masked data. Some early development came from practitioners which
produced designs mostly oriented to fit in real-world constraints: Trichina presents
in [Tri03] a masked AND gate resistant to first-order DPA attacks (first-order
secure masking).
A generic algorithm for the masked AND computation at any security level is given
by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner (here ISW) in [ISW03], together with a convenient
theoretical framework to prove the security of such a scheme. It is, however, well
known that early theoretical concepts of masking schemes rely on assumptions
that do not necessarily hold in practice. This is true for both the hardware and
the software side. A common problem for the latter is that Hamming distance
leakage, which is typically visible in memory-element transitions, may invalidate
the assumption that leakages from each share are independent [BGG+14]. For the
former, glitches (in static CMOS, a spurious transition of nodes in a combinational
circuit within one clock cycle, resulting from di erent arrival times of the input
signals) were shown to be a source of exploitable leakage [MPG05,MS06], enabling
successful DPA attacks against theoretically sound masked implementations due
to unsatisfactory leakage modeling.
The mitigation of glitches is a well-studied problem in digital design, since they are
not only inconvenient from a security point of view. Glitches are useless transitions
that consume extra energy and thus digital designers tend to minimize them to
achieve low-power and high-speed circuits. There are strategies to reduce glitches
(e.g., balancing the path delay using combinational tree-like structures) or fully
eliminate them (e.g. using dynamic logic styles, such as Domino or dynamic
di erential such as SABL [TAV02] or WDDL [TV04]).
Alternatively, a specific strand of masking schemes, namely Threshold
Implementations (TIs), were introduced in [NRR06] to address the aforementioned
model limitations. TIs are designed to deal with non-idealities in hardware (glitches)
at a higher level of abstraction, and can provide strong security guarantees that
may be relevant in practice. While ISW requires first to decompose a circuit into
(exclusively) AND, XOR and NOT gates and then masking those, TI has the
advantage that any function can be shared directly, which typically results in more
compact designs. Recently TIs were extended to provide not only first-order but
also higher-order security [BGN+14b].
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1.2 Our contribution
The discussion provided in this paper is threefold. First, we point out the similarities
and di erences between ISW, TI and the Trichina gate when the function to mask
is an AND gate. We gain deeper understanding about masking schemes from these
relations and use it to provide a generalized masking scheme (Section 3).
In the second part of the paper, we show how this generalization is mutually
beneficial to all three masking schemes mentioned above. We show a weakness in
the recently proposed higher-order extension of TI and suggest a fix using ideas
from the generalized scheme in Section 4. In addition, we discuss how ISW and the
Trichina masked AND-gate can be implemented securely in logic styles that glitch.
Finally, we focus on constructive applications. In Section 5.1, we discuss under
which conditions a TI function provides security against dth-order attacks using
only d+1 shares instead of the usual td+1 bound. We end the paper by describing
how ideas from TI could be inherited in software-oriented schemes to provide
security in a distance-based leakage model (Section 5.2).
2 Preliminaries
We begin with standard definitions and descriptions of the masking schemes that we
consider. Lower-case characters refer to elements in a field with characteristic two.
An element a is split into s shares ai, where i œ 1, 2, . . . , s by means of Boolean
masking. Namely, without loss of generality s≠ 1 random shares a1, . . . , as≠1 are
drawn from the uniform distribution, then as is calculated such that a =
m
s ai.
Bold characters refer to a valid shared vector a = a1, . . . , as. We use the term
s-share representation (s-sharing) of a to emphasize the number of shares. Note
that the sharing a generated as detailed above is uniform [BGN+14a]. Moreover,
the sharing a¯i = a1, . . . , ai≠1, ai+1, . . . , as is independent of the unshared value a
for any choice of i. It is hence an (s, s) secret sharing.
We use upper-case characters to denote functions. For a given unshared function
b = F (a), we generate a shared vector F = F1, . . . , Fs of component functions Fi
in order to perform the shared calculation. The sharing F is correct if b =
m
s bi
for bi = Fi(a). The algebraic degree of a function is denoted with t.
Adversarial model. We use d probing as our adversarial model which we define
as follows. The adversary is allowed to probe d wires in the circuit within a certain
time window. Each probed wire g calculating a function G gives information
about all the inputs of G up to the latest synchronization point1. This definition
1One of the many ways of synchronization is storing elements in registers which we inherit
throughout this paper without loss of generalization.
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directly implies that the adversary can derive all the intermediate values during the
computation of G and hence the output of G. To clarify, let us refer to Figure 1.
An attacker probing the output of the function G (that is, wire g) can observe all
the inputs to G up to, and including, reg2; can generate all the intermediate values
used during the calculation of G (including the outputs of G that are stored in
reg3); but can not directly learn all the values stored in reg1 or any intermediate
values occurring during the calculations of each Fi.
· · ·
F1
G
reg2
reg3
· · ·
reg1
F2
Fs
· · ·· · · g
f1
f2
fs
f 01
f 02
f 0s
Figure 1 – Exemplary circuit to aid the explanation of the adversarial
model adopted in this paper. Fi and G are combinational logic blocks,
regi are register stages and fi and g are wires that compute the Fi
(resp. G) functions.
We note that this is a theoretical model stronger than a real-world attacker since a
real-world attacker can only get a subset of the mentioned information. Moreover,
it is slightly di erent than the conventional d-probing model [ISW03]. Nevertheless,
it is advantageous since being able to see the inputs of the gates used during the
calculation implies the ability to observe real world e ects such as glitches. Hence,
we gain the flexibility to work also with non-ideal (glitchy) gates. If the usage of
ideal gates is assumed, working with the conventional model is typically su cient.
This model matches quite nicely with dth-order DPA attacks, which consider a noisy
function of intermediates’ leakage [DDF14]. There are certainly other adversarial
models that are even more powerful, in which the attacker has the ability to
adaptively move the probes between time periods (but not within a time period).
We note that this “adaptive-probes” model is stronger and we do not consider
moving probes in this paper.
Ishai–Sahai–Wagner scheme. Private circuits [ISW03] provide a procedure for
computation on masked data. They give a construction for NOT and AND gates,
and prove the security against d probes of any circuit composed of these secure
gates (“gadgets”) which are in turn built from logic gates that do not glitch. To
compute c = F (a, b) = ab while providing security against d probes, ISW takes
s = 2d + 1 shares a and b of each input and consumes
!s
2
"
bits of randomness.
We exemplify the computation of a masked AND gate providing security against
adversaries using one (d = 1, s = 3) and two (d = 2, s = 5) probes in Equation (1),
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Require: s-shares a and b
Ensure: s-shares c satisfying c =
ab
for i from 1 to s do
for j from i+ 1 to s do
zij Ω rnd()
zji Ω (zij ü aibj)ü ajbi
end for
end for
for i from 1 to s do
ci Ω aibi
for j from 1 to s, j ”= i do
ci Ω ci ü zij
end for
end for
Figure 2 – ISW
algorithm.
a1b1 z12 z13
z23a2b2
a3b3
c1 = a1b1 + z12 + z13
(z12 + a1b2)
+a2b1
c2 = a1b1+
c3 = a3b3+
+(z12 + a1b2) + a2b1
+(z13 + a1b3) + a3b1
+z23
+(z12 + a1b2) + a2b1
(z13 + a1b3)
+a3b1
(z23 + a2b3)
+a3b2
Figure 3 – Intermediate state
of the ISW computation for s =
3.
and Equations (2) and (3) respectively. An intermediate state of the computation
is shown in Figure 3.
z21 = (z12 ü a1b2)ü a2b1,
z31 = (z13 ü a1b3)ü a3b1,
z32 = (z23 ü a2b3)ü a3b2,
c1 = a1b1 ü z12 ü z13,
c2 = a2b2 ü z21 ü z23,
c3 = a3b3 ü z31 ü z32.
(1)
First, three (resp. ten) bits of randomness zij where 1 Æ i < j Æ s are drawn i.i.d.
uniformly random. Then the intermediates zji are computed as shown in the left
column of Equation (1) (resp. Eqn. (2)). The last step xors the intermediates zij
and the products aibi to compute the s output shares c (right column of Eqn. (1)
and Eqn. (3) respectively).
z21 = (z12 ü a1b2)ü a2b1,
z41 = (z14 ü a1b4)ü a4b1,
z32 = (z23 ü a2b3)ü a3b2,
z52 = (z25 ü a2b5)ü a5b2,
z53 = (z35 ü a3b5)ü a5b3,
z31 = (z13 ü a1b3)ü a3b1,
z51 = (z15 ü a1b5)ü a5b1,
z42 = (z24 ü a2b4)ü a4b2,
z43 = (z34 ü a3b4)ü a4b3,
z54 = (z45 ü a4b5)ü a5b4.
(2)
c1 = a1b1 ü z12 ü z13 ü z14 ü z15,
c2 = a2b2 ü z21 ü z23 ü z24 ü z25,
c3 = a3b3 ü z31 ü z32 ü z34 ü z35,
c4 = a4b4 ü z41 ü z42 ü z43 ü z45,
c5 = a5b5 ü z51 ü z52 ü z53 ü z54. (3)
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Extensions to higher orders are similarly generated using the algorithm in Figure 2.
It is well known that the ISW algorithm can work in larger finite fields by building
upon field multiplications instead of AND gates. In the case of AES, there is
a significant performance gain if ISW operates in GF(28), due to the algebraic
structure of the AES S-box [RP10]. We refer to [ISW03] for a variant of this
method using s = d+ 1 shares.
Threshold Implementations. TI provides provable security against dth-order DPA
even in a circuit with glitches according to [BGN+14b]. In addition, it is also
advantageous since any degree t function can be securely implemented using at
least s Ø td+ 1 shares.
The security of a single function relies on the satisfaction of dth-order non-
completeness: any combination of up to d component functions Fi of F must
be independent of at least one input share. It is shown that such a sharing can
always be constructed using sin = td + 1 and sout =
!sin
t
"
shares. Examples for
the function d = F (a, b, c) = c ü ab are given in Equations (4) and (5) for d = 1
and d = 2 respectively.
d1 = c2 ü a2b2 ü a1b2 ü a2b1,
d2 = c3 ü a3b3 ü a3b2 ü a2b3
d3 = c1 ü a1b1 ü a1b3 ü a3b1.
(4)
Notice that sout > sin for d > 1. In order to avoid further increase of the number of
shares when several functions are cascaded, some of the output shares are typically
xored. It is important that this reduction is performed only after the sout-sharing
d is stored in the registers in order to satisfy the non-completeness property and
to avoid glitches depending on all shares of a variable.
d1 = c2 ü a2b2 ü a1b2 ü a2b1,
d3 = c4 ü a4b4 ü a1b4 ü a4b1,
d5 = a2b3 ü a3b2,
d7 = c5 ü a5b5 ü a2b5 ü a5b2,
d9 = a3b5 ü a5b3,
d2 = c3 ü a3b3 ü a1b3 ü a3b1,
d4 = c1 ü a1b1 ü a1b5 ü a5b1,
d6 = a2b4 ü a4b2,
d8 = a3b4 ü a4b3,
d10 = a4b5 ü a5b4.
(5)
In order to provide security when several functions are cascaded, (i.e. the output
of F is used as the input to another shared nonlinear-function G), the shared
function and its output should satisfy uniformity [BGN+14a]. Several methods to
achieve uniformity have been proposed [BNN+12,BNN+15,KNP13,PMK+11]. It
is advised to use re-masking [BGN+14a,MPL+11] in case these methods do not
provide a solution.
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When a single AND gate is considered, it has been shown that there exists no
3-sharing satisfying both uniformity and first-order non-completeness [BNN+12].
Therefore, the output shares of the 3-share AND gate must be re-masked (refreshed).
Moreover, the sharing in Equation (4) considering an AND and XOR gate instead
of a single AND gate satisfies all TI properties.
Trichina AND-gate. Unlike ISW and TI which can be applied both at the
algorithm and at the gate level, Trichina [Tri03] investigates how to implement
a masked AND gate c = ab securely strictly at the gate level. The construction,
which is described in Equation (6), requires two 2-share inputs and uses 1-bit extra
randomness z12 to generate a 2-share output. The security relies strictly on the
order of the operations to avoid unmasking certain bits, on the ideality of the cells
and on the assumption that the sharing a of a is independent from b.
c1 = (((z12 ü a1b2)ü a2b1)ü a2b2)ü a1b1
c2 = z12.
(6)
3 Conciliation
In this section we first relate the ISW scheme with TI and the Trichina gate using
elementary transformations. We then use ingredients from all three schemes to
describe a generalized masking construction and argue its security. As a case study,
we consider a first-order sharing of an AND gate.
3.1 From ISW to TI
Consider the ISW construction with s = 3 input shares, providing first-order
security as depicted in Figure 4. It is equivalent to the computation in Equation (1)
and to Figure 2. In Figure 4, the computation flows from the outside towards the
center. It begins with deriving all the cross products aibj . Then three random
values zij are added to some of the cross products. The terms are finally xored
together in three groups to generate the output shares ci.
In the following, we perform several elementary transformations on this circuit to
arrive to a typical re-masked 3-share TI of an AND gate.
First transformation: moving random bits. Delaying the injection of randomness
using the random bits zij closer to the center (towards the end of the calculation)
as depicted in red yields the construction in Figure 5. Of course, this operation
preserves the correctness of the output. It is already possible to recognize a
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Figure 4 – Original ISW
scheme.
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z12
Figure 5 – After first
transformation.
refreshing operation in the inner ring where z12, z13 and z23 are involved. Note
that the security of this intermediate construction highly depends on the order of
computation of the XOR gates and the ideality (glitching behavior) of the gates.
Second transformation: moving AND gates. The next modification transforms
the circuit of Figure 6 into Figure 7. It simply moves around the two red AND
gates a1b3 and a3b1 together with the XOR gate from the upper to the lower-left
branch.
This second transformation also preserves the correctness at the output. Notice
that after this transformation each branch of the circuit sees at most two shares of
each input. For example, the upper branch sees only a2, a3, b2 and b3. We can
absorb the computation from each branch (3 ANDs and 2 XORs) into its respective
component function Fi as shown in Equation (7).
F1(a1, a2, b1, b2) = a2b2 ü a1b2 ü a2b1,
F2(a2, a3, b2, b3) = a3b3 ü a2b3 ü a3b2,
F3(a1, a3, b1, b3) = a1b1 ü a3b1 ü a1b3.
(7)
The reader will recognize that the resulting sharing F is a TI (satisfying first-order
non-completeness) followed by a refreshing (resulting from the first transformation.)
Note that one could also equivalently see this refreshing as an addition with the
uniform shares of the constant value 0.
The security of this construction follows from the fact that it is a TI, followed by a
refreshing. In particular, this construction is secure even in the presence of glitches.
Therefore, we link the s = 3 ISW scheme to first-order TI.
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Figure 6 – Before second
transformation.
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3.2 From ISW to the Trichina AND-gate
In Figure 8, we draw the ISW computation2 of an AND gate for s = 2. In Figure 9,
we have the Trichina AND gate. Similar to Section 3.1, we can transform the
ISW construction s = 2 to the Trichina gate by rearranging the term a1b1. It is
noteworthy that the Trichina gate resembles a simplified ISW, and thus can be
seen as the practitioners version.
3.3 Generalizing and inducing a structure
We can generalize the masked AND-gate transformations from Sections 3.1 and 3.2
to the general case of higher orders. In addition, we can construct variants that
compute logic gates with more than two inputs or more sophisticated functions.
In order to induce a structure to the mentioned generalization, we decompose the
resulting construction into four layers as exemplified in Figures 10 and 11 for first-
and second-order security respectively. Specifically, we notice a non-linear layer N ,
followed by a linear layer L and a refreshing layer R. In certain cases where we
want to reduce the number of shares, we add a linear compression layer C. Below
we detail the functionality of each layer.
The non-linear layer N . This layer is responsible for the bulk of the computation,
corresponding to the cross products aibj . For example, in the first-order secure
construction of a 3-share 2-input AND gate, N (a,b) = (a1b1, a1b2, . . . , a3b3) maps
2We stress that ISW with s = 2 is neither strictly defined nor proven secure in the ISW
simulation model. We are extending the algorithm in Figure 2 in a straight forward way to any s.
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6 input bits to 9 output bits (aibj). Note that the set of cross products calculated
in this layer is defined by the number of shares and the function itself. 3
In order to generalize the construction such that a function other than c = ab is
computed (such as d = abc, d = aü bc, d = aü bcü abc), N needs to be modified
accordingly. To be specific, all the shared terms (cross products and linear terms)
should be placed in N to be used in the following steps.
The linear layer L. This layer is an XOR net that reduces the number of shares
without modifying the unshared value. In the AND-gate example, it maps 9 input
bits (output of N ) to 3 output bits for the first-order case and 25 input bits to
10 output bits in the second-order case. The linear layer L of TI is responsible
for preserving non-completeness. Failure to achieve non-completeness can cause
sensitive information leakage in a glitchy circuit as in the case of the original ISW
scheme (see Section 4.2).
The reduction of the number of shares performed by L partially limits the
exponential blow-up of shares otherwise caused by the non-linear layer N alone. We
point out that the output of N is already a valid, non-complete sharing when each
cross product is considered as an output share. However, cascading several sharings
without L increases the number of shares rapidly, making such an implementation
impractical except for circuits with very shallow logic depth.
The refreshing layer R. This layer is applied in order to re-mask the output
of L. It is shown in several prior works on first-order TI that this layer can be
avoided if the output of L already satisfies uniformity. However, R is critical in
order to provide higher-order security as will be discussed in Section 4.1. In ISW,
each output of each masked AND gate is refreshed, which clearly increases the
randomness requirements compared to the generalized sharing of a more complex
function with several terms (such as d = aü bcü abc).
The compression layer C. While designing the L layer, there is a natural tension
between two desirable properties, namely satisfying dth-order non-completeness and
having a small number of output shares. Normally, one designs L to have a small
number of output shares yet satisfying dth-order non-completeness. One example
of this issue is the second-order masking of an AND-gate depicted in Figure 11,
where the number of shares at the output of L (10 shares) is considerable larger
than the number of shares of each input variable (5-share a and b).
3It is possible to add other terms to N (as long as they are inserted an even number of times),
such as virtual variable pairs [BNN+15], in order to increase the flexibility for generating a
uniform sharing.
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If it is desired to decrease the number of output shares further, the compression
layer C is applied. This layer is composed of XOR gates only. In order to satisfy
non-completeness and avoid glitches causing leakage of more than the intended
number of shares, it is crucial to isolate the R and C layers using registers.
Note that in typical TIs, the layers N and L are combined and absorbed into the
component functions without registers between these layers as drawn in Figure 11.
An additional challenge is to design L so that it simultaneously satisfies non-
completeness and uniformity.
3.4 Security arguments for generalized scheme
In this section, we argue the security of the generalized structure. We start by
showing the security of a 2-input AND gate (2AND) against a d-probing adversary
and inductively continue to a function of degree t. We assume that inputs to N
are uniformly shared and synchronous. This discussion enables us to relate the
number of required shares in TI with that in ISW.
2-input AND gate. Let us consider a set of information I (based on indices)
gathered by the attacker by probing d wires. Specifically, if a wire corresponding
to ai, bi or aibi is probed, the index i œ I. If the wire corresponding to aibj is
probed, both i, j œ I. This implies that a probed wire at the output of the layer
N can give information about at most two indices. Therefore, the cardinality of I
is at most 2d when d wires are probed in N . It follows that using at least 2d+ 1
shares is required to provide security up to L. However, an attacker is not limited
to probing certain layers. Notice that the attacker probing closer to the end of the
calculation of the component functions, i.e. just before the register between R and
C, gains more information. By the definition of the linear layer L, the component
functions should be formed such that any combination of up to d of them should
be independent of at least one share, i.e. one index, when a d-probing secure
circuit is considered. Hence, we know that if it is possible to construct L with the
given restriction, the attacker probing d wires never has all the indexes in I. Since
the input shares are uniformly shared and the vectors a¯i, b¯i, . . . are independent
from the unshared values a, b, . . ., we achieve security at the end of L. Moreover,
knowing the randomness used in R does not yield additional information to the
attacker. At this point the possibility of generating L with 2d+ 1 shares becomes
the question. It has been shown in [BGN+14b] with a combinatorial argument
that this is possible if the linear layer L is divided into !2d+12 " component functions.
Namely, each component function uses at most two input shares and hence at most
two indices are put in I for each probing. This gives the cardinality of at most 2d
when d probes are used.
CONCILIATION 165
Notice that the security discussion provided so far considers only one AND gate.
However, the security of the generalized scheme also holds for the composition of
several AND gates. Namely, the refreshing layer R and the register afterwards
impose independence of the composed elements and non-completeness respectively.
Hence, the union of the gathered information does not give an additional advantage
to the attacker.
In the case of a single-probe adversary, we can relax the requirements on R. As
long as the next nonlinear function sees uniformly shared inputs, one can simplify
the construction of R and even in some cases avoid R. This result follows from
the fact that an attacker using a single probe is unable to combine information
from more than one function.
3-input AND gate. The security argument for a 3-input AND gate (F (a, b, c) =
abc) follows the same lines as for the 2-input AND gate. The nonlinear layer N
calculates aibjck terms. In order to keep the number of shares small, we need to
make sure that each component function uses variables with at most 3 di erent
indices. Then, an attacker probing d wires can only gather information from at
most 3d indices. The question if it is possible to arrange L such that this restriction
is respected is answered positively in [BGN+14b]. It can be done by dividing
L into !3d+13 " component functions. Note that for a full proof of security, the
insertion of randomness (the R layer) and registers become critical in order to
provide higher-order security of the composition of such gates.
Naturally, it is also possible to generate a shared 3AND gate by composing two
shared 2AND gates. This requires usage of registers after both the first and the
second 2AND-gate calculation. However, the construction described above which
performs the 3AND gate calculation at once is typically more e cient.
t-input AND gate. We can inductively apply the arguments for 2AND and 3AND
gates to the t-input AND gate. This implies the su cient lower bound of sin = td+1
input shares. The shared function should be split into at least
!sin
t
"
component
functions in L and satisfy dth-order non-completeness.
Degree t Boolean functions. The above inductive argument does not exclude
functions composed of more than one degree t term. To clarify, the generation of N
is performed by straight-forward calculation of all cross products using sin = td+1
shares. The linear layer is split into
!sin
t
"
component functions, each of which sees t
indices as described above for a t-input AND gate. Any shared term of degree Æ t
can be placed to at least one existing component function since any cross product
of the shared Æ t term uses at most t indices, which concludes the argument.
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Degree t functions in other finite fields. A careful investigation of the above
arguments shows that they are independent of the used field. Namely, it is enough
to replace the AND gates in GF(2) with multiplication in the required field in
order to provide security for a degree t function.
We conclude the security argument of the generalized masking scheme by noting
that sin can be chosen to be greater than td + 1 in order to achieve flexibility
without invalidating the security arguments.
3.5 Wrapping up.
In this section, we provided a generalized scheme which extends ISW and TI
like masking schemes. Specifically, unlike the ISW scheme which builds up on
AND gates or field multiplications; the generalized scheme allows to implement
any function directly, enabling the usage of less compositions. The generalized
scheme inherits the ability to operate on larger fields and security against d-probing
adversary. In addition, it o ers protection for composition of gates.
4 What can go wrong?
In Section 3 we constructed a generalized masking structure, and assigned precise
requirements and functions to each of its layer. In this section, we show how small
deviations from this generalized scheme can cause vulnerable implementations. In
particular, in Section 4.1 we analyze the cost of lacking a refreshing layer R. We
use the recently proposed higher-order TI as our case study to show a higher-order
flaw, then we suggest a generic fix. In Section 4.2, we elaborate on the insecurity
that deviating from the structure especially on L brings in the presence of glitches
using the ISW and Trichina scheme as our case study.
4.1 Higher-order TI is not so higher-order secure
The higher-order TI proposed in [BGN+14b] fits to our generalized structure
as follows. N and L together enforce a correct and dth-order non-complete
implementation. However, unlike the generalized scheme, the refreshing layer
R is not performed in TI when the uniformity of the shared output of C can be
satisfied without R. This di erence becomes important since as we shall see in the
sequel, it can induce a higher-order security flaw when composing several sharings,
even if these sharings are uniform.
For simplicity, we use a second-order TI of a mini-cipher construction and show a
second-order leakage.
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Description of the mini-cipher. Let us consider a minimal non-linear feedback
shift register. This mini-cipher comes from an extreme simplification of the KATAN
block cipher for which a higher-order TI was given in [BGN+14b]. We consider a
4-bit state S[i], i œ 0, . . . , 3 for which the taps are at the state bits with indices
i = 1, 2, 3 and the feedback is plugged at position 0. This state is a “sensitive
variable4”. The feedback function (“round function” of an extremely unbalanced
Feistel) F = F (S[3], S[2], S[1]) is the same AND-XOR feedback function as in
KATAN, namely d = F (a, b, c) = abü c.
5 5
10
x
z
AND/XOR (Eq.5) 
5
S[0]S[1]S[2]S[3]
Figure 12 – Diagram of the shared version of the mini-cipher.
Shared version of the mini-cipher. The shared version of this mini-cipher (non-
complete sharing in the N and L) follows the lines of [BGN+14b]. The feedback
function F is shared as Equation (5). In particular, to provide security against
glitches, the state bit S[0], in which the output of F is stored, is composed of 10
shares, whereas S[1],S[2],S[3] are composed of 5 shares. The conversion from 10
to 5 shares is done as suggested in [BGN+14b]. That is, the fifth share of S[1] sees
the xor of the last six shares of S[0] when the cipher is clocked.
A second-order leakage. Some lengthy, albeit straightforward, calculations show
that the covariance (second mixed statistical moment) between the fifth share
of S[1] after the first cycle and the fourth share of S[1] after the seventh cycle
depends on the unshared initial value S[2]. Thus, there is a second-order flaw that
invalidates the security claims of the scheme.5
Mitigation. The direct mitigation is to refresh the shares after each shared
function computation, for example by adding fresh shares of the null vector. In
other words, the refreshing layer R should be implemented in TI when higher-order
security is considered. The idea here is to isolate the intermediates occurring within
4The goal is to show leakage in this construction. To simplify and keep the essentials, we do
not explicitly inject the key in this mini-cipher construction, but assume that the initial state is
secret (sensitive).
5This result had been previously reported in [Rep] and experimentally confirmed in [SM15].
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each computation stage from intermediates of another stage, so that combining
intermediates from di erent stages no longer reveals information about a secret
unshared value. With this argument, we fix the flaw in [BGN+14b] using the
conciliation of masking schemes.
Note that this fix naturally increases area and randomness requirements and we do
not claim that it is the optimal solution. We foresee that this solution may be an
overkill in many situations, and a careful analysis can save significant amount of
randomness. This is especially true since the existence of a second-order dependency
between two variables does not necessarily imply an easy key-extraction by DPA. In
particular, if there is a second-order flaw between two intermediates for which there
is enough key-di usion between them, key recovery exploiting the joint leakage of
intermediates becomes di cult. The exact minimum amount of R layers needed to
make the whole implementation secure against higher-order attacks may depend
from design to design.
4.2 ISW and Trichina in the presence of glitches
ISW scheme implicitly considers a logic gate that does not glitch. Thus, a
straightforward translation of ISW into standard CMOS technology can result in a
vulnerable implementation. To see this, observe that in Equation (8) c3 breaks the
non-completeness property:
c1 = a1b1 ü z12 ü z13,
c2 = a2b2 ü ((z12 ü a1b2)ü a2b1))ü z23,
c3 = a3b3 ü ((z13 ü a1b3)ü a3b1)ü (z23 ü a2b3)ü a3b2.
The trivial fix here is to register signals that otherwise could result in undesired
(and pernicious) glitches. More precisely, if during the ISW computation in logic,
the intermediate values zji where i < j (outputs in Equation (1), left column;
and Equation (2)) are stored in registers together with the intermediate values
aibi before further XOR combinations, the circuit becomes secure even if there
are glitches. This follows since non-completeness holds between register stages.
The caveat of this fix is the significant increase in area (and latency) due to extra
registers. Note that this extra layer of registers is prevented by careful selection of
the layer L.
Similar observations apply to the Trichina construction. Trichina also imposes
restrictions on the logic gates, especially on the order of evaluation of these gates. It
is implicitly assumed that signals are registered or latched in order to avoid glitches.
The case where first-order security fails due to glitches is studied in [MS06].
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5 Applications
Here we introduce two additional constructive applications. In the first one, we
focus on optimizing the generalized scheme further such that it uses less input
shares per function. The second application analyses software-like implementations
in a distance-based leakage model.
5.1 Using d+ 1 input shares
As described in Section 3, the generalized scheme uses at least td+ 1 input shares
to protect a function with degree t against d-probing attacks. Here, we improve
the scheme such that it uses less input shares, specifically, d+ 1 shares to achieve
d-probing security. As a trade-o , however, this sharings are more restrictive with
the requirements of independent input sharings. We illustrate with single-probe
secure examples the design process of such sharings and the construction of layers.
We provide a security argument and discuss connections with prior works.
First crack. We start with the first-order sharing of c = ab with sin = 2 and
sout = 4 given in Equation (8). The sharing c is only composed of the crossproducts
aibj . Hence, it can be seen as the output of N which is already a correct sharing
for c. Moreover, if the sharing of a is independent than that of b then each share
ci is independent of at least one input share of each variable. In other words, non-
completeness is satisfied. This implies the independence of c from the unmasked
variables a and b providing security under a single probe.
c1 = a1b1, c2 = a1b2, c3 = a2b1, c4 = a2b2. (8)
Note that in this simple sharing, if the sharings of a and b were dependent (for
example, a = b), then the second output share a1b2 = a1a2 would depend on all
shares of a (breaking non-completeness) and this would clearly leak information
about a. During the construction of layers in the following, we assume that the
sharings of each input variable is independent from all others.
Construction of N and L. The increase of number of variables in the input
increases the number of cross products and hence the number of output shares of
N exponentially. For example, if we consider the sharing of d = aü acü bc with
sin = 2, we end up with 10 terms (a1, a2, a1c1, a1c2, a2c1, a2c2, b1c1, b1c2, b2c1, b2c2)
in N . Notice that it is possible to reduce the number of output shares using a
careful selection of a linear layer L as shown in Equation (9) while satisfying the
non-completeness property.
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d1 = a1 ü a1c1 ü b1c1,
d2 = a1c2 ü b1c2,
d3 = a2 ü a2c1 ü b2c1,
d4 = a2c2 ü b2c2.
(9)
The number of output shares of L also changes significantly depending on the
function itself in addition to the number of input shares. To clarify, let us consider
the sharing of d = aü acü bcü ab which di ers from the prior unshared function
in the additional term ab. The terms (a1b1, a1b2, a2b1, a2b2) should be added
to Equation (9) for a correct implementation. Even if we place the additional
terms a1b1 and a2b2 to the first and the last component functions in Equation (9)
respectively, the remainding terms a1b2 and a2b1 can not be placed in these four
component functions without breaking the non-completeness property. Hence, we
need to increase the number of shares. One option to obtain non-completeness is
increasing the number of output shares of L as shown in the equation below.
d1 = a1 ü a1c1 ü b1c1 ü a1b1,
d2 = a1c2 ü b1c2,
d3 = a2 ü a2c1 ü b2c1,
d4 = a2c2 ü b2c2 ü a2b2,
d5 = a1b2,
d6 = a2b1.
(10)
Construction of R and C. It is clear that if n ◊ sin < m ◊ sout, the output
sharing can not be uniform. Even if n ◊ sin Ø m ◊ sout the uniformity is not
guaranteed. The output sharing described in Equations (8), (9) and (10) are such
non-uniform examples which require refreshing (R layer). An alternative approach
for the first-order case only is to decrease the number of shares in order to achieve
uniformity after storing the output of the mentioned sharings in registers (prior
to the C layer). To exemplify, consider the following sharing of d = abü c with 2
input shares of each variable.
d1 = a1b1 ü c1, d2 = a1b2, d3 = a2b1 ü c2, d4 = a2b2. (11)
The sharing d is a nonuniform 4-sharing. However, the 2-sharing e generated by
e1 = d1 ü d2 and e2 = d3 ü d4 is uniform. Moreover, if the sharing d is stored
in registers before decreasing the number of shares, as implied by the registers
between the R and C layers in the generalized construction, any glitch during the
calculation of ei does not reveal information about the input values. Note that
the selection of the xored terms is not random at all and must be performed with
extreme care. A bad choice for a compression layer would be e1 = d1 ü d3 and
e2 = d2 ü d4, since e2 = (a1 ü a2)b2 = ab2 obviously reveals information on a.
Security argument of the improved bound on the number of shares. It is
noteworthy that the security of the improved scheme is not proven using indices as
for the generalized scheme described in Section 3.4. Instead, since we assume that
each input sharing is independent of the others, we ensure that any combination of
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d probes miss at least one share of each input variable. Therefore d+1 input shares
are su cient in order to provide non-completeness in N hence independence of the
output shares from each unmasked input. As discussed above the requirements that
should be satisfied by the L and C layers in order to provide the claimed security
highly depends on the function. Therefore, we avoid to give a generic construction
besides imposing dth-order non-completeness in L and extreme care not to unmask
in C. The extension to higher orders is straightforward under given exceptions.
Application to 4-bit quadratic permutations. In order to increase the usability of
this technique, we provide a possible sharing S secure against 2-probing adversary for
one permutation S from each 4-bit quadratic a ne equivalence class of permutation
in Section 7. Any other permutation SÕ that is a ne equivalent to S can be
calculated by SÕ = A ¶ S ¶B where A and B refer to a ne transformations which
can be shared as described in Section 2. Note that there exist 6 such quadratic
classes which can be used to generate half of the 4-bit cubic permutations as
described in [BNN+15]. This set of permutations covers a significant part of all
4◊ 4 S-boxes.
Connections with software ISW. In [RP10], a fast masked AES at any order is
given. The authors improve the security guarantees with respect to the number
of shares from s = 2d+ 1 to s = d+ 1. This improvement actually resembles to
the contribution of this section. The improvement was later shown to be slightly
flawed by [CPRR13]. However, we observe here that the refreshing from [RP10] is
not exactly the same as the layer R presented in Section 3.3 (operating in GF(28)).
Namely, the refreshing from [RP10] uses 1 unit of randomness (elements in GF(28))
less than R. Using a refreshing that mimics the layer R makes the second-order
flaw disappear [BBD+15].
5.2 Resistance against distance leakage
There are many applications of the ISW scheme for masked software
implementations [RP10], [GLSV14]. In the case of AES, there is a significant
performance gain if the ISW operates in GF(28), due to the algebraic structure of
the AES Sbox. A common problem with ISW-based software implementations is
the mismatch between the probing model in which ISW is proven secure and the
leakage behavior of the device that runs the implementation. For instance, typical
processors can be approximately modeled by a distance-based leakage behavior
(Hamming distance) rather than value-based one (Hamming weight). Thus, a
straightforward implementation of ISW without a careful prior profiling of the
device leakage behavior will likely lead to an insecure implementation. This is
because, even if ISW is secure in weight-based leakage behavior, it is not in a
distance-based one.
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There are already some theoretical solutions for this problem, although they come
with a significant cost [CGP+12], [BGG+14]. We point out here that it is possible
to minimize the exposure to this issue with the same modification performed in
Section 3, i.e. bringing the non-completeness condition.
The generalized scheme (e.g. after the second modification in Figure 7) computes
sequentially each branch (component function) Fi, i = 1, 2, 3 and then performs a
refreshing. This scheme is secure even if during the computation of each branch
Fi the device leaks distances (or a more complex leakage function of several
values). Contrary to the ISW, we do not impose specific constraints on the order of
evaluation of intermediates (within each Fi). This result immediately follows from
non-completeness of each branch Fi. It is required, however, to make sure that
there is no distance leakage between an intermediate appearing in Fi and another
in Fj , for i ”= j. It is noteworthy that the randomness requirement, running time
and memory requirements stay the same as in the original algorithm.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the connections, similitudes and di erences between
several masking schemes, both from theoretical domains and from practitioners
working under real-world constraints. It is remarkable how two substantially
disparate communities arrive to essentially similar designs. This perhaps builds
even more confidence on the underlying techniques.
There are certainly many future avenues of research. For example, it would be
desirable to have explicit and tight bounds on the randomness requirements to
achieve e cient masked implementations.
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7 First-order Masking of Quadratic 4-bit
Permutations with d+ 1 Shares
We use the notation in [BNN+15] in order to represent a class. Namely, Qji
corresponds to a quadratic class of j bits with the class number i where the
classes are order lexicographically from their representatives. Each permutation
S(a, b, c, d) = (x, y, z, t) has 4 input and output bits. The component functions
F,G,H,K outputs x, y, z, t respectively. x (resp. a) is the most significant bit
whereas t (resp. d) is the least significant bit. We only consider first-order security
with 2 input shares. The sharing x of an output variable x refers to its sharing
after N followed by L1. x is in some cases not uniform and requires refreshing if
used as is. We also describe the 2-sharing x¯ with shares x¯i after L2 layer such that
the sharing is uniform.
7.1 Class Q44
S = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 12, 15, 14]
x = F (a, b, c, d) = a
y = G(a, b, c, d) = b
z = H(a, b, c, d) = c
t = K(a, b, c, d) = abü d
x1 = F1(a,b,c,d) = a1
x2 = F2(a,b,c,d) = a2
y1 = G1(a,b,c,d) = b1
y2 = G2(a,b,c,d) = b2
z1 = H1(a,b,c,d) = c1
z2 = H2(a,b,c,d) = c2
t1 = K1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü d1
t2 = K2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2
t3 = K3(a,b,c,d) = a2b1
t4 = K4(a,b,c,d) = a2b2 ü d2
x¯1 = x1
x¯2 = x2
y¯1 = y1
y¯2 = y2
z¯1 = z1
z¯2 = z2
t¯1 = t1 ü t2
t¯2 = t3 ü t4
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7.2 Class Q412
S = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 10, 11]
x = F (a, b, c, d) = a
y = G(a, b, c, d) = acü b
z = H(a, b, c, d) = abü acü c
t = K(a, b, c, d) = d
x1 = F1(a,b,c,d) = a1
x2 = F2(a,b,c,d) = a2
y1 = G1(a,b,c,d) = a1c1 ü b1
y2 = G2(a,b,c,d) = a1c2
y3 = G3(a,b,c,d) = a2c1 ü b2
y4 = G4(a,b,c,d) = a2c2
z1 = H1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü a1c1 ü c1
z2 = H2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2 ü a1c2
z3 = H3(a,b,c,d) = a2b1 ü a2c1
z4 = H4(a,b,c,d) = a2b2 ü a2c2 ü c2
t1 = K1(a,b,c,d) = d1
t2 = K2(a,b,c,d) = d2
x¯1 = x1
x¯2 = x2
y¯1 = y1 ü y2
y¯2 = y3 ü y4
z¯1 = z1 ü z2
z¯2 = z3 ü z4
t¯1 = t1
t¯2 = t2
7.3 Class Q4293
S = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 11, 10]
x = F (a, b, c, d) = a
y = G(a, b, c, d) = acü b
z = H(a, b, c, d) = abü acü c
t = K(a, b, c, d) = bcü d
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x1 = F1(a,b,c,d) = a1
x2 = F2(a,b,c,d) = a2
y1 = G1(a,b,c,d) = a1c1 ü b1
y2 = G2(a,b,c,d) = a1c2
y3 = G3(a,b,c,d) = a2c1 ü b2
y4 = G4(a,b,c,d) = a2c2
z1 = H1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü a1c1 ü c1
z2 = H2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2 ü a1c2
z3 = H3(a,b,c,d) = a2b1 ü a2c1
z4 = H4(a,b,c,d) = a2b2 ü a2c2 ü c2
t1 = K1(a,b,c,d) = b1c1 ü d1
t2 = K2(a,b,c,d) = b1c2
t3 = K3(a,b,c,d) = b2c1 ü d2
t4 = K4(a,b,c,d) = b2c2
x¯1 = x1
x¯2 = x2
y¯1 = y1 ü y2
y¯2 = y3 ü y4
z¯1 = z1 ü z2
z¯2 = z3 ü z4
t¯1 = t1 ü t2
t¯2 = t3 ü t4
7.4 Class Q4294
S = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 11, 10]
x = F (a, b, c, d) = a
y = G(a, b, c, d) = b
z = H(a, b, c, d) = abü c
t = K(a, b, c, d) = acü d
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x1 = F1(a,b,c,d) = a1
x2 = F2(a,b,c,d) = a2
y1 = G1(a,b,c,d) = b1
y2 = G2(a,b,c,d) = b2
z1 = H1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü c1
z2 = H2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2
z3 = H3(a,b,c,d) = a2b1 ü c2
z4 = H4(a,b,c,d) = a2b2
t1 = K1(a,b,c,d) = a1c1 ü d1
t2 = K2(a,b,c,d) = a1c2
t3 = K3(a,b,c,d) = a2c1 ü d2
t4 = K4(a,b,c,d) = a2c2
x¯1 = x1
x¯2 = x2
y¯1 = y1
y¯2 = y2
z¯1 = z1 ü z2
z¯2 = z3 ü z4
t¯1 = t1 ü t2
t¯2 = t3 ü t4
7.5 Class Q4299
S = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 11, 9, 15, 13]
x = F (a, b, c, d) = a
y = G(a, b, c, d) = abü acü b
z = H(a, b, c, d) = abü acü adü c
t = K(a, b, c, d) = abü adü d
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x1 = F1(a,b,c,d) = a1
x2 = F2(a,b,c,d) = a2
y1 = G1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü a1c1 ü b1
y2 = G2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2 ü a1c2
y3 = G3(a,b,c,d) = a2b1 ü a2c1
y4 = G4(a,b,c,d) = a2b2 ü a2c2 ü b2
z1 = H1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü a1c1 ü a1d1 ü c1
z2 = H2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2 ü a1c2 ü a1d2
z3 = H3(a,b,c,d) = a2b1 ü a2c1 ü a2d1
z4 = H4(a,b,c,d) = a2b2 ü a2c2 ü a2c2 ü c2
t1 = K1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü a1d1 ü d1
t2 = K2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2 ü a1d2
t3 = K3(a,b,c,d) = a2b1 ü a2d1
t4 = K4(a,b,c,d) = a2b2 ü a2d2 ü d2
x¯1 = x1
x¯2 = x2
y¯1 = y1 ü y2
y¯2 = y3 ü y4
z¯1 = z1 ü z2
z¯2 = z3 ü z4
t¯1 = t1 ü t2
t¯2 = t3 ü t4
7.6 Class Q4300
S = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, 12, 7, 6, 11, 10, 15, 14]
x = F (a, b, c, d) = acü bcü a
y = G(a, b, c, d) = bcü aü b
z = H(a, b, c, d) = abü bcü c
t = K(a, b, c, d) = aü d
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x1 = F1(a,b,c,d) = a1c1 ü b1c1 ü a1
x2 = F2(a,b,c,d) = a1c2 ü b1c2
x3 = F3(a,b,c,d) = a2c1 ü b2c1 ü a2
x4 = F4(a,b,c,d) = a2c2 ü b2c2
y1 = G1(a,b,c,d) = b1c1 ü a1 ü b1
y2 = G2(a,b,c,d) = b1c2
y3 = G3(a,b,c,d) = b2c1
y4 = G4(a,b,c,d) = b2c2 ü a2 ü b2
z1 = H1(a,b,c,d) = a1b1 ü b1c1 ü c1
z2 = H2(a,b,c,d) = a1b2
z3 = H3(a,b,c,d) = b2c1
z4 = H4(a,b,c,d) = a2b1
z5 = H5(a,b,c,d) = b2c1
z6 = H6(a,b,c,d) = a2b2 ü b2c2 ü c2
t1 = K1(a,b,c,d) = a1 ü d1
t2 = K2(a,b,c,d) = a2 ü d2
x¯1 = x1 ü x2
x¯2 = x3 ü x4
y¯1 = y1 ü y2
y¯2 = y3 ü y4
z¯1 = z1 ü z2 ü z3
z¯2 = z4 ü z5 ü z6
t¯1 = t1
t¯2 = t2
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Abstract. Masking is a popular countermeasure to thwart side-
channel attacks on embedded systems. Many proposed masking
schemes, even carrying “security proofs”, are eventually broken
because they are flawed by design. The security validation process
is nowadays a lengthy, tedious and manual process. In this paper,
we report on a method to verify the soundness of a masking scheme
before implementing it on a device. We show that by instrumenting
a high-level implementation of the masking scheme and by applying
leakage detection techniques, a system designer can quickly assess
at design time whether the masking scheme is flawed or not, and to
what extent. Our method requires not more than working high-level
source code and is based on simulation. Thus, our method can be used
already in the very early stages of design. We validate our approach
by spotting in an automated fashion first-, second- and third-order
flaws in recently published state-of-the-art schemes in a matter of
seconds with limited computational resources. We also present a new
second-order flaw on a table recomputation scheme, and show that the
approach is useful when designing a hardware masked implementation.
1 Introduction
Since Kocher published the seminal paper on side-channel attacks [Koc96],
cryptographic embedded systems have been broken using some auxiliary timing
information [Koc96], the instantaneous power consumption of the device [KJJ99]
or the EM radiation [AARR02], among others. An attack technique of particular
interest, due to its inherent simplicity, robustness and e ciency to recover secrets
(such as cryptographic keys or passwords) on embedded devices is Di erential
Power Analysis (DPA), introduced in [KJJ99]. DPA relies on the fact that
the instantaneous power consumption of a device running a cryptographic
implementation is somehow dependent on the intermediate values occurring during
the execution of the implementation. An especially popular countermeasure to
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thwart power analysis attacks, including DPA, is masking [CJRR99,GP99]. Masking
works by splitting every sensitive variable appearing during the computation of a
cryptographic primitive into several shares, so that any proper subset of shares is
independent of any sensitive variable. This, in turn, implies that the instantaneous
power consumption of the device is independent of any sensitive variable, and thus
vanilla DPA cannot be mounted. In theory, a (d+1)-order DPA attack can still be
mounted against a d-th order masked implementation; however, in practice higher
order DPA attacks are exponentially more di cult to carry out [CJRR99].
Crucially, in many cases the attacker is not required to perform a higher order
attack because the masking is imperfect and thus does not provide the claimed
security guarantees. The causes of the imperfections can be manifold: from
implementation mistakes to more fundamental flaws stemming from the masking
scheme itself. There are many examples in the literature of such flawed schemes: a
“provably secure” scheme published in 2006 [PGA06] based on FFT and broken
two years later [CGPR08], a scheme published in 2006 [SP06] and broken one
year later [CPR07], another “provably secure” scheme published in 2010 [RP10]
and (academically) broken three years later [CPRR13]; a scheme published in
2012 [BFGV12] and broken in 2014 [PRR14].
The verification process of a masking scheme is nowadays a very lengthy manual
task, and the findings are published in solid papers involving convoluted probability
arguments at leading venues, some years later after the scheme is published. Some
even won a best paper award as [CPR07]. From the stand point of a system
designer, it is often not acceptable to wait for a public scrutiny of the scheme or
invest resources in a lengthy, expensive, evaluation.
Our contribution. In this paper we provide an automated method to test whether
the masking scheme is sound or not, and to what extent. The method is conceptually
very simple, yet powerful and practically relevant. We give experimental evidence
that the technique works by reproducing state-of-the-art first-, second- and third-
order flaws of masking schemes with very limited computational resources. Our
approach is fundamentally di erent from previously proposed methodologies and is
based on sampling and leakage detection techniques.
2 Leakage detection for masked schemes in simula-
tion
Core idea. In a nutshell, our approach to detect flawed masking schemes is to
simulate power consumption traces from a high-level implementation of the masking
scheme and then perform leakage detection tests on the simulated traces to verify
the first- and higher-order security claims of the masking scheme.
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Input and output of the tool. The practitioner only ought to provide working
source code of the masked implementation. The tool instruments the code, performs
leakage detection tests and outputs whether the scheme meets its security goals or
not. In addition, should a problem be detected, the tool pinpoints the variables
causing the flaw and quantifies the magnitude of the statistical bias.
Security claims of masking schemes. We use in this paper the conventional
notions for expressing the security claim of a masking scheme. Namely, a masking
scheme provides first-order security if the expected value of each single intermediate
does not depend on the key. More generally, a masking scheme provides k-order
security if the k-th order statistical moment of any combination of k intermediates
does not depend on the key. This formulation is convenient since leakage detection
tests are designed specifically to test these claims.
Three steps. Our tool has three main ingredients: trace generation, trace pre-
processing and leakage detection. We describe each one in detail in the sequel.
2.1 Trace generation
The first step of our approach is to generate simulated power traces in a noise-free
environment.
Implementation. To accomplish this, the masking scheme is typically imple-
mented in a high-level software language. The implementation is meant to
generically reproduce the intermediate values present in the masking scheme,
and can be typically written from the pseudo-code description of the masking
scheme. (Alternatively, the description of the masking scheme can be tailored to a
specific software or hardware implementation and incorporate details from those.)
Execution. This implementation is executed many times, and during each
execution, the instrumentation environment observes each variable V that the
implementation handles at time n. At the end of each execution, the environment
emits a leakage trace c[n]. Each time sample n within this trace consists of leakage
L(V ) of the variable V handled at time n. The leakage function L is predefined;
typical instantiations are the Hamming weight, the least significant bit, the so-called
zero-value model or the identity function.
Randomness. The high-level implementation may consume random numbers (for
example, for remasking.) This randomness is provided by a PRNG.
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2.2 Trace pre-processing
This step is only executed if the masking scheme claims higher-order security. The
approach is similar to higher-order DPA attacks [CJRR99] and higher-order leakage
detection [SM15]. Suppose the scheme claims security at order k. We pre-processes
each simulated trace c[n] to yield cÕ[n1, . . . , nk] through a combination function as
cÕ[n1, . . . , nk] =
i=kŸ
i=1
(c[ni]≠ c¯[ni]). (1)
The result is a preprocessed trace cÕ. The length of the trace is expanded from N to!N
k
"
unique time samples. (It is normally convenient to treat cÕ as a uni-dimensional
trace.)
2.3 Leakage detection
The next step of our approach is to perform a leakage detection test on the
(potentially pre-processed) simulated traces. In its simplest form, a leakage
detection test [CKN00, CNK04, GJJR11, CDG+13, SM15] tries to locate and
potentially quantify information leakage within power traces, by detecting statistical
dependencies between sensitive data and power consumption. In our context, if
the test detects information leakage on the simulated traces, this means that the
masking scheme fails to provide the promised security guarantees.
Procedure. The instrumentation environment performs a fixed-vs-fixed leakage
detection test using the T-test distinguisher [CDG+13].
The process begins by simulating a set of power traces with fixed unmasked
intermediate z = z0 and another set of traces with di erent unmasked intermediate
value z = z1. Typical choices for the intermediate z are the full unmasked state or
parts of it. Then, a statistical hypothesis test (in this case, T-test) is performed per
time sample for the equality of means. The T-test [Stu08,Wel47] first computes
the following statistic
t[n] = m0[n]≠m1[n]Ò
s20[n]
N0
+ s
2
1[n]
N1
(2)
where mi[n], s2i [n], Ni are respectively the sample mean, variance and number
of traces of population i œ {0, 1} and n is the time index. This statistic t[n]
is compared against a predefined threshold C. A common choice is C = ±4.5,
corresponding to a very high statistical significance level of – = 0.001. If the
statistic t[n] surpasses the threshold C, the test determines that the means of the
two distributions are significantly di erent, and thus the mean power consumption
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of (potentially pre-processed) simulated power traces carry information on the
intermediate z. In this case, we say that the masking scheme exhibits leakage at
time sample n and flunks the test. Otherwise, if no leakage is detected, another
test run is executed with di erent specific values for z0 and z1. The test is passed
only if no leakage is detected for any value of z0 and z1. (Typically, there are only a
couple dozen of (z0, z1) pairs if the optimizations described in the next section are
applied.) Note that a time sample n may correspond to a single variable (first-order
leakage) or a combination of variables (higher-order leakage), if a pre-processing
step is executed.
On fixed-vs-fixed. Using fixed-vs-fixed instead of fixed-vs-random has the
advantage of faster convergence of the statistic (at the expense of leakage behavior
assumptions that are benign in our context). (This has been previously observed
by Durvaux and Standaert [DS16] in a slightly di erent context.) One could also
use a fix-vs-random test. This usually results in a more generic evaluation.
2.4 Optimizations
We note that the following “engineering” optimizations allow to lower the
computational complexity so that it is becomes very fast to test relevant masking
schemes.
Online algorithms. There is certainly no need to keep in memory the complete
set of simulated power traces. For the computation of the T-test as Eq. 2, one
can use online formulas to compute means and variances present in the formula.
These algorithms traverse only once through each trace, so that a simulated power
consumption trace can be generated, processed and thrown away. This makes the
memory consumption of the approach independent of the number of traces used.
More number of traces would require just more computational time, but not more
memory. We note that the same is possible in higher-order scenarios. Lengthy
but straightforward calculations show that a T-test on pre-processed traces can
be computed online using well-known online formulae for (mixed) higher-order
moments [P0´8]. (This was previously reported by Schneider and Moradi [SM15].)
Scale down the masking scheme. It is usually possible to extrapolate the masking
scheme to analogous, trimmed down, cryptographic operations that work with
smaller bit-widths or smaller finite fields. For example, when masking the AES
sbox, many masking schemes [RP10,CPRR13] rely on masked arithmetic (masked
multiplication and addition blocks) in GF(28) to carry out the inversion in GF(28).
It is often convenient to scale down the circuit to work on, say, GF(24) for testing
purposes –since the masking approach normally does not rely on the specific choice
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of field size, any flaw exhibited in the smaller GF(24) version is likely to be exhibited
in the GF(28) version of the algorithm (and vice versa). By experience we have
observed that statistical biases tend to be more pronounced in smaller field sizes,
and thus are more easily detectable. (See for instance [PRR14].) We suggest the
use of this heuristic whenever possible for an early alert of potential problems.
Reduce the number of rounds. There is little sense to check for a first-order
leak in more than a single round of an iterative cryptographic primitive, such as
AES. If the implementation is iterative, any first-order flaw is likely to show up in
all rounds. When testing for higher order security, however, one should take into
account that the flaw may appear from the combination of variables belonging to
di erent rounds.
Judiciously select the components to check. For first-order security it is
su cient to check each component of the masking scheme one by one in isolation.
The situation is slightly di erent in the multivariate scenario, where multiple
components can interfere in a way that degrades security. Still, the practitioner
can apply some heuristics to accelerate the search, such as testing for second-order
leakage first only in contiguous components. For example, second-order leakage is
likely to appear earlier between two variables within the same round or belonging
to two consecutive rounds.
Deactivate portions of the plaintext. To accelerate the leakage search, a
substantial portion of the plaintext can be deactivated, that is, fixed to a constant
value or even directly taken out from the algorithm. For example, in the case of
AES-128 one could deactivate 3 columns of the state, test only 4 active plaintext
bytes and still test for the security of all the components within one round.
Carefully fix the secret intermediate values. As we described, the framework
fixes two values z0, z1 for the unmasked sensitive intermediate, and then compares
the simulated traces distributions conditioned on z0 and z1. Depending on the
algorithm, concrete choices for zi (such as fixed points of the function being masked)
can produce “special” leakage. For example, in AES if we choose z1 such that the
input to the inversion is 0x00, we can hit faster zero-value type flaws.
3 Results
In this section we provide experimental results. We first begin by testing the
first-order security claim of two schemes, one that fails the claim (Section 3.1) and
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another that fulfills it (Section 3.2). Then we will focus on second- and third- order
claims (Section 3.3 and 3.4 respectively). We point out a new second-order flaw
in Section 3.5, we elaborate on how previously published flaws were discovered in
Section 3.6. Finally in Section 3.7 we report on the use of the tool when designing
masked circuits.
3.1 Smoke test: reproducing a first-order flaw
As a first test, we test the first-order security of the scheme published in [BFGV12].
We will refer to this scheme as IP in the sequel. We focus on reproducing the
results from [PRR14],
Test fixture. We study first the IPRefresh procedure. This procedure performs
a refreshing operation on the input IP shares. We scale down the scheme to
work in GF(22) following Section 2.4. The instrumentation framework finds 141
intermediate variables within a single execution of IPRefresh. The chosen leakage
function is Hamming weight, and there is no pre-processing involved.
Leakage detection. We ran the
!4
2
"
= 6 possible fixed-vs-fixed tests covering all
possible combinations of pairs of di erent unshared input values (z1, z0). (Here zi
is the input to IPRefresh.) For each test, the maximum absolute t-value, across
all time samples, is plotted in the y-axis of Fig. 1 as a function of the number of
192 DETECTING FLAWED MASKING SCHEMES WITH LEAKAGE DETECTION TESTS
simulated traces (x-axis). A threshold for the T-test at 4.5 is also plotted as a
dotted line. This threshold divides the graph into two regions: a t-statistic greater
than |C| = 4.5 (in red) means that the implementation fails the test, while a
t-statistic below 4.5 (area in green) does not provide enough evidence to reject the
hypothesis that the scheme is secure. We can see that 5 out of 6 tests clearly fail in
Fig. 1, since they attain t-values around 100 greater than C. Thus, the IPRefresh
block is deemed insecure. (Similar observations apply to the IPAdd procedure.)
It is also possible to appreciate the nature of the T-test statistic: the t-statistic
grows with the number of traces N as of
Ô
N in the cases that the implementation
fails the test (note that the y-axis is in logarithmic scale.) This can be interpreted
as follows: as we have more measurements, we build more confidence to reject the
null hypothesis (in our context being that the masking is e ective.) If the number
of simulated traces is large enough and no significant t-value has been observed,
the practitioner can gain confidence on the scheme not being flawed. We will find
this situation in the next subsection and elaborate on this point.
3.2 A first-order secure implementation
We tested the table recomputation scheme of Coron [Cor14]. This scheme passes
all fixed-vs-fixed tests with the identity leakage model. The results are plotted in
Figure 2. We can observe that the t-statistic never crosses the threshold of 4.5 for
any test, and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the implementation is
secure (i.e., the implementation is deemed secure, “on the strength of the evidence
presented” [CKN00].) Although it is theoretically possible that the masking scheme
exhibits a small bias that would only be detectable when using more than 106
traces, that flaw would be negligible from a practical point of view when using
Æ 106 traces, and definitely impossible to exploit in a noisy environment if it is not
even detectable at a given trace count, in a noiseless scenario.
3.3 Reproducing a second-order flaw
To show that our proposed tool can also detect higher-order flaws, we implemented
the scheme of Rivain and Prou  (RP) from [RP10]. For the allegedly second-order
secure version of this scheme, there is a second-order flaw as spotted by Coron et.
al. in [CPRR13] between two building blocks: MaskRefresh and SecMult. We will
see that we can easily spot this flaw with the methodology proposed in this paper.
Text fixture. We implemented the second-order masked inversion x ‘æ x≠1 in
GF(2n) as per [RP10] with n = 3. This inversion uses the MaskRefresh and
SecMult procedures. In this case, we enable second-order pre-processing (on the
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70 void MaskRefresh(u8 *s) {
71 u8 r;
72 for (int i = 1; i < number_shares; i++) {
73 r = rnd ();
74 s[0] ^= r;
75 s[i] ^= r;
76 }
77 }
...
110 void SecMult (u8 *out, u8 *a, u8 *b) {
111 u8 aibj,ajbi;
...
114 for (int i = 0; i < number_shares; i++) {
115 for (int j = i + 1; j < number_shares; j++) {
...
119 aibj = mult(a[i], b[j]);
120 ajbi = mult(a[j], b[i]);
___________________________________________________
$ ./run
entering fixed_vs_fixed(00,01)
> leakage detected with 1.20k traces
higher order leakage between
line 74 and
line 120
with tvalue of -7.03
Figure 3 – Excerpts of the code and output of the leakage detection
for the RP scheme.
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r
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Figure 4 – Two MaskRefresh concatenated. As explained in the
text, the second refresh can be optimized to reduce the randomness
requirements yet still achieving second order security.
fly), expanding 135 time samples to
!135
2
"
= 9045 time samples. Some excerpts of
the implementation are shown in Fig. 3, top.
Results. The instrumentation frameworks takes less than 5 seconds to determine
that there is a second order leakage between the variable handled at line 74 (inside
MaskRefresh) and 120 (inside SecMult), as Fig. 3, bottom, shows. Note that it is
trivial to backtrack to which variables corresponds a leaking time sample, and thus
determine the exact lines that leak jointly.
Fixing the second-order flaw. The folklore solution to fix the previous second-
order flaw is to substitute each MaskRefresh module by two consecutive
MaskRefresh invocations, as shown in Fig. 4. Applying the leakage detection
tests to this new construction shows that the leak is e ectively gone. However, it is
quite reasonable to suspect that this solution is not optimal in terms of randomness
requirements. We can progressively strip down this design by eliminating some
of the randomness of the second refreshing and check if the design is still secure.
We verified in this very simple test fixture that if we omit the last randomness
call (that is, we only keep the dotted red box instead of the second dashed box in
Fig. 4), the higher-order leaks are no longer present.
3.4 Reproducing a third order flaw
Schramm and Paar published at CT-RSA 2006 [SP06] a masked table lookup
method for Boolean masking claiming higher-order security. This countermeasure
was found to be flawed by Coron et al. at CHES 2007. Coron et al. found a
third-order flaw irrespective of the security parameter of the original scheme. We
reproduced their results by setting k = 3 when preprocessing the traces as in Eq. 1.
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The flaw of [CPR07] was detected in less than one second, which demonstrates that
the tool is also useful to test the higher-order security claims of masking schemes.
3.5 Schramm–Paar second-order leak
Here we report on a new second-order flaw that we found with the presented tool
in the masked table recomputation method of Schramm and Paar when used with
unbalanced sboxes.
Schramm–Paar method. The goal of the masked table recomputation is to
determine the sbox output shares N0, N1, . . . , Nd from the sbox input shares
M0,M1, . . . ,Md. Schramm–Paar proceed as follows (we borrow the notation
from [CPR07]):
1. Draw d output shares N1, . . . , Nd at random.
2. Compute from N1, . . . , Nd a table Sú such that
Sú(x) = S
A
xü
dn
i=1
Mi
B
ü
dn
i=1
Ni (3)
3. Set N0 := Sú(M0)
We set here d = 2, and aim at second-order security. An important part of the
procedure is to build the table Sú in a way that the higher-order security claims
are fulfilled. [SP06] proposes several methods. However, for the purposes of this
paper the details of the recomputation method are not important.
Test fixture. Following the guidelines of Section 2.4, we implement a very stripped
down version of the table recomputation method. We fix the simplest unbalanced
sbox S = (0, 0, 0, 1) (an AND gate), and work with 2-bit inputs and outputs leaking
Hamming weights. In a couple of seconds the tool outputs 4 di erent bivariate
second-order leakages, corresponding to the pairs (Sú(i), N0) for each i in the
domain of Sú. Here Sú(i) is the i-th entry on the Sú table, and N0 is one output
mask.
Once these leaks are located, proving them becomes an easy task. And also it
becomes easy to generalize and see that the flaw appears whenever S is unbalanced.
(We verified that second-order attacks using the leakage of Sú(0) and N work as
expected.)
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3.6 Higher-order threshold implementations
Here we report on how the observations from [RBN+15] regarding the security of
higher-order threshold implementations [BGN+14] were found. The results of this
section are obviously not new; the focus here is on the methodology carried out to
find those.
Intuition. The first suspicion stems from the fact that higher-order threshold
implementations originally claimed that the composition of sharings provides higher-
order security, if the sharings satisfy some property, namely uniformity. This is
a very surprising result, since it would imply that there is no need to inject fresh
randomness during the computation, minimizing overheads. In contrast, all other
previously published higher-order masking schemes need to inject randomness from
time to time as the computation progresses. For example, the security proof of
private circuits (one of the earliest masking schemes) [ISW03] critically relies on
the fresh randomness to provide security.
Test fixture. The hypothesis is that the previous security claim does not hold,
that is, the concatenation of uniform sharings do not provide higher-order security.
To test this, we design a minimal working test fixture consisting of a 32-round
Feistel cipher with a blocksize of 4 bits. For more details see [RBN+15]. The shared
version aims at providing second-order security, and shares each native bit into 5
shares. The traces consist of 225 “timesamples” (each one comprising one leaked
bit, including initialization.) This spans to 25650 timesamples after second-order
pre-processing.
Cranking it up. We run the simulation for a night (about 8 hours), having
simulated 200 million traces. We performed a fixed-vs-fixed test with unshared
initial state 0000 and 1111. (There is no key in this cipher, the initial state is
considered to be the secret.) (This is grossly unoptimized code.) The results of
the leakage detection test is drawn in Figure 5. We plot on the x- and y-axes the
round index, and each pixel in red if the t statistic surpasses the value 80, green
otherwise. We can see that many pairs of rounds leak jointly, in contradiction with
the security claims of the scheme. In Figure 6 the same information is plotted but
changing the threshold to |t| > 5. We can see, surprisingly, that almost all pairs of
rounds lead to second-order leakage. A bit of manual mechanical e ort is required
to prove this, but not more than taking a covariance.
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Figure 5 – Pairs of rounds
with |t| > 80
Figure 6 – Pairs of rounds
with |t| > 5
3.7 Refreshing in higher-order threshold AES sbox
The designers from [CBR+15] had access to the tool presented in this paper. They
performed several design iterations, and verified the design on each iteration. The
final evaluation was performed on an FPGA.
Text fixture. We implemented the whole sbox, with no downscaling of the
components to work in smaller fields. We leak register bits and the input value
(identity leakage function) to combinatorial logic blocks. (This is to account for
glitches as will be explained below.)
First-order leaks. Within one day, a first-order leak was identified due to a design
mistake. This design error considered the concatenation of two values a||b as input
to the next stage; each value a and b considered independently is a uniform sharing
but its concatenation a||b is not, and hence the first order leak. This first-order
leak disappears if a refresh is applied to the inputs of one GF(22) multiplier using 4
units of randomness (here 1 unit = 1 random field element = 2 bits). This refresh
block is similar to the 2010 Rivain–Prou  refresh block [RP10], we remind it uses
n≠ 1 units of randomness to refresh n shares (in our particular case here n = 5).
We will see later that this refresh is problematic in the higher-order setting.
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Figure 7 – Higher-order masked AES sbox from de Cnudde et al.
Second-order leaks. Subsequently, two second-order bivariate leaks were identi-
fied between register values. This was solved by placing a refresh block between
stage 2 and 3 from Figure 7 (taken from [CBR+15]).
In addition, many second-order bivariate leaks were identified between input values
to combinatorial logic blocks. In theory, hardware glitches could express these
leakages. Those disappear if one uses a “full refresh” using 5 units of randomness.
This e ect was previously observed [BBD+15, RBN+15] and is a reminiscent
of [CPRR13].
Other uses. We also used a preliminary version of this tool in [RRVV15].
4 Discussion
4.1 Implementing the framework
We implemented the instrumentation framework on top of clang-LLVM. The whole
implementation (including leakage detection code) takes around 700 lines of C++
code, which shows the inherent simplicity of our approach. It is easy to audit and
maintain.
4.2 Time to discover flaw, computational complexity and
scaling.
The computational requirements of the proposed approach are very low. In Fig. 8
we write the elapsed execution times required to spot the flaws from Sections 3.1,
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3.3 and 3.4. We can see that the flaws were identified in a matter of seconds on
a standard computer. All the experiments on this paper were carried out on a
modest 1.6 GHz laptop with 2 GB of RAM.
Bottlenecks. The main bottleneck on the running time of the methodology is
the first step: trace generation. The RP scheme is the one that took longer to
detect the flaw (5 seconds), presumably because of two reasons: a) the scheme
is more inherently complex and thus it takes more time to simulate each trace
and b) the bias exhibited in the scheme is smaller than the bias of other schemes,
and thus more traces are required to detect such a bias. We note that no special
e ort on optimizing the implementations was made, yet, an average throughput of
5k trace per second (including instrumentation) was achieved. The overhead of
instrumentation in the running time was estimated to make the implementation
on average ¥ ◊1.6 slower.
Time to pass. The time it takes to discover a flaw is normally less than the time
it takes to deem a masking scheme secure. For example, to assess that the patch
of Section 3.3 is indeed correct, it took about 6 minutes to perform a fix-vs-fix test
with up to 1 million traces (no leakage was detected). All possible 6 tests take
around 37 minutes. (The threshold of 1 million traces was chosen arbitrarily in
this example.)
Parallelization. We remark that this methodology is embarrassing parallel. Thus,
it is much easier to parallelize to several cores or machines than other approaches
based on SAT.
Memory. The memory requirements for this method are also negligible, taking
less than 4.5 MB of RAM on average. More interestingly, memory requirements
are constant and do not increase with the number of simulated traces, thanks to
online algorithms.
Scaling. The execution time of our approach scales linearly with the number of
intermediates when testing for first-order leakage, quadratically when testing for
second-order leakage and so on. This scaling property is exactly the same as for
DPA attacks. We could benefit from performance improvements that are typically
used to mitigate scaling issues in DPA attacks such as trace compression, but did
not implemented those yet.
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Scheme Flaw order Field size Time Traces needed
IP 1 4 0.04s 1k
RP 2 4 5s 14k
SP 3 4 0.2s 2k
Figure 8 – Running time to discover flaw in the studied schemes,
and number of traces needed to detect the bias.
4.3 Limitations
Risk of false negatives. Our tool should not be taken as the only test when
assessing a masked implementation, and is not meant to substitute practical
evaluation with actual measurements. Our tool provides an early warning that the
masking scheme may be structurally flawed, “by design”. However, even when the
masking scheme is theoretically secure, it is still possible to implement it in an
insecure way. This will not be detected with the proposed tool. For example, in
the case of a first-order masked software implementation, an unfortunate choice of
register allocation may cause distance leakage between shares, leading to first-order
leakage. Without register allocation information, our tool will not detect this issue.
One could provide this kind of extra information to our tool. We left this as future
work.
4.4 Related works
There are already some publications that address the problem of automatic
verification of power analysis countermeasure.
SAT-based. Sleuth [BRNI13] is a SAT-based methodology that outputs a hard
yes/no answer to the question of whether the countermeasures are e ective or
not. A limitation of [BRNI13] is that it does not attempt to quantify the degree
of (in)security. A first approximation to the problem was tackled in [EWTS14,
ABMP13].
MiniCrypt-based. Barthe et al. [BBD+15] use program verification techniques to
build a method prints a proof of security for a given masking scheme. It is very
hard to compare our tool with theirs since they are fundamentally di erent. The
goal is also di erent: while our results are probabilistic, the goal of Barth et al. is to
categorically prove the security of the scheme. Depending on the context, one might
be preferrable over the other. The two approaches are also very di erent. Barthe
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et al. base their approach on EasyCrypt, a sophisticated “toolset for reasoning
about relational properties of probabilistic computations with adversarial code.”
Considerations related to other approaches. While our approach does certainly
not carry the beauty of proofs and formal methods, it o ers a very practice-oriented
methodology to test the soundness of masking schemes. Our approach is in nature
statistical, and is a necessary condition for a masked scheme to be sound. It can be
thought of a worst-case scenario, where the adversary has access to noiseless and
sychronized traces. A more formal study can then be performed with the methods
of Barthe et al. to gain higher confidence, since the output of the tool of Barthe et
al. is a hard proof.
4.5 Which leakage function to select?
In previous Section 2 we mentioned that the practitioner has to choose a leakage
function to generate the simulated traces. It turns out that the specific choice of
leakage function seems not to be crucial —any reasonable choice will work. Figure 9
compares di erent leakage functions: Hamming weight, identity, least-significant bit
and zero-value. The test fixture is the same one as in Section 3.1. For each leakage
function, we performed all possible fixed-vs-fixed tests. Figure 9 is composed of 4
plots, one per leakage function. We can see that for any leakage function, there is
at least one fixed-vs-fixed test that fails. For the identity leakage function, all tests
fail. Thus, it is often convenient to use it to detect flaws faster (more fixed-vs-fixed
tests fail.) We speculate that this behavior may depend on the concrete masking
method used, and leave a detailed study as future work.
Glitches and identity leakage. We note that we can include the e ect of hardware
glitches in our tool. Note that the information leaked by a combinatorial logic
block F on input x due to glitches is contained already in the input x. Thus, we
can simulate the information leaked by hardware glitches, even if we do not have
a precise timing model of the logic function, by leaking the whole input value x
(that is, using the identity leakage model.)
This would correspond to an extremely glitchy implementation of F where glitches
would allow to observe the complete input. This is certainly a worst-case scenario.
Crucially, glitches would not reveal more information than x. This trick of using the
identity leakage model on inputs of combinatorial blocks is helpful when evaluating,
for example, masked threshold implementations.
Another alternate approach is to add a detailed gate-level timing model to simulate
glitches. If such timing model is available, the detection quality can be substantially
enhanced.
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Figure 9 – Influence of leakage function.
5 Conclusion
We described a methodology to test in an automated way the soundness of a
masking scheme. Our methodology enjoys several attractive properties: simplicity,
speed and scalability. Our methodology is based on established and well-understood
tools (leakage detection). We demonstrated the usefulness of the tool by detecting
state-of-the-art flaws of modern masking designs in a matter of seconds with modest
computational resources. In addition, we showed how the tool can assist the design
process of masked implementations.
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